The standard political/signaling rationale holds here. As CRS put it:

“…reducing or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe…could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO’s intentions to address Russia’s perception of the threat from NATO. This, in turn, might encourage Russia to accept negotiated limits or transparency measures on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some also believe that a NATO ‘step away’ from these weapons would encourage Russia to reduce its reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”

This rationale is typically paired with the “Euro tacnukes not needed for deterrence” observation. Again, CRS:

“…another recent review of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise found that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), which was once the ‘principle advocate for nuclear weapons in Europe,’ no longer advocates for these weapons and no longer recognizes a political role for these weapons in NATO. According to this study, officials at USEUCOM have argued that an ‘over-the-horizon’ capability, weapons deployed outside of Europe, could be just as credible as a deterrent to attack on NATO.”

These propositions are debatable, as Kirk indicated above, and many people share your skepticism.