Grading Scale for the Nuclear Posture Review

As analysts prepare for the impending release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (see 1 – 2 – 3), a grading scale would help to illustrate which policies are under consideration. Thankfully, Prof. Tom Sauer provided such a scale in “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” his contribution to the October 2009 issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Sauer argues that nuclear weapons states may choose to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons in their security policies sooner than is commonly expected. He then digs into some Global Zero analysis towards the end, so if that’s your bag, check him out.

Here is the excellent typology Sauer presents for considering nuclear weapons policy. Click to enlarge.

Here are the definitions and historical examples Sauer uses to illustrate his typology.

Nuclear Primacy
Description: the capability to eliminate the nuclear weapons force of the enemy with a first strike
Example: U.S. during the late 1940s

Maximum Deterrence
Description: role of nuclear weapons in the defence posture is emphasized, literally maximized, in order to squeeze as much benefit as possible out of deterrence
Examples: U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War; U.K. and France during the Cold War, albeit at much lower levels

Minimum Deterrence
Description: minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons…a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable
Examples: current postures of Israel, France, and U.K.; perhaps the U.S. and Russia in 15-20 years?

Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear weapons are able to deter thanks simply to their existence, regardless of the nature of the nuclear posture
Examples: China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan, although the latter two want to move up the chart

Post-Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear deterrence without the existence of nuclear weapons (i.e. tracking Mazarr)
Examples: Japan and Germany

When the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review comes out in the next few weeks, analysts might ask how closely it adheres to Sauer’s full description of minimum deterrence:

Minimum deterrence tries to minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons. According to minimum (and existential) deterrence, in contrast to maximum deterrence, a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable. As long as the opponent believes that he can be attacked with tens of nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike, the fear of assured destruction will prevail. Parity, let alone superiority, is therefore not a requirement. Because of the relatively small nuclear forces, counterforce targeting and massive attack options are excluded. To the same extent, high alert rates are not needed, except maybe for the invulnerable part of the arsenal. A no-first-use declaratory policy then also becomes an option, at least for states that cannot be easily overrun by non-nuclear means.

How will the Obama administration’s review stack up?