Korean President Lee Myung-bak at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit

The Nautilus Institute ran a piece on November 22, 2011 written by yours truly on the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and can be viewed here or here.

The gist of my piece is:

“There are clear ways in which Seoul can capitalize on its strengths to flavor the 2012 [Nuclear Security Summit] with a “Korean twist” as it maintains depth on key substantive issues that ensure the security of nuclear materials, parts, and facilities…The challenge lies in clearly demonstrating that the benefits outweigh the costs, and that states would have a national interest in further investing their political capital in nuclear security."

Click here to read more.

Read more

2012 Nuclear Security Summit, nuclear safety-security, radioactive sources, nuclear terrorism, North Korea, IAEA (all tags)

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton greets UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova at UNESCO HQ in Paris. Photo courtesy of state.gov

After the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted on October 31 to admit Palestine as a full member-state to the organization, the U.S. defunded UNESCO in accordance with a U.S. law from 1990.  

The law restricts funding to any United Nations organization that accepts Palestine as a full member before an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.  With the Palestinian Authority (PA) actively seeking membership in U.N. organizations, the UNESCO rebuff could mark a U.S. trend in defunding other U.N. organizations.  Blanket application of the law is of particular concern because it could lead the U.S. to defund organizations that directly contribute to U.S. and global security, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After failing to secure an expedient vote in the U.N. Security Council on Palestinian statehood, the PA applied for membership at UNESCO.  Ibrahim Khraishi, a Palestinian official at the U.N. in Geneva, told the Associated Press, “[w]e are working on [membership], one by one" to gain greater recognition for an internationally recognized Palestinian state at the U.N.

White House spokesperson Jay Carney said of the move: "Today's vote at UNESCO to admit the Palestinian Authority is premature and undermines the international community's shared goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”  

The next international organizations to vote on whether to admit Palestine as a full member could be the World Health Organization and IAEA.  

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, IAEA, Congress, UNESCO (all tags)

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano

Okay, IAEA, we need to talk about your timing.  Don’t get me wrong, I’m happy to have a new Safeguards Report on Iran, but… well, I guess if you’re tuned into Nukes of Hazard right now you’re probably not on your way to the beach anyway (or maybe you are?) so here’s what you need to know:

On one hand, the IAEA is “increasingly concerned” about “the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”  

On the other hand, while the report is anything but "evidence of Iran's transparent and peaceful nuclear activities," it does show a moderately increased level of cooperation by the country, a level that could be significant if maintained.

The report details a visit by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to Iran from August 14-19, 2011.  During his visit, the Deputy Director General was allowed access to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (which was down at the time), the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the IR-40 Reactor and Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak, and the conversion and fuel fabrication facilities at Esfahan.  In addition, Iran provided access to “an installation where research and development (R&D) on advanced centrifuges was taking place,” along with “extensive information” on its current work on advanced centrifuges, which has fallen behind its originally conceived timeframe.

According to the report, Iran estimates that between September 14 and August 20, 2011, approximately 45.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced.  This would result in a total of approximately 70.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 having been produced since the process began in February 2010.  

Ultimately, Iran’s decision to continue producing 20%-enriched uranium beyond the needs of the Tehran Research Reactor is increasingly concerning, but before folks tack on to those two new words used by the IAEA, they would be wise to calculate the real time remaining and consider the steps that can still be taken with regard to diplomacy, as well as the considerable messiness of the other option.

The report is due to be discussed by the IAEA's 35-member board of governors at a meeting September 12-16.

Read more

Iran Watch, IAEA (all tags)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stand at a crossroads over the nuclear ambitions of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

On June 9, the Board of Governors at the IAEA declared Syria in noncompliance with IAEA safeguards.

Notably, the resolution was predicated not on information from unbiased IAEA inspections, but on intelligence provided by the United States and verified by data in the public domain. Eleven NAM countries chose to abstain from the vote to report Syria, in part because they were hesitant to rely on intelligence provided by the U.S. and its allies. The resolution stands no chance in New York as Russia and China, both of which possess veto power over possible sanctions as permanent members of the UN Security Council, will certainly oppose it.

India in particular faces a dilemma that typifies the choices facing the NAM. On October 1st, 2008 the U.S. Senate approved HR 7081: the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. Championed by the Bush administration, the “123 agreement” elevated India to a de-facto internationally recognized nuclear weapons state despite New Delhi’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Syria, India, IAEA (all tags)

AFP/Getty Image

Just two days after the International Atomic Energy Agency’s reported that Syria had likely built a nuclear reactor on the site bombed by Israel in 2007 (see Laicie’s post), Syria has promised full compliance with any and all future IAEA investigations and inspections.  

On a side note, Syrian President Assad today also offered general amnesty to all “political” prisoners, i.e. protesters, in an attempt to quell the protests that military force has been unable to stop for over ten weeks.  1,000 people have been killed by Syrian forces.

It appears that the Syrian government is hard at work to renovate its public image.  

The U.S. has put forth a draft resolution to the IAEA governing board referring Syria to the U.N. for non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The vote is scheduled for June 6 and could result in punitive action against Damascus, as occurred with Iran.  By reporting Syria, the U.S. may be hoping to gain has the added benefit of reigniting the conversation about Iran’s NPT transgressions, thereby strengthening support for tougher sanctions on Iran.

Syria’s sudden interest in making nice after having stonewalled inspectors since 2008 is likely to stall any attempts to penalize the country and could offer Damascus more time to destroy what evidence is left at the reactor site.   Another concern is that Syria’s sudden agreeableness could also “dilute efforts to end Syria’s bloody crackdown on its grass-roots pro-democracy movement.”

The IAEA is a slow moving body and inspections might not resume immediately, but soon enough we shall see if President Assad and his Ba’athist party have any interest in real change or if it is just PR.

Read more

Syria, NPT, IAEA (all tags)

A few big things have come out recently with regard to Iran’s nuclear program.  While some were long awaited and highly anticipated, such as the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), none turned out to be particularly earth shattering.

A new NIE on Iran’s nuclear program will remain classified, but reportedly walks back the conclusions of the controversial 2007 NIE, which stated that Iran had ceased its nuclear weapons activities in 2003.  Reports indicate that while Iran may not have made the ultimate decision to build a nuclear weapon, due to internal politics and external pressure, it is likely working on the components of such a device.  

"We believe Iran is moving to the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability," Robert Einhorn, the State Department's senior adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, said at a briefing today.  Due to the inefficient nature of Iran’s uranium enrichment technology, though, Einhorn says that "it would make no sense" for Iran to make the decision to build a nuclear weapon at this point.

Likewise, the most recent report (GOV/2011/7) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to express concern over the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, noting that some of these activities may have continued past 2004.  According to the IAEA, Iran continues to deny a number of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including implementation of the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment and heavy water related activities; and "clarification of the remaining outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear program."

Additionally, IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano reported Monday that Iran may have engaged in nuclear weaponization studies more recently than previously thought.

"Unfortunately, I cannot say a lot on this issue. But I can tell you that we have received information…" since the last board meeting in December, Amano said, "we have received some information raising further concerns."

Tomorrow, Army Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee to deliver his assessment of world threats facing the US. His prepared statement, released today, suggests that any new news from the US is likely to be equally optimistic.

Read more

Iran Watch, National Intelligence Estimate, IAEA, Amano (all tags)

New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, who retruned from a private mission to Pyongyang, said that North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, and negotiate the sale of 12,000 spent nuclear fuel rods.

At a glimpse, this may appear to be a positive sign to the internaional community, especially amid a stalemate in nuclera dialogue, revelations of new nuclear facilities, and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

However, we must not get our hopes up too high too fast. Let's unpack what this REALLY means. Here are some initial thoughts:

Re-inviting IAEA inspectors:
North Korea's willingness to allow IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon appears to be an attempt to justify its uranium enrichment program (UEP) when Pyongyang clearly violated international agreements by building a pilot UEP.

Even if Pyongyang was serious and IAEA inspectors returned to Yongbyong, it will be a matter of time before North Korea kicks them back out again, as we've seen in the past. What is more, IAEA inspectors would only be allowed to monitor what they are shown and will not be able to inspect facilities they deem suspicious.

Most importantly, the most genuine gesture of North Korea's wilingness to denuclearize would be to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

China has been trying to jumpstart the Six-Party Talks and even proposed that Pyongyang invite IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon as a gesture. However, such proposal can be seen as Beijing either not knowing or intentionally ignoring the implications of bringing the UN nuclear watchdog back into Yongbyon.

Selling 1,200 Nuclear Fuel Rods
The nuclear fuel rods North Korea told Bill Richardson about appears to be fuel rods that have not yet been used. This means that Pyongyang may be willing to decrease the amount of fissile material it extracts, but the sale of such rods is meaningless in the bigger picture.

(More analysis on these points to come in my next post)

Read more

North Korea, IAEA, fuel rods (all tags)

Predicting when Iran will get the bomb has been a popular activity for politicians, strategists, analysts, and the public for some time now.  Unfortunately, these predictions are frequently politicized and exploited to justify increased investments in long-range missile defenses, unilateral sanctions, and even military strikes.

Last month, a report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities concluded that a deployable Iranian ICBM is more than a decade away. The study, authored by former UN weapons inspector Mike Elleman, states that “Iran is not likely to field a liquid-fueled missile capable of targeting Western Europe before 2014 or 2015… Iran is many years away from developing a ‘second-generation’ 4,000-5,000 km intermediate-range solid-propellant missile, if it should decide to do so.” It goes on to say that “many years” has historically been around ten, and thus concludes that since Iran would develop and field an intermediate range missile before developing an ICBM, “a notional Iranian ICBM, based on No-Dong and Scud technologies, is more than a decade away from development.”  The report also separates the development of ballistic missile technologies from the development of nuclear capabilities, saying it can only “appear” that these two programs are linked, but that this cannot be confirmed by the IAEA, and is in fact denied by Iran.

This analysis helps to clarify statements put forward by public officials, which are often stripped of crucial context and twisted by the media in an effort to make an Iranian nuclear weapon seem right around the corner.

Read more

Iran Watch, Sanctions, IAEA, NPT, Missile Defense (all tags)

I'm more important than nuclear security

With President Ahmadinijad last week boasting of the production of Iran's first batch of highly enriched uranium and its "capability to enrich at over 20 percent and at over 80 percent," the need to accurately account for and safeguard Iran’s nuclear material is of ever-pressing importance.  

Most observers agree that any weapons program in Iran is more likely to follow a clandestine path, since Tehran is unlikely to risk diverting materials from IAEA monitored facilities.  Yet just how satisfied can we be that Iran can’t actually misuse the stocks of uranium currently safeguarded by the IAEA?

Given the scope of the IAEA's worldwide responsibilities, it must rely on remote nuclear monitoring equipment to ensure that the nuclear fuel under its watch is not diverted for military use.  Many people fail to realize that this system is not fool proof.  However, the steps required to fill in these gaps and strengthen the IAEA require additional resources that the international community has to date been unwilling to provide…  

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Iran Watch, IAEA (all tags)