In its mark-up of the Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal 2013, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee lauded the prior accomplishments of the Airborne Laser Test Bed program. It then went further by directing the Missile Defense Agency to provide a report by 31 July 2012 on the costs that would be involved in returning the Airborne Laser aircraft to an operational readiness status to continue technology development and testing, and to be ready to deploy in an operational contingency, if needed, to respond to rapidly developing threats from North Korea.

This Airborne Laser program, instituted in 1996, envisioned mounting a chemical laser in a modified Boeing 747-400F aircraft to destroy enemy missiles in their boost phase before they could deploy their nuclear weapons and countermeasures. After spending about $5.2 billion on the program over 16 years, the Missile Defense Agency announced its termination in February 2012, and advised that the modified aircraft would be mothballed and retired to the aircraft bone yard in Arizona. Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, noted that a new generation of smaller and far more powerful unmanned solid-state lasers, capable of operating at higher altitudes, would be developed over the decade in the hope of creating an operationally effective anti-missile laser program.  

A basic problem with the Airborne Laser is that the effective range of the weapon is limited by the attenuation of the beam as it passes through the atmosphere. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing on 13 May 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that “the reality is that you would need a laser something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the chemical laser in the plane … to be able to get any distance from the launch site to fire. So right now, the ABL would have to orbit inside the borders of Iran in order to be able to shoot down that missile in the boost phase.” The conclusion regarding its lack of effectiveness was not limited to the Iran case. The Secretary advised in conclusion that “nobody in uniform that I know … believes that this is a workable concept.”

Nor are current prospects for the Airborne Laser any brighter in combatting missiles launched from North Korea as well as Iran. In a letter dated as recently as 30 April 2012 to the chair and ranking member of the same Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that is advocating revival of the Airborne Laser, the co-chairs of the “National Academy of Sciences National Research Council Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives” stated that “the defense cannot be based close enough to the threat during the boost-phase to kill it, even with the most optimistic assumptions about technical performance.”  

Why, given the consistently negative evaluations, would the House Subcommittee want to revive this discredited weapons system? Hopefully, common sense will prevail, especially in this period of fiscal stringency, and we will allow the Airborne Laser 747 aircraft to rest in peace in the aircraft bone yard.

The 6th Annual DC Atomic Open Golf Tournament  
Monday, June 11th (1:00pm Registration, 2:00 PM shotgun start)
Reston National Golf Course
11875 Sunrise Valley Dr., Reston, Virginia
(703) 620-9333
$80 Entry Fee

Anyone connected with the nuclear world, as well as their friends and family, are eligible to join this fun event. Pro-nukes to no-nukes are welcome. The event will be a scramble captain’s choice, and players at all skill levels are encouraged to participate.

NoH will definitely be putting a team together and we hope to see some of you in attendance! If you're interested, let us know and we'll send you the registration form.

If DOD believed it essential to spend $6 billion on the CMRR, it already had the opportunity to chip in the money. Decisions about how to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile are made by both DOD and NNSA through an entity called the Nuclear Weapons Council. In fact, as stated in Turner’s amendment, DOD already transfers billions of dollars to NNSA for projects it deems important. It is clear that DOD, in conjunction with NNSA, already decided that they could not afford to build the CMRR and adequately fund or manage other high priority nuclear modernization activities. They also concluded that CMRR is not needed now since other alternatives to sustain essential U.S. plutonium capabilities exist. In documents explaining the FY 2013 budget request, the Office of Management and Budget stated, “NNSA has determined in consultation with the national laboratories that existing infrastructure in the nuclear complex has the inherent capacity to provide adequate support for these missions. Therefore, NNSA proposes deferring CMRR construction for at least five years.”

Turner’s amendments claim that the only way “to create and sustain the capability to produce plutonium pits for nuclear weapons, and to ensure sufficient plutonium pit capacity, to respond to technical challenges in the existing nuclear weapons stockpile or geopolitical” is via construction of the CMRR. But the CMRR-NF is not a prerequisite for producing plutonium pits. In fact, the United States has been producing plutonium pits on a small scale for much of the past decade and has thousands of pits in storage from dismantled weapons. As NNSA Administrator Tom D’Agostino testified to the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee earlier this year “we are not hampered by saying the nation has to have a capability right now to make 50 or 80 pits per year in order to take care of the stockpile.”

Turner’s attempt to prevent consideration of more cost-effective alternative to CMRR is such a bad idea that, earlier this year, members of his own party criticized NNSA for doing the exact same thing. The House FY 2013 Energy and Water bill noted that, "By not fully considering all available options [to CMRR], millions of taxpayer dollars have been spent for work which will not be needed until a much later date." Both the House and Senate appropriations committees supported the administration’s decision to delay construction of the facility.

Additionally, Turner’s amendments would establish a completely unrealistic timetable for construction. If Turner’s provisions were to be codified into law later this year, the CMRR project, which is winding down, would then have to be restarted and transferred to DOD. From a simple logistics standpoint, the process of transferring construction, determining the source of funding for the project within DOD, and completing other essential changes, would undoubtedly delay the completion date of the facility beyond 2024 and drive up the cost.

Remind me again why Congressman Turner wants a nuclear facility that DOD and NNSA say they cannot currently afford, do not currently need, and the construction of which would squeeze out higher-priority nuclear modernization and defense activities?

Some highlights:

-"The launch, in effect, shattered a Feb. 29 deal made with the United States on halting all missile and nuclear activities."

-"Two days after the launch, Pyongyang rolled out what appeared to be new missiles in its military parade celebrating the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the regime’s late founder. Some news reports initially speculated they were mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)... [but] specialists on North Korean missiles, however, have dismissed them as mock-ups. Attention quickly shifted to the vehicles carrying the missiles, amid suspicions that they came from China, North Korea’s main patron.” (Click Read More)

-"U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies is said to have clearly reminded his North Korean counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, of the meaning of this provision during February talks. Sources say, however, the young Kim Jong Un, the country’s new leader, was unable to defy his late father and predecessor’s command to complete the rocket launch, which was timed to mark the Kim Il Sung centennial and proclaim North Korea to be a 'strong and prosperous nation.'"

-"A key element of the Security Council statement is the use of a “trigger” clause, in which the council “expresses its determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test.” Although a Security Council statement is not legally binding, the provision lays the groundwork for a swift sanctions resolution in the event of a future nuclear or missile test. The inclusion of the trigger clause is also significant in that Beijing has not blocked it, which may reflect Chinese disappointment after failed attempts in 2006 and 2009 to dissuade North Korea from launching missiles."

-"Previous North Korean provocations led to a flurry of diplomacy to resume talks. This time, Washington does not seem eager to return to negotiations. Instead, North Korea’s rocket launch seems to have triggered a different approach in the way the United States and South Korea deal with Pyongyang. Instead of initiating more talks with the regime and trying to prevent its every move in its nuclear and missile game, the two allies are aiming at Pyongyang’s human rights violations and the livelihoods of the North Korean people."

-"Little is known about the North’s uranium-enrichment capabilities, but a uranium nuclear test could indicate an operational uranium-enrichment program, successful production of HEU in sufficient quantities, and a bomb design. All this would equip Pyongyang to build up larger stocks of weapons-grade material. From a nonproliferation standpoint, a uranium test would have serious implications."

-"A key question is whether Pyongyang has the political motivation to follow through with any nuclear test in the near future in the face of tougher international attitudes after its unsuccessful rocket launch last month."

Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner’s op-ed in the Washington Times on April 23 muddled the history of ballistic missile defense when he blamed President Barack Obama for the inability of the United States to field anything more than a nascent missile defense system. The United States has been developing missile defense systems for almost sixty years without success. Without irony, his solution to persistent cost overruns and schedule delays would be to increase the missile defense budget by nearly 40%, adding an additional three billion dollars a year to an already astronomical price tag. Furthermore, Dr. Feulner approves of the United States’ abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that contributed to strategic stability for forty years by trying to argue that missile defense, if it actually worked, would improve relations between the United States and Russia despite repeated threats from Russian military officials regarding the future of missile defenses in Europe...