AQ Khan

The Washington Post revealed yesterday accusations and alleged evidence of North Korean bribes for nuclear “know-how” in an article that if true, will prove extremely damning for Pyongyang, Islamabad, and Washington.  Any iota of faith left in North Korea’s desire to ever denuclearize would disappear among any of the remaining believers, for it would confirm that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium path to nuclear weapons simultaneous to the steps it was taking towards denuclearization in the late 1990s.  The reputation of Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat (also ex-U.S. Ambassador and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Commissioner) would be in tatters, raising serious questions in Washington about nuclear security in a country increasingly plagued by terrorism.

In essence, The Post’s story suggests that Abdul Qadeer Khan personally handed over North Korean money to a Pakistani general in 1998 in exchange for nuclear know-how.  To corroborate, Khan provided The Posts’ source (Simon Henderson) with a letter he allegedly received from North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary, Jon Bong-ho, which detailed payments of cash and jewelry intended for two Pakistani generals.  Henderson received the backstory and letter “in the years after  [Khan’s] 2004 arrest by Pakistani authorities”, deciding to pass them onto The Post in 2011 “because he lacked the resources to authenticate it himself”.  But despite The Posts best efforts, the articles author R. Jeffrey Smith admits he was unable to confirm the allegations, instead providing argument and counter-argument from U.S. and Pakistan officials respectively.  Given the serious allegations contained in the article and the potential ramifications if proved true, it is important to look closer at both source and evidence before making any hasty conclusions.

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north korea, dprk, kcna, pyongyang (all tags)

Was it all talk?

After South   Korea released its international report on the sinking of the Cheonan detailing North Korean responsibility for the incident, tensions rose on the Korean peninsula to levels not seen in recent years.  With South Korea promising a ‘stern response’ to the attack and North   Korea promising retaliation that could include a ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, it looked like there was real potential for escalation.  Now, nearly three weeks on, both South and North Korea appear to be u-turning on a number of the threats they issued. Which begs the question: were the threats just all talk, as we have seen in the past, or were tensions so high (as I explained here) that both sides deemed that they had no choice but to urgently take de-escalatory steps?

Reports initially suggested that South Korea would seek sanctions at the U.N Security Council as part of its promised ‘stern response’ to the sinking of the Cheonan. But Pyongyang threatened to respond to any action at the Security Council using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style.’  Nearly three weeks later, Seoul has finally referred the case to the Security Council and naturally, North Korea has responded again with strong rhetoric – even implying the possibility of more missile / nuclear tests.  But instead of sanctions, South Korea now seems to be looking to send a ‘political, symbolic and moral message’ at the Security Council.  North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric may have contributed to this change in approach, but it also seems that uncertainty over Russia and China’s position curtailed South Korea’s desire to try and get sanctions through the UN.

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Nukes on a Blog, DPRK, North Korea nuclear, nuclear (all tags)