Will Pyongyang's famous propaganda ever become reality?

Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks.  On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.”  Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S.   Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.”   This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show "what a real war is like" if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.

The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise.  As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades.  I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan.  Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

The NK Sanctions Chain

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on July 21 a series of measures to increase Washington’s ability to “prevent North Korea's proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions.”  She added, “We will implement new country-specific sanctions aimed at North Korea's sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities.”  Although the U.S is already committed to implementing exactly these sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, Ms. Clinton explained that they will now be more strictly imposed in response to steps North Korean entities have taken to adapt to the existing sanctions.   In addition to bolstering current sanctions, Washington also looks set to freeze a number of bank accounts associated with suspect North Korean companies, although on limited scale. So, is this latest development merely a posturing, the seeds of a major change in North Korean behavior, or likely to start a second Korean war?

In answering this question it’s important to look first at the context in which the U.S announcement was made.  March 26 saw the sinking of the Cheonan, on May 26  South Korea released its alleged evidence of North Korean culpability and ever since, U.S rhetoric has continued to condemn Pyongyang’s behavior while also warning of inevitable consequences.  Unfortunately for Washington though, ‘consequences’ did not arise for North   Korea when the Cheonan incident was finally raised at the United Nations Security Council in early July.  While the UNSC statement condemned the sinking of the ROK navy corvette and expressed “deep concern” over South Korea’s investigative report, the carefully worded text excluded any actual reference to the DPRK.  Consequently it came as no surprise that North Korea considered the UNSC statement a “diplomatic victory,” enabling it to elude any formal punishment at the Security Council.  This was of course due to China’s reticence on the issue, which derives from the fact that Beijing was unwilling to call out its communist neighbor by name (just as the U.S is rarely willing to do so with Israel)....

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North Korea, sanctions, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

CATO Event in Washington D.C

The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday.  Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved.

Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States.  Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame.  Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats.   He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”.....

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North Korea, nuclear, event, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung - 1994

Last week the Council on Foreign Relations released a Task Force report suggesting that the current U.S policy of ‘strategic patience’ offers a ‘time time frame for achieving denuclearization…so vague that there is a significant risk that [it] will result in acquiescence to North   Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli.’ Echoing a frustration shared by many Korea watchers, the report describes the current administration’s efforts toward the objective of denuclearization in North Korea as ‘halfhearted’.  It warns that Washington must up its game and deal with the policy challenges presented by North Korea, ranked according to their fundamental importance: 1) preventing DPRK nuclear proliferation to others; 2) rolling back the nuclear program; and 3) integrating the isolated nation into the international community.

In order to deal with these issues the Task Force first identifies and reviews four policy options for the current administration: (1) explicitly recognizing and acquiescing to a nuclear North Korea; (2) containing and managing the problem; (3) attempting to roll back the program and; (4) pursuing regime change.  The report suggests that while the current policy of ‘strategic patience’ is most similar to option 2, it is now time to pursue this in combination with option 3, including ‘a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs’.

While many will welcome the timeliness of the report and its rightful critique of current policy, it is not clear how the proposed combination of policy options 2 and 3 can offer Washington any new leverage over Pyongyang…

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Nukes on a Blog, North Korea, Engagement, nuclear (all tags)

Was it all talk?

After South   Korea released its international report on the sinking of the Cheonan detailing North Korean responsibility for the incident, tensions rose on the Korean peninsula to levels not seen in recent years.  With South Korea promising a ‘stern response’ to the attack and North   Korea promising retaliation that could include a ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, it looked like there was real potential for escalation.  Now, nearly three weeks on, both South and North Korea appear to be u-turning on a number of the threats they issued. Which begs the question: were the threats just all talk, as we have seen in the past, or were tensions so high (as I explained here) that both sides deemed that they had no choice but to urgently take de-escalatory steps?

Reports initially suggested that South Korea would seek sanctions at the U.N Security Council as part of its promised ‘stern response’ to the sinking of the Cheonan. But Pyongyang threatened to respond to any action at the Security Council using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style.’  Nearly three weeks later, Seoul has finally referred the case to the Security Council and naturally, North Korea has responded again with strong rhetoric – even implying the possibility of more missile / nuclear tests.  But instead of sanctions, South Korea now seems to be looking to send a ‘political, symbolic and moral message’ at the Security Council.  North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric may have contributed to this change in approach, but it also seems that uncertainty over Russia and China’s position curtailed South Korea’s desire to try and get sanctions through the UN.

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Nukes on a Blog, DPRK, North Korea nuclear, nuclear (all tags)

Reigning national debate champions Michigan State University will face Emory University for what promises to be a lively debate on U.S. CTBT on June 10.  Typically showcasing the views of renowned nuclear weapons experts, this specially organized PONI debate will put some of the nation’s brightest and sharpest young thinkers head to head in front of an expert judging panel (consisting of DoD and DoE officials) and audience.  The event builds on the momentum generated by the intercollegiate policy debate topic of 2009, “Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons Policy”, which saw over ten thousand two-hour debates on the subject.

With debaters having spent hours and hours researching and strategizing in preparation, we can expect to hear some fresh viewpoints and new ideas on how to get CTBT ratified as well as the likely arguments that will be employed to block ratification.  And in being joined by an expert panel and audience, the students will for their part get an opportunity to road-test ideas and receive useful feedback.....  

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debate, CTBT, PONI, nuclear, nuclear testing (all tags)

The international team investigating the sinking of the Cheonan released its report last week, alleging North Korean responsibility for the attack.  With the outcome of the investigation widely accepted by the international community, condemnation of Pyongyang has been nearly universal.  As I explained in last week’s analysis, both South Korea and its allies have few avenues to reprimand the DPRK.  Nonetheless, talk of U.N sanctions and the resumption of South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign has infuriated Pyongyang, which has  threatened to retaliate with ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style’.  While this isn’t the first time North Korea has threatened to respond with war or even use nuclear weapons, its release in the context of the Cheonan incident must not be dismissed lightly – especially given signs that Kim Jong Il has instructed the DPRK military to get ready for combat.

Given the current uncertainties surrounding succession, Kim Jong-Il will not want to look weak to the DPRK military – the group holding the most significant power broker in North Korea.  By not following through on at least some of the type of actions detailed in North Korea’s warnings, Kim could risk being seen as ineffectual – potentially causing problems for the planned succession to his son Kim Jong-Eun.  Kim’s leadership over the coming days and weeks will thus be informed by this context.  Similarly, Lee Myung Bak has stressed that South Korea ‘will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence’.  He too will be under pressure to show strong leadership, especially in advance of the June 2, 2010 local elections in South Korea.  In this context, it seems there are several potential flashpoints that could lead to escalation.

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North Korea, 6 Party Talks, Cheonan, South Korea, nuclear (all tags)

The Cheonan

Kim Jong Il’s declaration last week that he was willing to ‘provide favorable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks’ marked a positive change in tone from North Korea’s previous insistence on a peace treaty with the U.S. as a precondition to resuming negotiations.  However, the pledge comes just six weeks after the deadly sinking of a South Korean navy vessel, the Cheonan - a catastrophe that Seoul appears set to formally accuse North Korea this week of.

While it’s unclear if the torpedo rumored to have sunk the Cheonan was actually launched by the order of Kim Jong Il, both the U.S and South Korea have made it clear that there will be no resumption of nuclear talks until the case is resolved.   And until a response is decided upon and implemented, engagement of any sort will remain out of the question.

While North Korea denied attacking the Cheonan, sources within both the U.S and South Korean Governments have continued to insinuate that Pyongyang is to blame.  Suggestions that a key KPA General was promoted at the time of the sinking, and that a rumor of responsibility has been ‘proudly’ circulating North  Korea, further call into question Pyongyang’s assertion of innocence.  Other indicators of North Korean culpability include the fact that the ship sunk so close to the disputed Northern Limit Line and the traces of the powerful explosive ‘RDX’ recently identified at the scene.  Despite all this, there has still been no official confirmation of what seems to be crystal clear – a North Korean torpedo sunk the Cheonan…

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North Korea, 6 Party Talks, Cheonan, South Korea, nuclear (all tags)

Last week Israel’s Prime Minister announced his decision to cancel abruptly his appearance at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.  Israeli officials suggested that Netanyahu scuttled the trip due to fears that a group of Arab states might have used the conference to demand Israel sign up to the Non Proliferation Treaty.  At a time when Israel continues to lobby allies to punish Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program, such focus on its own program would have made it a target for criticism.  And in the context of nuclear terrorism, this criticism seems increasingly valid.  

Netanyahu's attendance at the summit would have been unprecedented.  He would have been the first Israeli premier ever to participate in discussions on nuclear issues.  It’s also a subject he is knowledgeable about, having written specifically about it in his book, ‘Fighting Terrorism’.  And it’s a subject that is particularly relevant for Israel, since historically it has been a frequent victim of terrorist attacks.

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Israel, nuclear, nuclear security summity, middle east, WMD (all tags)

In recent weeks calls to further sanction Iran for its nuclear program have been on the rise in a number of high profile op-eds, in blogs, and in rhetoric from the White House.  

For example, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA) recently stated that it is now time for ‘moving beyond engagement’.  Berman is a key author and supporter of unilateral U.S. sanctions legislation that has passed both the House and the Senate and could be sent to President Obama’s desk for approval soon.  Berman writes that the legislation will ‘impose severe penalties on companies that sell refined petroleum products to Iran or support the development of Iran’s domestic refining capacity.’

David Milliband, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, said that ‘proportionate and reversible’ multilateral sanctions ‘are needed urgently’ to affect a change in Iran’s behavior.  In the blogosphere, the Heritage Foundation is calling for ‘extremely strong international sanctions that would impose excruciating economic pain and threaten the regime’s continued hold on power.’  In a (sadly) similar vein, Hillary Clinton called for ‘sanctions that will bite’.  Although varying in the level and form of sanctions called for, both sides of the political spectrum appear to be coalescing around the view that tougher measures are required because engagement has failed.  

Yet dialogue should have always been framed as a long-term pursuit, not something that was ever going to solve problems in any immediate time-frame…

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Iran, nuclear, US, Obama, Washington, Ahmadinijad (all tags)