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Jim Jones: New START Won’t Limit U.S. Missile Defenses
Travis | Apr 20, 2010 |
0 In this morning’s WSJ, NSA Jim Jones rebuts the paper’s April 17 editorial claiming that New START places too many restrictions on U.S. missile defenses. Jones argues that the treaty’s limits on converting ICBM silos for missile defense interceptors is not a problem because the United States would probably just dig new holes, which is apparently cheaper than converting existing silos, if it ever needed to add additional missile defense silos in California or elsewhere.
Sounds reasonable, although one wonders what the timeline would be for converting silos versus building new ones. In a rapidly-developing crisis situation, would the United States have time to dig new holes? I ask because Keith Payne raised concerns about a rapid, unforeseen scenario in his April 8 WSJ op-ed, which will continue to be plagiarized heavily by the Journal and Senate Republicans.
Here’s the full text of Jones’s letter…
Your editorial claim that the new START treaty restrains missile defenses ("Stopping Missile Defense?" April 17) is weakened by your urging President Obama to "personally clarify the limits implied by the treaty text." I would like to clarify this issue: It is important that there is understanding with regard to what is and is not in this treaty where missile defense is concerned.
The treaty restrains neither our program for missile defense of the U.S. (at bases in California and Alaska) nor the new phased adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. It is true that the treaty prohibits conversion of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and for submarine-based launchers for missile defense usage, and vice versa, while "grandfathering" five former ICBM silos in California that were so converted. It's a limit in theory, but not in reality. As Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, explained to Congress on April 15, we have no plans to convert any additional ICBM silos. In fact, it would be less expensive to build a new silo rather than convert an old one. In other words, if we were to ever need more missile defense silos in California, we would simply dig new holes, which is not proscribed by the treaty (nor are we barred from building new missile defense silos anywhere else). Gen. O'Reilly also told Congress that launching missile defense interceptors from submarines was reviewed and deemed an "unattractive and extremely expensive option."
In short, by adopting this treaty we give up nothing, and gain additional strategic stability between the world's two great nuclear powers. Moreover, compared to the expired START treaty, the new treaty reduces constraints on missile defense testing, because the prior treaty limited the types of targets we could use.
Your criticism of the treaty's withdrawal clause, and how Russia may allegedly use it to restrain missile defense, is mystifying. Most treaties signed by the U.S. have withdrawal provisions, and for good reason. If circumstances change, we want a legal escape hatch. It was just such a withdrawal clause that allowed the last administration to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
The president remains committed to developing and deploying missile defenses, as evidenced by his nearly $10 billion budget request for fiscal year 2011, almost $700 million more than the current year. A Russian threat to withdraw from START will not deter the president from taking steps necessary to protect the U.S. and her allies. We have done so in reaching the new START agreement, a fact that is supported by the senior leadership of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Nukes on a Blog, Obama Administration, New START, FY 2011 Budget Request, Missile Defense (all tags)
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