Been Unhappy Lately?
Duyeon | May 27, 2011 |... Now we know why... On May 26, 2011, North Korean state-run media KCNA reports Happines Index among 203 countries and grades out of 100 points:
1. China (100)
2. North Korea (98)
3. Cuba (93)
4. Iran (88)
5. Venezuela (85)
152. South Korea (18)
203. USA
* Released by a Chinese source, picked up by South Korea's Chosun Ilbo
North Korea-Iran
Duyeon | May 16, 2011 |In case you've missed it:
A UN sanctions committee report submitted to the Security Council over the weekend suggests North Korea and Iran have been regularly sharing ballistic missile technology via air cargo in violation of UN sanctions against Pyongyang. The New York Times reported that China is delaying the publication of the report.
Here are some excerpts of the unpublished report disclosed by Reuters :
European Missile Defenses: Following in the Inept Shoes of National Missile Defense?
John Isaacs | Feb 03, 2011 |The knock on United States National Missile Defense based in Alaska and California is that it never has been proved to work in real-world situations. Billions of dollars have been spent on that system, now called “ground-based mid-course,” but there is no sure evidence that the defense would work should North Korea launch nuclear-tipped missiles against us.
Because of the powerful political backing for the program, missile defense has avoided the commonsense “Fly Before You Buy” mantra that prevents billions from being wasted on weapons that may eventually prove ineffective.
According to a recent report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the government auditing agency, the Obama Administration is risking repeating history with its proposed missile defense systems in Europe.
Sell Your Dominoes Someplace Else, We're All Stocked Up Here
Kingston Reif | Sep 02, 2010 |Friend of NoH Johan Bergenas hit the online pages of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday to make that case that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, while something we should seek to prevent, would not cause a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East. He makes a persuasive case, because, well…Johan is a persuasive guy. And did I mention that the piece has a great title: “The Nuclear Domino Myth”? Nice.
Come get some:
But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964.
The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country nuclear arms race in the region.
[snip]
Predictions of catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries -- expecting that their neighbors will be nuclear powers -- to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
Nightmare scenarios are dangerous for yet another reason: the expected consequences of a nuclear Iran, real or imagined, will determine the policies pursued to prevent Tehran from developing the bomb. If the consequences are out of sync with reality, the methods applied will be disproportional to the threat. Seven years ago, the United States walked into Iraq based on worst-case-scenario predictions about its nuclear program that were far from beyond a reasonable doubt. Washington cannot afford to wage another war on false pretenses.
There is no question that the world would be better off if Iran did not obtain nuclear weapons, and the international community must use all appropriate measures to prevent Iran -- or any other country -- from doing so. But the case against a nuclear Iran is strong enough without a nuclear domino myth. By invoking worst-case scenarios, policymakers are only clouding nuanced thinking.
S-300 Bluffing from Iran?
Tad | Aug 06, 2010 |Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency allegedly reported Wednesday that Tehran has acquired “four S-300 surface-to-air missile systems”. Iran apparently acquired two “S-300 from Belarus and two others from another unspecified source”, with Fars adding, "Iran possesses four S-300 PT missiles.” The news comes following June reports that suggested the seemingly never-ending saga between Russia and Iran over the sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system had finally come to a close - as a result of a recent tightening of UN sanctions.
As explained before, if Iran really did acquire the much touted S-300 PMU-1, it would make an air attack of its controversial nuclear program a lot harder. However, from looking at the Fars report in more detail and the context in which it was released, it seems that there are a number of issues which cast doubt on the credibility of the notion Iran has acquired a robust S-300 air defense system from Belarus.
In terms of the detail of the report, there is firstly no elaboration on what is meant with regards to the "four S-300 surface-to-air missile systems". Indeed, does the wording refer to launchers or batteries? One battery of S-300 PMU1’s, the system that Iran was trying to buy from Russia, consists of up to 12 semi-trailer erector-launchers (TEL) which mount four tubular missile container-launchers and a launcher complex of several other components, detailed photographically here. Should this report merely infer that Iran has acquired four launchers, then there is little for any would-be aerial attacker to worry about. Indeed, even with a launcher complex, four TELs would only ever be able to provide a highly limited air defense....
S-300 Cancelled
Tad | Jun 24, 2010 |As anticipated by many, it was reported this weekend that Russia has decided to cancel its controversial sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system to Iran. According to Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov, the cancelation was a result of the restrictive measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1929 –though its not clear if the Resolution would actually prohibit the sale. The news marks the apparent end of a years long saga in which Russia ostensibly delayed delivery on a number of occasions due to ‘technical reasons’ – but perhaps more realistically as a result of pressure from Israel and the U.S. As a result, this news represents an Israeli and U.S diplomatic success and illustrates a possibly increasing distance between the once close Iran and Russia…
The S-300 PMU-1 is one of the most advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the world, capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously up to 90 km away. Given the capabilities of the system, it was always easy to see why countries like Israel and the U.S were opposed to the sale. Indeed, by installing S-300 missile batteries close to its nuclear facilities, Iran could have made it a lot harder for an enemy to successfully destroy its nuclear program from the air. Naturally, this would not be in the interests of either Israel or the U.S in the event that they felt they had to use military force...
Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important
Sarah | Jun 01, 2010 |The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 - to be attended by all Middle Eastern states - which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”
Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty "ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”
Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.
The NPT Review Conference's Focus on a Nuclear Free Middle East
Sarah | May 27, 2010 |As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones. A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.
Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too. The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole. While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.
The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.
Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons. First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.
Interesting developments in the Russia / Iran S-300 deal?
Tad | Apr 09, 2010 |Back in February I blogged about the ongoing delays surrounding the delivery of Russia’s S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Iran. At the time, Russia cited technical problems as being the cause of the delay whilst simultaneously promising Tehran that they would still honor the sale. But according to a new story from Russian media outlet RIA Novosti, it seems that the Iranians are still no closer to getting their hands on the advanced air defense system. This time the delay has been explained as being caused by ongoing ‘talks’, again with the Russian caveat that ‘contracts have been signed, and they are being implemented’.
Since the S-300 contract was signed in December 2005, it would seem that the only talks that could be delaying delivery are those not involving the Iranians. As Richard Weitz recently pointed out, in light of the ongoing nuclear impasse, its likely that Israel and the U.S are exerting significant diplomatic pressure on Moscow to delay delivery for as long as possible. Iran’s hope that ‘Russian officials [are not] swayed by political pressure from other countries’ reflects their frustration at what appears to be the continuing success of Israeli and American efforts. But as Weitz suggests, these efforts ‘will matter little if China chooses to sell them its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, which is characterized as "a not-so-bad Russian S-300 for less money."’ Which is where things get interesting…
What engagement?
Tad | Apr 05, 2010 |In recent weeks calls to further sanction Iran for its nuclear program have been on the rise in a number of high profile op-eds, in blogs, and in rhetoric from the White House.
For example, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA) recently stated that it is now time for ‘moving beyond engagement’. Berman is a key author and supporter of unilateral U.S. sanctions legislation that has passed both the House and the Senate and could be sent to President Obama’s desk for approval soon. Berman writes that the legislation will ‘impose severe penalties on companies that sell refined petroleum products to Iran or support the development of Iran’s domestic refining capacity.’
David Milliband, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, said that ‘proportionate and reversible’ multilateral sanctions ‘are needed urgently’ to affect a change in Iran’s behavior. In the blogosphere, the Heritage Foundation is calling for ‘extremely strong international sanctions that would impose excruciating economic pain and threaten the regime’s continued hold on power.’ In a (sadly) similar vein, Hillary Clinton called for ‘sanctions that will bite’. Although varying in the level and form of sanctions called for, both sides of the political spectrum appear to be coalescing around the view that tougher measures are required because engagement has failed.
Yet dialogue should have always been framed as a long-term pursuit, not something that was ever going to solve problems in any immediate time-frame…









