North Korea and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Extended Deterrence in East Asia
Tad | Sep 01, 2010 |
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A panel of experts on Monday discussed the utility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, in East Asia in the wake of a nuclear North Korea. The experts agreed that the U.S. policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has been effective symbolically.
Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
- to protect and reassure allies;
- to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
- to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;
- to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.
North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)
North Korea Just Bluffing?
Tad | Aug 16, 2010 | 0 
Will Pyongyang's famous propaganda ever become reality?
Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks. On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.” Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S. Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.” This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show "what a real war is like" if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.
The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise. As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades. I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan. Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them. But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?
North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)
