Long Range Strike (aka Next Generation Bomber)

For FY 2011, the Air Force requested $199 million in research and development (R&D) funding to develop a “Long Range Strike capability in support of Air Force Global Strike and Global Persistent Attack Concept of Operations.” In FY 2011, the money will go toward supporting the industrial base, program planning, and requirements review and definition. What the hell does that mean?

The Pentagon is paying for a study, basically. As Undersecretary for Policy Michele Flournoy remarked on February 1:

One of the insights that came out of this QDR was that we needed to take a much more in-depth look at the full range of capabilities for long-range ISR and precision-strike, and the whole question of a follow-on strategic bomber. And so one of the things we decided in the QDR is that we weren't ready to make definitive long-term programmatic decisions; that we wanted to make some investments that would keep technological opportunities going, but we wanted to take some time to get this right and to study it in much more depth.

A so-called “tiger team” did study long range strike as part of the 2010 QDR. Sticking to his script, Sen. John Thune (R-SD) asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates February 2 (check minute 103) why it was necessary to study it yet again. “I think what the studies up to now have been is whether, and now the study is what,” Gates said in response. He added, “We’re talking about a bomber that would probably not appear into the force until the late ‘20s.”

Some murky indication has been given about what the “what” is going to be for long range strike:

--The 2010 QDR said the new study will examine “what combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades.” The QDR also mentioned the capacity of Virginia-class submarines for long range strike; naval unmanned combat aerial systems; a new joint Air Force-Navy cruise missile; and conventional prompt global strike prototypes.

--The FY 2011 Air Force budget documents stated, “capability areas of interest include advanced sensors, electronic warfare and countermeasures, survivability, manufacturing readiness, ‘net ready’ and communications, open systems architectures and multi-level security, missions management, weapons and combat ID.”

--The new 30-year aircraft investment plan said, “A study is underway to identify the right mix of manned and unmanned technologies that will provide future long-range strike capabilities and to determine the right balance between range, payload, speed, stealth, and onboard sensors. A product of that study will be the identification of a replacement aircraft for the aging aircraft in the legacy bomber fleet and the timing and funding profile required to support this aircraft.”

--At its budget rollout February 1, Air Force Deputy for Budget Marilyn Thomas said the $199 million in FY 2011 long rang strike funding is “primarily in the areas of [low-observable] sensors and net-ready [data links].”

Got all that? Yeah, me neither. What I do got, however, is certainty that funding for this effort is going to accelerate in the years ahead. Between 2011 and 2015, the Air Force budget projects spending $1.7 billion in total R&D on long range strike.

After the capabilities study evolves into an investment profile, expenditures might really ramp up. Here’s what is projected by the new 30-year aircraft investment plan.

Next Generation Ballistic Missile Submarine (aka SSBN-X)

For FY 2011, the Navy requested $493 million in R&D funding for the Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD aka SSBN-X) program. According to Navy budget documents, this money will go toward “design, systems engineering, prototyping, and vendor qualification activities needed to execute the schedule for Common Missile Compartment (CMC) design, and whole ship design and component development technologies.” The United States is designing and building the missile compartment earlier than other parts of the ship. The compartment work will then be spun off to help the UK develop its own next generation SSBN.

Between 2011 and 2015, the Navy projects spending about $3.7 billion in R&D funding for the SBSD, which includes many overlapping development activities happening at the same time. (Naval officials this week put the 2011-2015 figure at around $6 billion, although I don’t see that total in the actual line items)

Right now, the SSBN-X program is structured to procure at least 12 ships. As the new 30-year shipbuilding plan noted, however, “Should the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review change the SSBN requirements, the number of replacement ships may need to be adjusted to accommodate that outcome.” The plan also emphasized that procurement must start on time in FY 2019 and that schedule slippages are not an option:

Recapitalization must start no later than FY 2019 to ensure operational submarines will be available to replace these vital assets as they leave operational service… It is especially critical that these ships meet their scheduled deliveries as they are one-for-one replacements for ships fulfilling, real-time, Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent missions in support of national strategic objectives…There is no leeway in this plan to allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.

A few weeks ago I wrote about the Navy potentially not wanting to pay for the SSBN-X “out of hide,” meaning out of its regular shipbuilding budget. The 30-year plan appears to have put a hex on that notion. The plan states, “Contrary to previous plans, this FY 2011 shipbuilding plan includes the provision for funding SSBN recapitalization from the Navy’s expected shipbuilding funds.” The chart below shows why this is not an insignificant consideration.

The final SSBN-X will be procured in FY 2033 according to the 30-year plan. When SSBN-X procurement is occurring between 2019 and 2033, look below at the overall effect on the number of new ships the Navy can buy per year. It’s about one-half a ship less per year, or seven fewer total ships between 2019 and 2033. That’s not the end of the world, but it is an important strategic tradeoff to think about.

Conclusion

In the short term, can the United States develop new nuclear delivery vehicles while simultaneously pursuing negotiated reductions in warheads and delivery vehicles? I don’t see why not. As President Obama articulated in his Prague speech last year, “As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.” Maintaining a robust, modernized nuclear force structure with upgraded delivery vehicles is consistent with a policy of minimum deterrence, which the 2010 QDR supports by endorsing “a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels consistent with U.S. and allied interests.” Russia is building new delivery vehicles right now too, so it possesses no legitimate basis for opposing U.S. modernization.

In the longer term, however, the procurement schedules outlined above show the United States building new nuclear bombers and submarines well into the 2030s. Based on the preliminary descriptions, both the new bomber and submarine will represent significant technological advancements over the systems they are replacing.

If we allow that technological innovation plays some role in strategic competition (don’t use the R-word!), can nuclear warheads be reduced while the means for their delivery are made ever more lethal? Will Russia see a whiz-bang new U.S. bomber as a “one-to-one” replacement for a B-52 built 50 years ago?

In other words, can President Obama develop new nuclear delivery vehicles while simultaneously pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons? Or, by allowing the development of new delivery vehicles today, is he essentially locking in the nuclear status quo for decades?

Those aren’t rhetorical questions. I seriously don’t know the answers. But it’s something that we need to think about.

Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Posture Review, Navy (all tags)

Full discussion: http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/2/5/135039/0467