Guest Post by Cole Harvey

On February 5, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev approved the text of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (available in the original Russian here).  The new doctrine had been the subject of some concern before its publication (including from yours truly), following an interview with the secretary of the Russian Security Council in which he suggested that the document would authorize the use of nuclear weapons in “local” conflicts.  Thankfully the new military doctrine outlines a far more circumscribed role for nuclear weapons than the secretary had indicated...

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Nukes on a Blog, Russia (all tags)

Earlier today Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) submitted a statement for the record on the START follow-on agreement (aka New START).  The full statement is posted below the jump.  Some highlights:

...

The United States and Russia maintain over ninety percent of the world’s approximately 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the capacity to destroy an entire city; collectively, they can destroy the world. The mere existence of these weapons creates the risk of a nuclear accident, unauthorized use, and theft by a terrorist group. The size and structure of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals reflect an antiquated Cold War mindset that we must move beyond.

...

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that “terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by a state.” Our priority, therefore, should be to work together with Russia to reduce the size and vulnerability of our nuclear arsenals, and ensure that proper security and surveillance safeguards are in place.

...

I am encouraged that efforts to negotiate a START follow-on agreement have bipartisan support among national security experts. Notably, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, headed by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger, endorsed a follow-on agreement to START. Similarly, Secretary Perry joined with former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz to pen an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for the extension of the key provisions of START and further reductions in our nuclear stockpile.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START (all tags)

Part I of two posts on the Global Zero Movement

The congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which outlines U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, and readiness, has been delayed until, at the earliest, the second half of this month.  According to a senior administration official, the review will call for “dramatic reductions in the stockpile,” a “greater role for conventional weapons in deterrence” and ruling out the need for low-yield, bunker-busting nuclear weapons capable of penetrating underground targets.  

While this is very encouraging news, there is still some concern that the new NPR will not go far enough towards achieving President Obama’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.  Reports have indicated that early drafts of the Nuclear Posture Review fell short of the transformational vision put forth by the President in Prague.  Here’s to hoping that when he makes his final decisions on the review, President Obama will take his cues from the rapidly growing Global Zero movement rather than those who may be urging him not to stray too far from the status quo…

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Nukes on a Blog, Nuclear Posture Review, Global Zero (all tags)

Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad.

In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.”

Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:

THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?

When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:

THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?

MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.

Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:

MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.

Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:

SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.

THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?

SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.

Well said, General.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Senate, Posture Review, Air Force (all tags)

Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.”

Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted.

Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support.

In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:

The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, CTBT, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Senate (all tags)

I’ve been thinking a lot about the “inevitability assumption” lately.  There is a fundamental problem associated with the assumption that Iran is inevitably going to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Back in December, Jim Walsh, Thomas Pickering, and William Luers hit the problem on the head:

This “inevitability assumption” has been a common belief in the nuclear age, and yet, it has repeatedly turned out to be wrong. The examples include Egypt, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The assumption is tantamount to relying on a worst-case scenario, which in turn has the effect of truncating the list of potential policy options. Worse yet, an assumption that Iran is going nuclear can lead decision-makers to miss the signals and signs when a negotiated settlement is actually possible.

Today, U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Glyn Davies told Christiane Amanpour that “the world's patience with Iran is running out. ‘It's becoming quite clear that they're preserving at least the option of developing a nuclear program. And we want all nations of the world to take note of this and draw the right conclusion.’”

I can only assume the conclusion he speaks of is that Iran is working to build, and will one day acquire, a nuclear weapon. As a result of this conclusion, the U.S. is once again focusing narrowly on sanctions, while others push for more decisive action. Ultimately, though, any and all of these tactics are aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Not the option of a weapon; not the desire for a weapon; but a fully capable nuclear arsenal able to wipe out… well, anyone at all.

Iran does not currently have this ability…

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Iran Watch, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

As analysts prepare for the impending release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (see 1 – 2 – 3), a grading scale would help to illustrate which policies are under consideration. Thankfully, Prof. Tom Sauer provided such a scale in “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” his contribution to the October 2009 issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Sauer argues that nuclear weapons states may choose to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons in their security policies sooner than is commonly expected. He then digs into some Global Zero analysis towards the end, so if that’s your bag, check him out.

Here is the excellent typology Sauer presents for considering nuclear weapons policy. Click to enlarge.

Here are the definitions and historical examples Sauer uses to illustrate his typology.

Nuclear Primacy
Description: the capability to eliminate the nuclear weapons force of the enemy with a first strike
Example: U.S. during the late 1940s

Maximum Deterrence
Description: role of nuclear weapons in the defence posture is emphasized, literally maximized, in order to squeeze as much benefit as possible out of deterrence
Examples: U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War; U.K. and France during the Cold War, albeit at much lower levels

Minimum Deterrence
Description: minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons…a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable
Examples: current postures of Israel, France, and U.K.; perhaps the U.S. and Russia in 15-20 years?

Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear weapons are able to deter thanks simply to their existence, regardless of the nature of the nuclear posture
Examples: China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan, although the latter two want to move up the chart

Post-Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear deterrence without the existence of nuclear weapons (i.e. tracking Mazarr)
Examples: Japan and Germany

When the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review comes out in the next few weeks, analysts might ask how closely it adheres to Sauer’s full description of minimum deterrence:

Minimum deterrence tries to minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons. According to minimum (and existential) deterrence, in contrast to maximum deterrence, a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable. As long as the opponent believes that he can be attacked with tens of nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike, the fear of assured destruction will prevail. Parity, let alone superiority, is therefore not a requirement. Because of the relatively small nuclear forces, counterforce targeting and massive attack options are excluded. To the same extent, high alert rates are not needed, except maybe for the invulnerable part of the arsenal. A no-first-use declaratory policy then also becomes an option, at least for states that cannot be easily overrun by non-nuclear means.

How will the Obama administration’s review stack up?

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, Obama Administration (all tags)

During last week’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the fiscal year 2011 U.S. Navy budget request, Senator John Thune (R-SD) stuck to his parochial and political guns by quizzing the witnesses about U.S. nuclear force posture. His line of attack on the administration’s policy process suggests an argument that opponents of New START may advance during Senate debate on the agreement, whenever that occurs.

Following an exchange on nuclear delivery vehicles (pun!), Thune cited last year’s Guardian article and asked whether it was true that President Obama had rejected the Pentagon’s previous Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) draft because it was too timid. This question dovetailed with the “numbers game” criticism I dissected last week, wherein conservatives claim that the White House is cutting nuclear weapons sans either strategy or international/ intragovernmental consultations.

In response, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead detailed just how inclusive and accountable the Obama administration’s NPR process has been. He said:

I've been involved in the NPR and I believe that the process we've had, the considerations we've had, has placed great value on our nuclear deterrent force, all legs of that triad, and the considerations of being able to feel the strategic needs of the nation.

[snip]

I'm very comfortable with the discussions we've had, the involvement that we've had, and how we're looking at things.

[snip]

I think as we have worked our way through what's a very complex process, I've been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having, sir.

Policymakers and analysts will inevitably disagree about what the new NPR contains. Yet there is clear evidence that the White House has not unilaterally imposed its agenda on the Pentagon. The process has been collaborative, responsible, and, perhaps as a consequence, a teensy bit behind schedule.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Senate, Congress, Posture Review, Obama Administration (all tags)

Fully extended, yo.

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Nukes on a Blog, Video, Extended Deterrence (all tags)

The Senate Democratic Policy Committee today released three excellent policy reports on nuclear weapons issues:

1. The Follow-on START Agreement: Responding to False Claims (3/3/10)

2. A New START Treaty Is Critical to U.S. National Security (3/3/10)

3. The President's Budget Makes Vital Investments for Maintaining Our Robust Nuclear Stockpile, Minimizing Proliferation Risks, and Halting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Read 'em while they're hot!

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, modernization (all tags)