HASC Seapower Subcommittee Restricts SSBN-X Funds

Artist’s conception of a possible design for the SSBN-X

HASC Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor yesterday announced his panel’s decision to “gate” 50 percent of FY 2011 R&D funding for the SSBN-X until the Navy shares its analysis of alternatives for the program. As I wrote previously, Taylor is interested in discovering whether a smaller, cheaper submarine could relieve some of the inevitable pressure on the Navy’s future shipbuilding budget—and just so happen to ensure consistent funding for the surface combatants built in his district.

Here’s CQ Today’s (subscription only) summary of the move:

The bill, if enacted, would restrict 50 percent of the $672.3 million authorized “until the secretary of Defense reports to the committee the guidance which shaped the results of the analysis of alternatives, the time needed to develop and deploy each alternative capability, and the rationale associated with construction of a new class of submarines capable of carrying the current weapon vice development of a smaller missile to fit an existing submarine,” said Seapower panel Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss.

[snip]

Taylor argues that the last Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) already limits the D-5 missile to carrying only eight nuclear warheads, despite its ability to carry more. “Is this very big missile what we need and do we need to build a new submarine for it?” Taylor asked.

The House may not get to vote on arms control treaties, but it certainly has ways to make its presence felt in U.S. nuclear policy deliberations.

UPDATE May 15: Rep. Taylor may indeed smell a rat, generally speaking, with this analysis of alternatives (AOA) business. As GAO reported last year:

Many of the AOAs that GAO reviewed did not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for addressing a warfighting need or assess technical and other risks associated with each alternative

[snip]

Without a sufficient comparison of alternatives and focus on technical and other risks, AOAs may identify solutions that are not feasible and decision makers may approve programs based on limited knowledge

[snip]

While AOAs are supposed to provide a reliable and objective assessment of viable weapon solutions, we found that service sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution or a narrow range of solutions early on, before an AOA is conducted. The timing of AOAs has also been problematic. Some AOAs are conducted under compressed timeframes in order to meet a planned milestone or weapon system fielding date and are conducted concurrently with other key activities required to become a program of record. This can short-change a comprehensive assessment of risks and preclude effective cost, schedule, and performance trade offs from taking place prior to beginning development.

Some of these findings could (as in maybe) apply to the SSBN-X, I think.