Albert Wohlstetter, the father of the “fail-safe” concept which dictated that bombers flying to deliver a nuclear attack should return to base after reaching a predesignated point en route unless they received an explicit order to continue, would not be amused to learn that the new communications terminals designed to connect bomber crews to the U.S. president in the event of a nuclear war are years behind their development schedule and millions of dollars over budget.

Get it sorted, people.

(GAO has more; check pages 67-68)

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending (all tags)

Army Day marked the unveiling of some um… exciting new possibilities in Iran.  Take this fabulous mock-up of their new stealth fighter (h/t to Stephen Trimble at The DEW Line).  The mock-up was one of two that appeared at the event, both probable variants of Iran’s Sofreh Mahi, tested in February.

Since Iran has trouble just supporting its current force of U.S.-built F-5s, F-4s, F-14s and former Iranian fighters, U.S. Air Force officials have noted that the idea of Iran developing its own stealth fighter or UAV is highly unlikely.  This rudimentary mock-up serves as an excellent example of their thoughts.

During the parade and celebration held on April 18, President Ahmadinejad commented that Iran’s armed forces have such strength that its enemies will not even think of attacking the country.

Just one truly interesting development did come out of the event...

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Iran Watch, S-300, Air Force, Russia (all tags)

InsideDefense.com (subscription only) reports that it will cost $339 million to make the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, according to U.S. Air Force officials.  

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey continue to host an estimated 200 B61-3 and -4 gravity bombs for delivery by various U.S. and NATO aircraft, including the “dual-capable” F-16 fighter-bomber that the JSF is slated to replace. Like the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) before it, the 2010 NPR punted on the question of U.S. tacnukes in Europe, concluding that “Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”

Yet the $339 million price tag to wire-up the B61 and JSF does not represent the full cost of maintaining nuclear-capable U.S. aircraft in Europe. As Malcolm Chalmers wrote recently:

The US is obliged to maintain a special infrastructure for the purpose [of maintaining nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe], together with the posting of around 1,500 of its service personnel (250 in each of six [US Munitions Support Squadrons] bases) in expensive foreign security postings. Ongoing threats from terrorism further add to the risks against which these bases must guard themselves.

Because of these costs, the U.S. military has long questioned the usefulness of continuing to deploy U.S. tacnukes in Europe. Chalmers noted:

As early as the 1970s, there was a fierce internal Pentagon dispute as to whether the increased weight and complexity required to wire the USAF’s F-16s for the nuclear role, together with the training required to provide a useable capability, justified the costs in reduced conventional capability.

Those questions have not disappeared. As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.” The Task Force of course disagreed with this assessment, arguing that such an attitude ignores the political and psychological value that tacnukes possess as a concrete U.S. commitment to NATO security.

But are tacnukes really the best way to address squishy concerns like politics and psychology, particularly when the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal already provides a credible “over the horizon” deterrent? Not every problem needs to have a (redundant) military solution, after all, particularly when enormous budgetary pressures confront the U.S. military in the years ahead. If the Soviets probably aren’t coming through the Fulda Gap anytime soon, then maybe it’s time to do something totally unprecedented in U.S. defense planning—make a tough choice!—and reallocate resources toward the most serious and most likely threats confronting the United States in the 21st century.

Anyway, here are the key excerpts from the InsideDefense.com article…

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, B61, Air Force, tactical nuclear weapons, Extended Deterrence, F-35 (all tags)

What’s gotten into the Air Force lately?  First there was this December 2009 report from the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies calling for a bomberless dyad.  Now, in an article in the latest issues of Strategic Studies Quarterly co-authored with two professors from Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, Col B. Chance Saltzman, chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters Air Force, calls for significant reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

Just how significant you ask:

In fact, the United States could address military utility concerns with only 311 nuclear weapons in its nuclear force structure while maintaining a stable deterrence. [emphasis mine].

And to think they didn’t even pick a nice round number!

Saltzman et al, argue that such a force could be maintained on a triad of 100 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, 192 de-MIRVed Trident D-5 SLBMs on 12 Ohio class submarines, and ALCMs to be deployed on 19 B-2s.  Apart from calling for a triad of counterforce and countervalue weapons, the article mostly ignores the other specific details of deterrence that have consumed so much energy in the context of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.

I’m not really up on the intricacies of Air Force bureaucracy, so I don’t know how much weight the Strategic Plans and Policy Division actually pulls within the department, but it seems to me to be noteworthy that the head of said division is associating himself with a strategy of minimum deterrence…

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force (all tags)

Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad.

In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.”

Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:

THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?

When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:

THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?

MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.

Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:

MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.

Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:

SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.

THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?

SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.

Well said, General.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Senate, Posture Review, Air Force (all tags)

From the gang called Russians with attitudes, crazy motherf***** named Putin said yesterday that Russia should proceed with building a new nuclear-capable bomber.

Putin’s statement comes as President Obama is ramping up funding for development of the next generation U.S. nuclear submarine and bomber.

Now boys, are we merely seeking to keep capabilities in tip top shape, or are we having a resolve contest in the middle of negotiating a nuclear reductions treaty? Yes yes, we’re all seriously committed to blowing each other up in the most stylish manner possible. Let’s get on with the reductions now, shall we?

Alternatively: pandering to Russian military-industrial complex while recapturing Soviet glory days = Putin for Prez 2012.

UPDATE 3/3: In retrospect, the picture caption probably should have been “Long pole in the nuclear tent.” I regret the oversight.

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Nukes on a Blog, Russia, New START, Posture Review, Navy, Air Force (all tags)

The big funding increase for nuclear nonproliferation has become, at this point, a well-developed part of the narrative surrounding the new fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget. Vice President Biden messaged it in the Wall Street Journal. An administration apparatchik followed up on background with tastemaker Laura Rozen. And the press guys (and they are all guys) covered it: Fleck, Landay, Matishak, Pincus, and Ambinder.

More nonproliferation funding is always good. If the Pentagon is as serious about stopping nuclear terrorism as the 2010 QDR suggests, it ought to spend at least 0.074 percent of its total budget on Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, as is proposed for FY 2011, right?

Yet there’s more to the nuke game than nonproliferation. Yep, you guessed it: I’m talking about hardware. How much leg did the FY 2011 budget show on new nuclear bombers and submarines? And what does it mean for President Obama’s arms control agenda? Read on, read on…

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Posture Review, Navy (all tags)

NNSA isn’t the only agency looking to get paid next fiscal year. From the Air Force’s budget summary:

Starting in FY 2011 the B-2A will receive funding across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to improve the [Defensive Management System] on the aircraft. This initiative will allow the B-2A to continue operations around the world in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. The B-2A will also have funding increased for the Weapon System Support Center (WSSC) which enables testing of current as well as developmental aircraft systems. The B-52H is undergoing several modernization programs in order to maintain its viability through 2040. Current initiatives include installing the 1760 bus on the B-52H for increased smart weapon capability while progressing with the Strategic Radar Replacement program, aimed at replacing its current radar (which is experiencing sustainment and obsolescence issues). The B-52H Extremely High Frequency program integrates communications and data and supports United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements for secure, survivable communications via Emergency Action Messages.

As part of the effort to sustain ICBMs, funding was realigned in FY 2011 to complete the installation of new environmental control systems at the launch facilities. The Air Force also procured more Minuteman III test equipment over the FYDP to provide the necessary flight test components for follow-on test and evaluation launches to ensure reliability, accuracy and viability of the fielded ICBM force. Additionally, funding provided for the development of software to validate message generator processes critical for nuclear certification. The FY 2011 Budget Request includes $295M to modernize out-dated fuzing mechanisms and to sustain test equipment and environmental control systems for the aging but capable Minuteman III ICBMs. The UH-1N that supports missile launch complexes will begin replacement activities with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of FY 2015. The Air Force continues to analyze and address requirements to maintain the Minuteman III ICBM to 2030 as directed by Congress.

Raise your right hand and repeat after him: The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is…

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Posture Review (all tags)

According to Reuters, the forthcoming Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 defense budget “foresees spending about $4 billion over the next five years to maintain the U.S. bomber industrial base, study plans for a possible new bomber, and upgrade existing B-2 and B-52 bombers.” Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ashton Carter said yesterday that when it comes to details about the new bomber, "We will provide an answer on what comes next on that within the next year." Secretary Gates said previously that the new bomber would likely get around $1 billion in FY 2011.

At a HASC subcommittee hearing yesterday, CBO analyst Eric Labs said that building 12 new SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines to replace the 14 Ohio-class subs could cost around $85 billion, with the lead ship costing $11 billion and subsequent ships costing $7 billion apiece. More modern construction techniques could help hold down costs; however, increased labor and material costs, the enhanced capabilities of all Navy subs, and the current low rate of ship construction (i.e. fixed overhead costs spread over fewer ships) might push costs upward.

At the same hearing, CRS analyst Ronald O’Rourke made the point that if the Navy pays for the new SSBN(X) out of its regular shipbuilding budget, it would have to steal money from other programs. This could reduce the total number of ships the Navy is able to procure by 56 (20 percent) and “make a substantial consolidation of some kind of the surface ship construction industrial base a distinct possibility, if not a likelihood,” according to O’Rourke. To deal with this problem, the Navy has started asking whether or not an individual service like the Navy should be responsible for spending so much of its own budget on “force structure elements that serve a national mission of strategic nuclear deterrence,” as O’Rourke put it. Loren Thompson suggested to HASC the creation of a “separate, strategic funding” category for the SSBN(X) that would keep it separate from other shipbuilding programs, a model similar to how the Department of Energy pays for U.S. nuclear warheads even though they are fielded aboard DOD-financed delivery vehicles.

One last thing covered at the hearing was the issue of ship requirements for the Obama administration's rejiggered plan for U.S. missile defense in Europe (yeah, we might consider Aegis missile defense a "strategic" budget priority now). For more detail, read what both Labs and O'Rourke said.

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Nukes on a Blog, Table Scraps, Iran Watch, Missile Defense, Defense Spending, Posture Review, Acquisition, Navy, Air Force (all tags)