September 24 marked the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since then, little progress has been made on the treaty’s entry into force. In a creative attempt to ensure the permanence of some of the CTBT’s essential functions, some observers are calling on states to remove the provisional status of the treaty’s key institutions.

The CTBT has been signed by 182 nations and ratified by 155. However, it will not enter into force until the remaining nine states from the list of 44 so-called Annex 2 states have ratified the treaty, including the U.S. and China. Despite the CTBT not having entered into force, the treaty’s Preparatory Commission and Provisional Secretariat provide invaluable services to many countries through an extensive monitoring network which not only detects nuclear testing but also provides early warning for tsunamis and tracks the fallout from nuclear accidents.

In other words, the CTBT offers much more than a ban on nuclear testing.

Read more

CTBT, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

Happy International Day Against Nuclear Tests!  For a brilliant reminder of why a permanent legal ban on nuclear testing is vital, check out Daryl Kimball’s moving take over at Armscontrolnow.  

Looking for another nuclear testing-related item to put on your calendar?  
The “2011 Article XIV Conference” on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be held September 23 in New York.

Hosted by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, this will be seventh conference on the ratification and implementation of the CTBT (for background information our  site is chock full of CTBT resources, including a fact sheet here).  

The CTBT calls for an indefinite ban on all nuclear test explosions in all environments, to inhibit the research and development of new nuclear weapons. Since opening for signature in 1996, 182 states have signed the treaty and 154 have ratified it. However, before the treaty can “enter into force” (i.e. be made into international law) the 44 countries that possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at the time the treaty was negotiated have to sign and ratify the pact.  Nine of these countries still need to deposit their articles of ratification: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the United States of America, India and Pakistan.

Representatives from all countries are invited to participate in the conference – whether they have signed or ratified the treaty or not.  Those states that have already ratified the treaty use the conference to promote the treaty’s goals and urge states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty so as soon as possible.  They will also propose concrete measures to hasten entry into force, such as by urging countries with nuclear weapons research programs to refrain from developing new nuclear devices.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, CTBT, UN, Arms Control (all tags)

Last week the Arms Control Association published an excellent rebuttal to the Heritage Foundation's recent uninformed musings on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Dadie Loh and I have been working on a response as well, and you can head over to the mothership for the final result.  A quick teaser:

Uncowed by its failure to convince the U.S. Senate and the American public to oppose the New START treaty, the Heritage Foundation is trying to gin up opposition to another international treaty that would greatly benefit U.S. national security: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The CTBT prohibits all nuclear test explosions and creates a robust international verification regime to buttress the existing national capabilities of state parties in ensuring compliance with the treaty.

A growing number of military leaders and former nuclear laboratory directors agree that nuclear testing is a dangerous relic of the Cold War and isn’t in the best interests of the U.S.

Because the U.S. does not conduct nuclear tests and has no plans or the need to do so, it should take advantage of the security and political benefits that would come with ratification of the CTBT. A permanent test ban would close off the one reliable avenue - nuclear testing - by which other states might develop new, sophisticated weapons and/or increase the lethality of already existing arsenals.

A legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing is particularly important in South Asia, where India and Pakistan continue to build up and modernize their nuclear forces. A test ban would help lessen the chances of a destabilizing arms race in the region – assuming the two countries agree to ratify the accord.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, CTBT (all tags)

"The [Comprehensive Test Ban] treaty would further compromise our atrophied nuclear arsenal (which Obama isn't sufficiently modernizing) by ending our ability to test our aged stockpile if necessary. (We haven't tested since 1992.)" [emphasis mine.]

Peter Brookes, Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow, June 9, 2011

The spending measure approved [by the Republican-controlled House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee] in Thursday's mark-up session would grant about $7.1 billion for that work, according to an initial breakdown of the appropriations bill obtained by Global Security Newswire. That is a decrease of slightly less than $500 million, or 7 percent, from the administration's request, the document shows. [emphasis mine.]

"House Panel Cuts More Than $1 Billion in Nuclear Agency Funds," Global Security Newswire, June 3, 2011

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, CTBT, quote of the day, Congress (all tags)

Yesterday Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher delivered a speech at the Arms Control Association's annual meeting on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Tasucher emphasized the vital national security importance of the treaty and indicated that the administration intends to step up its efforts to educate the Senate and the public about the treaty.

Full text below the jump.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, CTBT (all tags)

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 182 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation benefits of the CTBT, it should come as no surprise that state parties to the NPT reaffirmed the vital importance of the treaty’s entry into force at the recent May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. But after fourteen years, how much longer will the world have to wait?

Read more

CTBT, Nukes on a Blog, UN, nuclear weapons testing (all tags)

Reigning national debate champions Michigan State University will face Emory University for what promises to be a lively debate on U.S. CTBT on June 10.  Typically showcasing the views of renowned nuclear weapons experts, this specially organized PONI debate will put some of the nation’s brightest and sharpest young thinkers head to head in front of an expert judging panel (consisting of DoD and DoE officials) and audience.  The event builds on the momentum generated by the intercollegiate policy debate topic of 2009, “Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons Policy”, which saw over ten thousand two-hour debates on the subject.

With debaters having spent hours and hours researching and strategizing in preparation, we can expect to hear some fresh viewpoints and new ideas on how to get CTBT ratified as well as the likely arguments that will be employed to block ratification.  And in being joined by an expert panel and audience, the students will for their part get an opportunity to road-test ideas and receive useful feedback.....  

Read more

debate, CTBT, PONI, nuclear, nuclear testing (all tags)

On April 26, USD-AT&L Ashton Carter formally commissioned a new Defense Science Board Task Force to assess nuclear treaty monitoring and verification technologies. “Potential requirements for new or expanded monitoring and verification requirements place a renewed focus – after almost 2 decades of limited investment,” Carter’s memo states, “on the adequacy of the Nation’s technical tools to support monitoring and verification, both as part of the cooperative verification regimes of the treaties and through national intelligence.”

The objective of the Task Force will be to “recommend a comprehensive set of time-phased technical programs that could be conducted” by DOD, DOE, and/or the Intelligence Community, with thought given to how State, DHS, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy might pitch in.

Depending on when its findings are released, this Task Force could affect New START and CTBT ratification deliberations. Stay tuned.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, CTBT, verification (all tags)

Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.”

Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted.

Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support.

In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:

The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, CTBT, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Senate (all tags)

Remarks of Vice President Biden
National Defense University
Washington, DC
February 18, 2010
The Path to Nuclear Security:
Implementing the President’s Prague Agenda

Ladies and gentlemen; Secretaries Gates and Chu; General Cartwright; Undersecretary Tauscher; Administrator D’Agostino; members of our armed services; students and faculty; thank you all for coming.

At its founding, Elihu Root gave this campus a mission that is the very essence of our national defense: “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” For more than a century, you and your predecessors have heeded that call. There are few greater contributions citizens can claim.

Many statesmen have walked these grounds, including our Administration’s outstanding National Security Advisor, General Jim Jones. You taught him well. George Kennan, the scholar and diplomat, lectured at the National War College in the late 1940s. Just back from Moscow, in a small office not far from here, he developed the doctrine of Containment that guided a generation of Cold War foreign policy.

Some of the issues that arose during that time seem like distant memories. But the topic I came to discuss with you today, the challenge posed by nuclear weapons, continues to demand our urgent attention....

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Obama Administration, New START, CTBT, 2011 Budget Request (all tags)