Conventional Weakness Propels North Korean Nuke Ambitions

It doesn’t take much prodding for me to post Team America or topless fishing pics. As fun as that is, foreign leaders’ quirks are not the reason states seek nuclear weapons.

For example, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair shed some light on North Korea’s nuclear motivations during his annual threat assessment testimony last month:

The [Korea People’s Army] capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

I was told by a friend with a background in Asia intelligence that this language about DPRK conventional capabilities was more detailed than what has typically been revealed in open source forums. If that is true, maybe a small U.S. policy shift is on display in this switching DPRK from an axis of evil designee (i.e. Bush) to more of a legitimate security seeker? After all, the United States ought to deal differently with a North Korea possessing justifiable security concerns versus a North Korea that is irreconcilably provocative and dangerous, right?

This is pure uninformed speculation on my part, so DPRKers should feel free to chin check me.