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New UK Disarmament Group Seeks Unified European Voice

Kirk Bansak | Oct 29, 2009 | there are 4 comments 4

A newly created elite group of British cross-party parliamentarians dedicated to multilateral nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation (aptly titled the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation) was officially launched today with a meeting in Westminster. Former Defence Secretary Des Browne is the group’s convener.

Drawing inspiration from America’s Four Horsemen, the British group seeks to secure the world from nuclear dangers. Their plans include reducing nations’ reliance on nuclear weapons and advocating for the CTBT. Yet perhaps their most valuable aspiration is the group’s hope to create a unified European voice.

In an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment last month, Des Browne introduced this mission as part of his goal for the group: “We hope to bring Europe together. As I say, every country in Europe has its Gang of Four, but they’re operating broadly separate from each other.” In the press release announcing their launch, the group stated that they hope to “provide an authoritative European voice to back up the position of U.S. President Barack Obama.”

Such an enterprise could provide U.S. politicians and lawmakers with a clear window into the European stance on key issues. As the press release explains: “The group has also tasked itself with ensuring that politicians in the U.S., of all political persuasions, are in no doubt of their allies’ positions on extended deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.”

The issues of extended deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons have fueled an intense debate in Washington over the future of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe. Withdrawal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe would go a long way toward promoting global nuclear reductions, but this possibility has run into numerous obstacles.

Despite strong indications that the tactical deployments are unwanted and unnecessary, critics of withdrawal argue that our European allies want the nukes. They argue that withdrawal would lead to anxiety and even proliferation as the Europeans would begin to doubt the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And the critics have plenty of anecdotes from their own meetings with Europeans to support this view.

On the other hand, Des Browne at Carnegie articulated his strong personal view that tactical nuclear weapons could be discarded without undercutting anyone’s strategic defense. He also expressed his confidence that the United States could withdraw its tactical nuclear deployment from Europe smoothly without prompting some sort of extended deterrence crisis, provided that the United States properly engaged diplomatically with Europe in the process.

The UK group’s pursuit of a unified European voice should help to clarify these types of conflicting messages The U.S. political process and future of nuclear reductions are in great need of a clear and coherent message from U.S. allies. The UK group has spotted this problem and seems poised to ameliorate it.

tags Nukes on a Blog, CTBT (all tags)


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cause and effect

"Withdrawal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe would go a long way toward promoting global nuclear reductions."  What evidence or rationale can you offer to support that claim?  Please be aware that my question is not implying that U.S. weapons reductions would foster nuclear proliferation across Europe, but I am skeptical about the effect that you suggest could very well result from withdrawal of U.S. weapons in Europe.  Which states do you think will follow-up by withdrawing or eliminating nuclear weapons, and why?

Industry standard

The standard political/signaling rationale holds here. As CRS put it:

“…reducing or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe…could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO’s intentions to address Russia’s perception of the threat from NATO. This, in turn, might encourage Russia to accept negotiated limits or transparency measures on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some also believe that a NATO ‘step away’ from these weapons would encourage Russia to reduce its reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”

This rationale is typically paired with the “Euro tacnukes not needed for deterrence” observation. Again, CRS:

“…another recent review of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise found that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), which was once the ‘principle advocate for nuclear weapons in Europe,’ no longer advocates for these weapons and no longer recognizes a political role for these weapons in NATO. According to this study, officials at USEUCOM have argued that an ‘over-the-horizon’ capability, weapons deployed outside of Europe, could be just as credible as a deterrent to attack on NATO.”

These propositions are debatable, as Kirk indicated above, and many people share your skepticism.

RE: Industry standard

If by the standard political/signaling rationale you are referring to the IR theory literature on costly signals (e.g., Fearon and Glaser), then I humbly suggest your language on the causal strength of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe is too strong.  Rather than "would go a long way," I would say "could (or might) contribute to promoting . . . ."  Frankly, we do not know what will happen as a result of withdrawing up to 240 U.S. nuclear weapons (number cited by Federation of American Scientists) from Europe.  Other countries, such as Russia, might simply say "whatever."  I am not convinced that Russia sees gravity bombs as a threat to its nuclear capabilities.

You are probably correct in suggesting that the weapons are not needed for deterrence.  The weapons are supposedly in Europe to provide our NATO allies a role in nuclear decision-making.  As many analysts have pointed out, the United States can provide nuclear capabilities from over the horizon.  Thus, I think the U.S. government should pose two simple questions to NATO governments: Do you want U.S. nuclear weapons based on your soil?  And if so, to what end?  If the answer to the first question is "no," then the United States should withdraw the weapons.  If the answer is "yes," then the United States will have to weigh the pros and cons of various force structure options in light of the answer to the second question.

You got it

Well, a little further back than Fearon and Glaser, but yeah you got it.

You:

I think the U.S. government should pose two simple questions to NATO governments: Do you want U.S. nuclear weapons based on your soil?  And if so, to what end?  If the answer to the first question is "no," then the United States should withdraw the weapons.  If the answer is "yes," then the United States will have to weigh the pros and cons of various force structure options in light of the answer to the second question.

Well put.

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