"The question is what was he thinking?....Did anybody tell Samore he should say less?"

Representative Rick Larsen (D-WA), March 3, 2010. Larsen was responding to comments made by White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction, Gary Samore, who said last weekend that the United States would redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea if Seoul asked for them to be redeployed.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, extended deterrence, quote of the day (all tags)

InsideDefense.com (subscription only) reports that it will cost $339 million to make the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, according to U.S. Air Force officials.  

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey continue to host an estimated 200 B61-3 and -4 gravity bombs for delivery by various U.S. and NATO aircraft, including the “dual-capable” F-16 fighter-bomber that the JSF is slated to replace. Like the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) before it, the 2010 NPR punted on the question of U.S. tacnukes in Europe, concluding that “Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”

Yet the $339 million price tag to wire-up the B61 and JSF does not represent the full cost of maintaining nuclear-capable U.S. aircraft in Europe. As Malcolm Chalmers wrote recently:

The US is obliged to maintain a special infrastructure for the purpose [of maintaining nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe], together with the posting of around 1,500 of its service personnel (250 in each of six [US Munitions Support Squadrons] bases) in expensive foreign security postings. Ongoing threats from terrorism further add to the risks against which these bases must guard themselves.

Because of these costs, the U.S. military has long questioned the usefulness of continuing to deploy U.S. tacnukes in Europe. Chalmers noted:

As early as the 1970s, there was a fierce internal Pentagon dispute as to whether the increased weight and complexity required to wire the USAF’s F-16s for the nuclear role, together with the training required to provide a useable capability, justified the costs in reduced conventional capability.

Those questions have not disappeared. As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.” The Task Force of course disagreed with this assessment, arguing that such an attitude ignores the political and psychological value that tacnukes possess as a concrete U.S. commitment to NATO security.

But are tacnukes really the best way to address squishy concerns like politics and psychology, particularly when the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal already provides a credible “over the horizon” deterrent? Not every problem needs to have a (redundant) military solution, after all, particularly when enormous budgetary pressures confront the U.S. military in the years ahead. If the Soviets probably aren’t coming through the Fulda Gap anytime soon, then maybe it’s time to do something totally unprecedented in U.S. defense planning—make a tough choice!—and reallocate resources toward the most serious and most likely threats confronting the United States in the 21st century.

Anyway, here are the key excerpts from the InsideDefense.com article…

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, B61, Air Force, tactical nuclear weapons, Extended Deterrence, F-35 (all tags)

Fully extended, yo.

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Nukes on a Blog, Video, Extended Deterrence (all tags)

Today, Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech on nuclear weapons that badly needed to be given. Delayed completion of the U.S.-Russia New START agreement has endangered the Obama administration’s tightly-sequenced arms control agenda (New START, Nuke Summit, NPT RevCon, CTBT…FMCT/deep cuts?) During the time since START I’s lapse in December, opponents of the administration’s agenda have become more organized and more vocal, threatening to block progress before it even starts. Yet Biden’s speech today should help the administration reverse these negative trends and regain control over what has become one of its signature foreign policy objectives.

What did Biden do well? He spoke movingly about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons, something that gets forgotten in the transaction-oriented culture of Washington and the theory-oriented culture of strategic policy. “The very existence of nuclear weapons leaves the human race ever at the brink of self-destruction,” he said. “The destroyed world Oppenheimer feared must not ever become a reality.” [All quotes from my notes and not official]

Biden also achieved something very important: he clearly delineated how the Obama administration’s priorities—nuclear reductions, nonproliferation, strategic stability—can provide the U.S. nuclear weapons labs with a reinvigorated mission and sense of purpose. The labs are “true national treasures that deserve our full support,” said Biden. He lauded the labs’ historical role and explained how the bigger FY 2011 nuclear weapons budget “reverses the last decade of dangerous decline” under the Bush administration, when “nuclear facilities were neglected and underfunded.” Biden concluded that “responsible disarmament requires versatile specialists” who provide the scientific and technical expertise to achieve the nation’s national security goals.

In response to my question earlier—political co-optation or chastisement?—Biden went with co-optation. He cited Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, Nunn, and McCain as members of the “emerging bipartisan consensus” on nuclear issues. He triangulated between liberal arms controllers concerned with the bigger FY 2011 nuclear budget and conservative deterrence-freaks alarmed by anybody not named Ronald. “We respectfully disagree” with both groups, he noted. In sum, Biden mostly kept his political nose clean, except for the shots at President Bush’s stewardship of the nuclear complex, and stuck to positive justifications for the administration’s plans.

Finally, Biden said relatively little about international concerns, though he did remark that the NPT “consensus is fraying” and needs to be strengthened. Of all the forums where international relations are too wonky to discuss, I thought National Defense University would have been an exception. I guess not.

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Nukes on a Blog, Obama Administration, New START, CTBT, FY 2011 Budget Request, Extended Deterrence (all tags)

In Washington today at 1 PM eastern time, Vice President Joe Biden will give a major address on U.S. nuclear weapons policy at National Defense University. According to press reports, the speech will complement Biden’s January 29 WSJ op-ed by: 1) elaborating on the rationale behind the FY 2011 nuclear weapons budget increase; 2) previewing April’s Global Nuclear Security Summit and May’s NPT Review Conference; 3) explaining how advances in nuclear weapons science have delegitimized previous concerns about the CTBT; and 4) debunking the straw man criticism that envisioning a future without nuclear weapons somehow negates concrete initiatives that advance U.S. security interests today, such as New START.

Here are three things to look for in Biden’s speech:

Co-opt or chastise? – Does Biden justify the administration’s agenda by co-opting the political middle (i.e. moderates/graybeards) or by chastising critics as out of touch with 21st century security challenges? Or neither? This will forecast how the administration plans to handle New START ratification a few months from now.

Budget and the labs – It doesn’t take a lot of imagination to see the FY 2011 nuclear weapons budget increase as “hush money” for the Obama administration’s arms control agenda. This makes for shrewd short-term tactics; however, it does not address the long-term challenges facing the labs on personnel, morale, and more. While we shouldn’t let the laboratory tail wag the U.S. foreign policy dog, let’s not pretend that Obama’s political opponents won’t exploit the labs’ challenges not only to pocket the FY 2011 budget increase, but also to demand more more more.

So, for Biden today: how does the FY 2011 budget increase tie into a long-term vision for what the labs should be doing in the 21st century? How can the administration’s priorities—nuclear reductions, nonproliferation, strategic stability—provide the labs with a reinvigorated sense of purpose?

International community and ED – If there was a flaw in Biden’s WSJ op-ed, it was that he avoided touting the administration’s approach to key allies. Not to carp when an 800 word op-ed doesn’t accomplish everything a 5,000 word essay could, but there is an international component to the administration’s agenda that goes beyond the Nuclear Summit and Review Conference. I’m talking about ED—no, not John Isaacs’s sweetest tie ever, but extended deterrence.

Mr. Veep: how will the Obama administration assure allies of the commitment of the U.S. nuclear umbrella while reducing its arsenal? Providing a positive answer to this question will demonstrate to key allies that the administration’s agenda is not being pursued unilaterally without considering our friends’ interests, too.

UPDATE 12:15 PM: You can watch the speech here or here.

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Nukes on a Blog, Obama Administration, New START, CTBT, FY 2011 Budget Request, Extended Deterrence (all tags)

Can Secretary Gates fire Belgian Ministry of Defense officials too?  Via the Federation of American Scientists, it appears that last week some peace activists with a video-camera managed to infiltrate Kleine Brogel Air Base, which happens to house 10-20 U.S. B61 non-strategic gravity bombs.

Watch the incredible video here. Apparently they even managed to stroll by the aircraft shelters beneath which are believed to be the vaults that house our nukes before they were apprehended by base security.

The incident reminded me of something Jeffrey highlighted at the Carnegie Endowment last September:

And if I think there’s – the dominant – the dominant character I would say of the existence of those weapons in Europe is that we don’t talk about them. I think NATO countries have been incredibly reluctant to make the public case about why they need U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. And as a result, because there is no public case, I think you see a corresponding lack of funding for security at the sites at which the European allies provide security, and you see a corresponding lack of investment in dual-capable aircraft. And NATO’s aircraft are getting quite old, and we’re coming up to a series of decision points.

...

[B]ecause there is no support, I worry very much about a singularity, an event. It could be a security event. Our friends from Peace Action, Belgium, could get in the wire with a cell phone and take a picture of a [sic] vault. It could be a very ugly public debate about certifying a particular new aircraft for nuclear weapons. It could be a debate about deploying refurbished B-61s on airbases.

I do worry that something could happen that will deny NATO its preferred option of not talking about this, and then force the participants into a very ugly public debate in which the result would be the rapid, disorganized, uncoordinated withdrawal of the weapons amidst recriminations. And to me that would be much worse than beginning the dialogue about what the optimal posture is and whether that includes weapons.[emphasis mine.]

Well, they didn't get pictures of the vault per se, but close enough! It will be interesting to see what, if any, impact this incident has on the debate about U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, extended deterrence, and the future of the B61.

UPDATE 2/4: Jeffrey has some more thoughts on the incident here.

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Nukes on a Blog, B61, tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence (all tags)

Chalk up another Republican endorsement for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Last Friday former Utah Republican Senator Jake Garn called on the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty.  Said Garn:

Today, one of our greatest security interests is to discourage nuclear weapons testing by others. A global verifiable ban on testing would help block the ability of nuclear-armed countries, such as China, to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapon test explosions, could-be nuclear-armed nations — like Iran — would not be able to proof test the smaller, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs that could be used to arm ballistic missiles.

Evidence that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has some pretty sensible views on nuclear weapons continues to pour in.  Last week Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reaffirmed the DPJ's commitment to Japan's three nonnuclear principles.  Meanwhile, in an end of the year letter to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada stated that the Japanese diplomats who told the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that the TLAM-N is a key piece of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan might have gone a little overboard.  According to Okada:

Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, it was never the case that views were expressed as being those of our government concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, in some tentative way such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.

In a speech on European Security at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris Secretary of State Clinton reiterated the Obama administration's commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.  She also commented on the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.  On the Review Clinton noted: we are conducting a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to chart a new course that strengthens deterrence and reassurance for the United States and our allies while reducing the role and number of the nuclear weapons we have.  How exactly this tightrope will be walked will be revealed (as of now) on March 1.

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Nukes on a Blog, Table Scraps, tactical nuclear weapons, Japan, Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Posture Review (all tags)

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament today released its big report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers.” At over 300 pages and with 76 recommendations and loads of supplemental data, this report is an arms control abbondanza. The commissioners are ballers, too.

Here are five of the report’s more significant recommendations…

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Nukes on a Blog, CTBT, START, Posture Review, New START, Extended Deterrence (all tags)

In an Op-Ed in the October 5th edition of Defense News, Keith Payne writes "that global nuclear disarmament is infeasible in the world as we now know it."  According to Payne, the main reason this goal is unattainable is the fact that "more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe seek protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter emerging weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) threats in their region."

Which got me to thinking: Who are these anonymous "more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe"?  It turns out that not even nuclear umbrella-philes seem to know:

"Our 'extended deterrence' umbrella, initially formalized with NATO in the 1950s, has subsequently expanded to cover 30-plus nations."
--Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, chaired by James Schlesinger (December 2008)

"More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn echoed that sentiment in The Wall Street Journal, but all have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own."
--Robert Gates (October 28, 2008)

“That's simply unacceptable for a nation whose nuclear protective umbrella covers some 40 nations.”
--Defense News Editorial (August 17, 2009)

"...the United States must be prepared to defend both itself and over a dozen other countries from nuclear attack."
--Andrew Krepinevich (October 2, 2009)

To recap, the U.S. extends deterrence to more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe.  Except when it extends deterrence to 30-plus nations.  Or maybe it's over two dozen allies and partners?  Some 40 nations?  What's this I hear about over a dozen other countries?

Clearly I wouldn't want to accuse the above of being flippant in highlighting the importance of the assurance (or is it reassurance?) function of U.S. nuclear weapons, but, well, you get the point.

For some additional thoughts on this issue, see here and here.

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Nukes on a Blog, extended deterrence (all tags)

The issue of extended deterrence has been in the news a lot in the past few weeks.  First, via GSN's Martin Matishak, at last week's STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, stated:

there will be an increased emphasis [in the Nuclear Posture Review] on extended deterrence and the assurance of allies...."The concern about tipping points is rising," Roberts said, noting that the anxieties of partner nations in East Asia have "sharpened" as a result of North Korea's two nuclear tests and the modernization of the Chinese military's nuclear capabilities.

 And yesterday, on the 64th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bomb drop on Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso reiterated his nation's commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and global nuclear disarmament, while at the same time warning that he considers nuclear abolition to be "unimaginable".  Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of Japan's primary opposition party took an even stronger pro-disarmament line, noting that "Realizing a nuclear-free world as called for by U.S. President [Barack] Obama is exactly the moral mission of our country as the only atomic-bombed state."  Japan has long been considered to be the most important beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Those who are wary about reducing the role and size of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy are increasingly pointing to the challenges associated with protecting and reassuring allies in an age of Russian aggression, Chinese military modernization, and North Korean and Iranian provocation as a reason why we must be very cautious about further nuclear cuts with Russia, the CTBT, etc.

For example, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States raised a lot of eyebrows in the emphasis it placed on extended deterrence.  Take, for example, this graf from the executive summary:

For the deterrence of attacks by regional aggressors and even China, the force structure requirements are relatively modest. The focus on Russia is not because the United States and Russia are enemies; they are not. No one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia, however, are fearful of Russia and its tactical nuclear forces. The imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed. The need to reassure U.S. allies and also to hedge against a possible turn for the worse in Russia (or China) points to the fact that the U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to address a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the force is as important as ever.[emphasis mine].

Though it didn't explicitly say so, the Commission implies that extended deterrence is one of the most important, if not the most important, factor driving the size and characteristics of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Below the jump I outline some reasons to avoid overstating the value of extended deterrence.  For more go read Jeffrey and Hans.

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Nukes on a Blog, extended deterrence (all tags)