NPT RevCon Produces Consensus Final Document
Mary | May 28, 2010 |Well folks, the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference has successfully produced a consensus final document! This is the third time in the 40-year history of the Treaty that a consensus document has been achieved, so it is a not-unsubstantial achievement, especially given the tense negotiations that sometimes accompanied the month-long negotiations.
The past 24 hours in particular witnessed tense negotiations surrounding one complicated and highly politicized issue in particular: Israel. Their nuclear weapons program is the big open secret of the international community, and this NPT RevCon witnessed a contentious debate surrounding their being called out on it.
Negotiations between Egypt (representing the Non-Aligned Movement states) and the United States in the final hours of the conference resulted in the United States capitulating in the interest of achieving a consensus document and allowing the following language to remain in the final document:
The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
Immediately after agreeing to the final document, states were given the opportunity to speak. Amidst a river of thanks to the Review Conference President, Indonesian Libran Nuevas Cabactulan, there were some pointed remarks. Among them were words by the United States delegate, State department official Ellen Tauscher, that the United States "deeply regrets" that Israel was called out by name in the final text to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and participate in a 2012 conference on the establishment of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
Meanwhile, other states -- from Egypt (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement) to Lebanon and Algeria -- reiterated their position that a reaffirmation of the intention to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East was a vital point to be included in the final document.
Other areas of disagreement that were ultimately sidelined in order to reach consensus were: the encouragement of stronger safeguards, particularly through the adoption of the Additional Protocol; a timeline for complete disarmament (NAM states in particular had been calling for a firm date of 2025 as the goal for complete disarmament by the nuclear weapon states); negative security assurances, i.e. a guarantee on the part of nuclear weapon states that they will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states; and a moratorium on the production of fissile material, amongst other issues.
Overall, the consensus final document can be viewed as a success. Despite immense tension between some of the states party to this treaty, a substantive consensus document was still achieved through a month of gritty diplomacy. We would wish that the efforts of political rivals working alongside each other in the interest of disarmament and non-proliferation would encourage further diplomacy and frank discussions between countries. The NPT Review Conference is only every five years, yet the cooperation and frank discussions witnessed at the RevCon should occur with much more frequency.
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Nukes of Hazard will post the final document text when it becomes available. Until then, see this draft version.
What Do The Non-Nuclear Weapons States Want?
Mary | May 27, 2010 |According to Iran, whose representative to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference spoke with press this afternoon while on his way to a plenary session at which the latest draft of the final document was distributed, there are three things holding up consensus on this NPT RevCon. In particular, he said "there are three issues that have been serious obstacles for the success of the conference so far, and the [nuclear] weapons states have not cooperated:
"One is the Non-Aligned Movement - 116 countries - have demanded setting a definite timeline of 2025 to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states have not accepted that.
"Second point is there should be negative security assurances. This means that nuclear weapon states should give us a legally binding, unconditional assurance that they will not use nuclear weapons against other countries which do not have nuclear weapons. They have not accepted yet.
"The third point is to promptly commence negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. We have non-proliferation convention, what about nuclear weapons convention. Again they have not accepted this yet."
He went on to say that nuclear weapon states and the Non-Aligned Movement states "have been facing a stalemate situation up until now" because of these issues.
Preliminary Thoughts on the Draft NPT RevCon Final Document
Mary | May 25, 2010 |A draft final document penned by the President of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Indonesian Libran Nuevas Cabactulan) has been circulating at the United Nations -- and the internet -- in the past 24 hours.
After a quick read through of the draft final document, it is clear that the core sticking points amongst States parties remain the same: disagreement over the voluntary vs. binding nature of the Additional Protocol, which would strengthen IAEA ability to oversee and inspect nuclear programs; the Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, for which a distinct conference in 2012 has been proposed and which Israel is being lobbied to attend; and the ever-present debate over a timeline for disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.
However, the draft document also makes clear how forcefully the Non-Aligned Movement states are seeking to delink non-proliferation from nuclear energy; the document text quite stridently defends their right to peacefully develop nuclear energy. Some interesting points are highlighted below:
33: “The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”
And 34, which reaffirms the right of States parties to the Treaty to develop “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
35 is also emphatic: “The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.”
Also notable:
On non-NPT states parties (103): “The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and promptly.”
Notably absent is any mention of Israel (although they are called out by name later).
On diplomacy: “The Conference emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State Party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”
Unsurprisingly, the text of the final document does not mention Iran by name, but does express concern “with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.”
On the Additional Protocol: point 25 “notes that the entry into force and implementation of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapons States is of vital importance for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of non-nuclear-weapon States’ nuclear programmes.”
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On an unrelated note, it seems likely that the United Nations Security Council will wait until the Lebanese presidency of the UNSC is over, i.e. until June, to begin discussing the fourth round of sanctions against Iran. This saves face for Lebanon, and will also allow the NPT RevCon to get the attention it warrants during this last, closing week.
5,113 Nukes in the U.S. Arsenal
Laicie Olson | May 03, 2010 |The United States disclosed the current size of its nuclear arsenal for the first time today: 5,113 warheads operationally deployed, kept in active reserve and held in inactive storage.
This number does not include an estimated 4,600 warheads that have been retired and scheduled for dismantlement.
While operationally deployed strategic warheads have been previously disclosed -- 1,968 at the end of 2009 -- an overall number has never been reported.
According to the following fact sheet, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been reduced by 84 percent from its maximum level of 31,225 warheads at the end of fiscal year 1967.

More after the jump...



