On April 25 the seven Subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) began releasing their marks in preparation for the full HASC mark up of the defense bill on May 9. Among the marks released today was the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark. The Subcommittee is scheduled to take up the mark on April 26.

If previous years are any indication, the Subcommittee marks are likely to be very short. In the case of Strategic Forces, controversial issues such as missile defense funding, the budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) weapons activities account, and likely amendments on nuclear weapons and missile defense from Chairman Rep. Michael Turner's (R-OH) "Maintaining the President's Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security Act of 2012," (H.R. 4178) and Rep. Mo Brooks' (R-AL) "Protecting U.S. Missile Defense Information Act of 2012." (H.R. 4125) will not be debated until the full Committee considers the defense bill.

The Subcommittee mark doesn't contain detailed funding levels for strategic forces programs at DoD and NNSA. Those figures may not be revealed until HASC Chairman Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA) releases his Chairman's mark prior to the full Committee mark up.  Recall that House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-WI) provided nearly $4 billion more for National Defense (Function 050) than the Presidents budget request.

Most of the Subcommittee's legislative provisions and reporting requirements pertain to making drastic changes to NNSA’s governance and management systems to make the agency more independent and efficient and missile defense programs. Below is an early look at some of these provisions.

Re: missile defense, the mark proposes a $356 million increase for the ground based midcourse defense system (GMD), despite the fact that the system has not had a successful flight intercept test in 3+ years and additional funding will not ameliorate many of the problems that continue to plague the system.

The mark also requires the Missile Defense Agency to develop a plan for the deployment of missile defense site on the East Coast of the United States to be operational not later than the end of 2015. The mark would also authorize $100 million in FY 2013 to be available 30 days after the plan is presented to the congressional defense committees. For a good take on why this would be a bad idea, see Noah Shachtman's piece over at Danger Room here.

In keeping with Chairman Turner's zeal for national missile defense programs, the mark includes a provision requiring Europe to shoulder much more of the financial burden for the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Meanwhile, the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee mark includes two controversial provisions re: the air- and sea-based legs of the U.S. nuclear triad:

• A provision requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to make certain that the new long-range strike bomber will be certified to use strategic weapons by the date it receives declaration of initial operational capability.
  
• A provision requiring the Secretary of the Navy to maintain a minimum of 12 ballistic missile submarines in the fleet.

The Pentagon's FY 2013 budget request delayed procurement of the first Ohio-class replacement submarine by two years, which according to current plans will result in a strategic submarine fleet of 10 subs in the 2030s. The Pentagon has also indicated that it plans to delay certification of the nuclear mission for the new bomber to control costs.

Rep. McKeon has stated that HASC will seek to begin undoing the two-year delay to the Ohio-class by adding funding in FY 2013 for research and development for the program, which was more than $600 million less than projected as of the FY 2012 budget request.

There is simply no need to rush the certification of a nuclear capability for the bomber and requiring the Navy to maintain 12 ballistic missile submarines in perpetuity regardless of the global security environment makes neither strategic nor fiscal sense. U.S. nuclear force structure should be driven by strategic needs (a review of which is ongoing) and affordability, not the inertia of the status quo.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, missile defense, nuclear weapons budget, nuclear guidance review (all tags)

By Kingston Reif and Nickolas Roth

On April 24 the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee released its draft Committee report of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Energy and Water bill.  The full House Appropriations Committee is scheduled to take up the bill on April 25.  

The House version of the bill recommends $11.28 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a decrease of $260.9 million below the requested level and an increase of $275 million above the FY 2012 level.  

Subcommittee Chairman Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Pete Visclosky (D-IN) deserve credit for prioritizing NNSA’s core nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs, which support the U.S.-led global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials at an accelerated rate. As we hinted last week, the Committee actually increases funding for some of these programs, while wisely reducing funding for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program and research and development on a cultivating a domestic uranium enrichment capability.

Regarding weapons activities, the draft bill supports the Obama administration’s decision to delay by at least five years construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.    

Nuclear Material Security and Non-Proliferation

Including rescissions, the draft House report funds NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account at $2.276 billion, a decrease of $20 million below last year's level and a decrease of $182.6 million below the requested level...  

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, nuclear terrorism, nuclear weapons budget (all tags)

An excerpt from the Government Accountability Office's April 2012 report titled "MISSILE DEFENSE: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency":

MDA undertook a highly concurrent acquisition strategy to meet the President’s 2002 directive to deploy an initial set of missile defense capabilities by 2004. To do so, the GMD element concurrently matured technology, designed the system, tested the design, and produced and fielded a system. While this approach allowed GMD to rapidly field a limited defense that consisted of five CE-I interceptors and a fire control system, the concurrency resulted in unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls. Since then, MDA has produced and emplaced all of its planned CE-I interceptors. To address issues with the CE-I interceptors, MDA has undertaken an extensive retrofit and refurbishment program.

Prior to MDA fully completing development and demonstrating the capability of the initial interceptor, MDA committed in 2004 to another highly concurrent development, production, and fielding strategy for an enhanced version of the interceptor—CE-II—as shown in figure 2.

MDA proceeded to concurrently develop, manufacture, and deliver 12 of these interceptors before halting manufacture of components and delivery of interceptors in 2011 due to the failure in FTG-06a. Although MDA had not successfully tested this interceptor, failing in both its attempts, it manufactured and delivered 12 of these interceptors.

The discovery of the design problem while production is under way has increased MDA costs, led to a production break, may require retrofit of fielded equipment, delayed delivery of capability to the war-fighter, and altered the flight test plan. For example, the flight testing cost to confirm the CE-II capability has increased from $236 million to about $1 billion. In addition, the program will have to undertake another retrofit program, for the 10 CE-II interceptors that have already been manufactured. According to a GMD program official, although the full cost is currently unknown, he expects the cost to retrofit the CE-II interceptors to be around $18 million each or about $180 million for all 10. Intended to be ready for operational use in fiscal year 2009, it will now be at least fiscal year 2013 before the warfighter will have the information needed to determine whether to declare the variant operational.

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Nukes on a Blog, missile defense (all tags)

With the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces set to mark up the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on April 26, to be followed on May 9 by the full House Armed Services Committee, stay tuned to this space for a preview of what to expect on nuclear weapons and missile defense policy as well as analysis of the bill as it moves it's way through the House.

For a reminder of what transpired on these issues last year, see our summary of the FY 2012 NDAA here.

As was the case last year, Strategic Force Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) plans to use the defense bill to attempt to severely constrain the President and the Pentagon's ability to implement the New START treaty and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Rep. Turner and his allies are likely to draw amendments to offer to the NDAA during the full Committee markup from two sources: H.R. 4178, also known as the "Maintaining the President's Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security Act of 2012," and H.R. 4125, titled "Protecting U.S. Missile Defense Information Act of 2012."

We'll have more to say about these bills and their specific provisions in the coming days - in fact we've already had a say on some of the content of H.R. 4178. Our colleagues over at the Arms Control Association also provided a nice rejoinder.

For a taste of just how mystifying Rep. Turner's program is, it's difficult to do better than H.R. 4178's provision titled "Nuclear Warheads on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles of the United States."

The provision includes a Sense of Congress stating "that reducing the number of nuclear warheads contained on each intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States does not promote strategic stability if at the same time other nuclear weapons states, including the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, are rapidly increasing the warhead-loading of their land-based missile forces." It also includes a limitation mandating that the number of nuclear warheads on ICBMs can't be reduced to a single warhead "unless the President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both also carrying out a similar reduction."

You'll recall that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review declared that "The United States will “deMIRV” all deployed ICBMs, so that each Minuteman III ICBM has only one nuclear warhead....This step will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first."

This decision has been applauded by just about everyone, except it seems, the Republicans on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.  For example, the bipartisan Senate ICBM caucus, which can't exactly be accused of being soft on this issue, noted in a recent letter the move a single warhead force is a "stabilizing trend".  And at an April 17 House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, STRATCOM Gen. Robert Kehler proclaimed:

And so the idea is to bring them down to one reentry vehicle per ICBM to essentially reduce their strategic value. That's the pathway that we've been on for quite some time. I support that. I think that that is the right way to go forward for both of those reasons. I also believe that maintaining the ability to go back to a MIRV in the future as a hedge is also the right thing to do.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, nuclear guidance review (all tags)

Regular readers know that we weren't big fans of the Obama administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget request for core nuclear material security programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration. And given that Republicans on the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee made significant cuts to these programs in FY 2012, there was concern that an already ugly budget could get even uglier.

On April 17, the Subcommittee released the fiscal year 2013 Energy and Water and Related Agencies Appropriations bill.  Excluding rescissions, the bill funds NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account at $2.283 billion, an decrease of $12.8 million below last year's final appropriated level and a decrease of $175.6 million below the requested level. The bill did not included detailed numbers for the various subaccounts within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation portfolio.  

Nor were the detailed budget numbers revealed at the Subcommittee's April 18 markup of the bill. In his opening statement at the markup, Chairman Rep. Rodney Freylinghuysen stated: "Funding for Nonproliferation, although below the request, actually increases for some core programs. $100 million is provided to support new uranium enrichment activities." Likewise, Ranking Member Rep. Pete Visclosky said: "Let me first express my appreciation for the inclusion of additional funds for core Nonproliferation activities and the focus on American manufacturing."

It's encouraging that both the Chairman and Ranking Member are touting increases to core nonproliferation programs, which likely means the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) program (or activities therein). It's also encouraging that the Subcommittee only provided $100 million out of the $150 request for USEC. And rumor on the street is that a portion of the overall cut to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account reflects cuts to the Mixed Oxide Fuel program.

Despite these good early indicators, it remains to be seen if the increases to core programs touted by Reps. Freylinghuysen and Visclosky are relative to last year's appropriation or this year's requested level. An additional area that needs confirmation is that the Subcommittee didn't makes cuts to radiological security activities, which have been cut the last two fiscal years.

We wont have definitive answers to these questions until the detailed budget numbers are released at the full Appropriations Committee markup of the bill likely sometime next week.

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Nukes on a Blog, nuclear terrorism, Congress (all tags)

Check out my latest article about the future of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent on the Center for Arms Control website.

A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation?

A complicating factor for the referendum is that while the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a recognized nuclear weapon state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the strategic nuclear weapons forces which it possesses are all located on submarines based in Scotland. The majority party in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish National Party, has declared that if they achieve independence in 2014, they would call for the unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland.

The possibility of Scottish independence brings into serious question the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent. According to William Walker, there is no other existing submarine base in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland that would be able to host the United Kingdom’s Vanguard ballistic missile submarines. As the referendum nears and it becomes clearer whether it is likely to pass, there will undoubtedly be a more vigorous search for other basing alternatives within the U.K. Ministry of Defense and Parliament...

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Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

Via cartoonist Mike Keefe, circa July 2006, following North Korea's failed test of the Taepodong 2:

Two fair questions prompted by the cartoon: (1) How far has North Korea's missile program advanced since 2006 and (2) how far has the US Ground Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) advanced since 2006?

We know North Korea's missile program hasn't exactly distinguished itself.

According to Director of Operation Test and Evaluation Dr. Michael Gilmore's 2011 report on missile defense, “To date, GMD has demonstrated a limited capability against a simple threat.” He also says: “Lack of sufficient data for comprehensive model and simulation verification, validation, and accreditation continues to preclude end-to-end GMD performance assessment.” You'll notice this assessment hasn't changed very much since the 2006 and 2007 reports.

For a take from both sides of the debate on these and other questions re: missile defense, see Douglas Guarino's article today in Global Security Newswire, "North Korea’s Failed Rocket Launch Prompts Missile Defense Questions". Also have a look at Edward-Isaac Dovere's April 13 Politico piece: "Missile defense debate reignites".

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Nukes on a Blog, North Korea, missile defense (all tags)

Our new Senior Science Fellow Dr. Phil Coyle has a new article in the World Politics Review on U.S. nuclear test detection capabilities and why its important to sustain and improve them with our without the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Here's an excerpt:

The CTBT is not the only compelling reason for the U.S. to devote the necessary resources to nuclear test monitoring around the world, notwithstanding the constraints of “sequestration” or tight budgets generally. The nuclear test detection capabilities described by the NRC are indispensible with or without a CTBT. Given the world’s justifiable concern about Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, for example, the U.S. should be sure that it maintains the ability to detect a surprise nuclear test by Tehran.

Read the whole thing here (sadly subscription only).

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Nukes on a Blog, CTBT (all tags)

Earlier this year we profiled the Defense Science Board's (DSB) September 2011 report titled "Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility." We noted at the time that the report is about a lot more than early intercept; it highlighted a number of shortcomings of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), some of which also plague the Ground Based Midcourse Defense system. The report was especially startling given that such information doesn't often make it beyond the classification wall.

One of the most important conclusions of the DSB report is that "The current Aegis shipboard radar is inadequate to support the objective needs of the EPAA mission. For this reason, the TPY-2 land-based radars and the future Navy ship-based Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) upgrade become critical components of the European defense scenarios." [emphasis mine.]

The report went on to state:

The challenge for an advanced missile defense shipboard radar will be to accommodate the long-range detection and tracking needs to support a robust PAA, wherever it may be required in the world, while fitting within the volume, weight, and power constraints of both back-fit and new Navy combatant platforms. The Navy’s AMDR program is the only program solely focused on that challenge. Continued effort must be made in the years ahead to continue to develop advanced missile defense shipboard radar.

But the Navy's plans for the AMDR my be unworkable, according to Aviation Week's Michael Fabey:

Questions over cost and risk are already threatening the U.S. Navy’s Flight III version of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer fleet while the program is still in the service’s developmental womb.

Military analysts for a host of government watchdog agencies such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have questioned the Navy’s Flight III plans for some time, but it is the GAO review released earlier this year that highlights newly emerging cost and schedule risks.

One big worry is the Flight III ship design’s ability to handle the proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)— the cornerstone for the ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategy for the nation and the Navy—given the Burke hull’s lack of room for additional equipment.

You can read the whole GAO report cited by Fabey here. The first DDG-51 equipped with the AMDR is not scheduled to have an initial operating capability until 2023. According to GAO:

The Navy faces significant technical risks with its new Flight III DDG 51 ships, and the current level of oversight may not be sufficient given these risks. The Navy is pursuing a reasonable risk mitigation approach to AMDR development, but it will be technically challenging. According to Navy analysis, selecting the DDG 51 hullform to carry AMDR requires significant redesign and reduces the ability of these ships to accommodate future systems. This decision also limits the radar size to one that will be at best marginally effective and incapable of meeting the Navy’s desired capabilities.

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Nukes on a Blog, missile defense (all tags)

In my April Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column, I examine the recently released National Academy of Sciences report on the technical and security issues related to the CTBT.  Here's the headline intro graf:

In 1996, the United States was the first country to sign the CTBT, but in 1999, the US Senate rejected the treaty. That year, Republicans who opposed the test ban did so largely on the grounds that the US nuclear deterrent cannot be maintained without testing and that the treaty is unverifiable. While the NAS report does not take a position on whether the United States should ratify the CTBT, it does conclude that the "United States is now better able to maintain a safe and effective nuclear stockpile and to monitor clandestine nuclear-explosion testing than at any time in the past." In other words, in this day and age, concerns about the maintenance of the stockpile and verification of the treaty are no longer compelling arguments. In short, the United States should ratify the CTBT as soon as possible: It has nothing to lose and everything to gain.

I've always believed that the national security case for the CTBT rests on three core foundations:

• The CTBT would make it more difficult for nuclear-armed states to improve their nuclear arsenals via nuclear testing. For example, a global ban on testing would make it more difficult for China, India, and Pakistan to develop the smaller warheads necessary to arm their ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. States could produce simple, less complicated nuclear weapons in the absence of testing, but the NAS report concludes US leaders “could respond equally well whether or not the CTBT were in force.”
  
• The United States has conducted 1,030 nuclear tests – more than all other nations combined – the last of which was in September 1992. Given the knowledge it has gleaned from this testing history, a permanent test ban would provide the United States with an enormous advantage relative to other nuclear-armed states.
  
• The CTBT would strengthen the US ability to deter and detect clandestine nuclear explosions.

The case for the CTBT is furthered strengthened by the fact that not only does the United States have no technical need to resume explosive testing, it has not conducted a nuclear test in 20 years and is unlikely to do so in the future. Thus, the United States must invest in the capabilities to sustain the stockpile in the absence of testing with our without the treaty.  The same goes for US monitoring capabilities: it must remain vigilant about the possibility of foreign nuclear tests with or without the treaty.

Sounds like a pretty good deal, no?

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Nukes on a Blog, CTBT, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column (all tags)