HASC Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor yesterday announced his panel’s decision to “gate” 50 percent of FY 2011 R&D funding for the SSBN-X until the Navy shares its analysis of alternatives for the program. As I wrote previously, Taylor is interested in discovering whether a smaller, cheaper submarine could relieve some of the inevitable pressure on the Navy’s future shipbuilding budget—and just so happen to ensure consistent funding for the surface combatants built in his district.

Here’s CQ Today’s (subscription only) summary of the move:

The bill, if enacted, would restrict 50 percent of the $672.3 million authorized “until the secretary of Defense reports to the committee the guidance which shaped the results of the analysis of alternatives, the time needed to develop and deploy each alternative capability, and the rationale associated with construction of a new class of submarines capable of carrying the current weapon vice development of a smaller missile to fit an existing submarine,” said Seapower panel Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss.

[snip]

Taylor argues that the last Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) already limits the D-5 missile to carrying only eight nuclear warheads, despite its ability to carry more. “Is this very big missile what we need and do we need to build a new submarine for it?” Taylor asked.

The House may not get to vote on arms control treaties, but it certainly has ways to make its presence felt in U.S. nuclear policy deliberations.

UPDATE May 15: Rep. Taylor may indeed smell a rat, generally speaking, with this analysis of alternatives (AOA) business. As GAO reported last year:

Many of the AOAs that GAO reviewed did not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for addressing a warfighting need or assess technical and other risks associated with each alternative

[snip]

Without a sufficient comparison of alternatives and focus on technical and other risks, AOAs may identify solutions that are not feasible and decision makers may approve programs based on limited knowledge

[snip]

While AOAs are supposed to provide a reliable and objective assessment of viable weapon solutions, we found that service sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution or a narrow range of solutions early on, before an AOA is conducted. The timing of AOAs has also been problematic. Some AOAs are conducted under compressed timeframes in order to meet a planned milestone or weapon system fielding date and are conducted concurrently with other key activities required to become a program of record. This can short-change a comprehensive assessment of risks and preclude effective cost, schedule, and performance trade offs from taking place prior to beginning development.

Some of these findings could (as in maybe) apply to the SSBN-X, I think.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Navy, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request (all tags)

The always-scooping Christopher Cavas reports:

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Seapower subcommittee, complained in a letter sent Thursday to Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the Navy “refuses to share” the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the SSBN(X) program — a document that, Taylor says in the letter, was completed last year.

Rather than commit to replacing the current crop of large Ohio-class submarines armed with Trident II D5 ballistic missiles with similar ships, Taylor wants to see what a smaller, Virginia-class submarine armed with a less-lethal ballistic missile would cost. Instead, he says, the Navy already has decided it wants the bigger and more expensive ships — which some sources say could cost as much as $70 billion.

“I have repeatedly asked officials of the Department of the Navy if less-expensive alternatives to building the Ohio-class were examined,” Taylor said in the letter. “I have repeatedly been told that only the Trident solution met the requirement.”

Rep. Taylor understands the chart below and can clearly do the math: if replacing the Ohio-class SSBN fleet costs $85 billion and eats into funding for other Navy shipbuilding—like, say, the surface combatants built in Mississippi that employ at least 11,250 people in Gulfport and Pascagoula—then his district would take a serious economic hit.

The key question is whether Taylor’s parochial preference for a smaller, cheaper SSBN-X might actually comport with broader U.S. national security requirements. I for one would like to read the analysis of alternatives to see what the Navy thinks about a smaller, cheaper boomer.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Navy, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Trident (all tags)

InsideDefense.com (subscription only) reports that it will cost $339 million to make the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, according to U.S. Air Force officials.  

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey continue to host an estimated 200 B61-3 and -4 gravity bombs for delivery by various U.S. and NATO aircraft, including the “dual-capable” F-16 fighter-bomber that the JSF is slated to replace. Like the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) before it, the 2010 NPR punted on the question of U.S. tacnukes in Europe, concluding that “Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”

Yet the $339 million price tag to wire-up the B61 and JSF does not represent the full cost of maintaining nuclear-capable U.S. aircraft in Europe. As Malcolm Chalmers wrote recently:

The US is obliged to maintain a special infrastructure for the purpose [of maintaining nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe], together with the posting of around 1,500 of its service personnel (250 in each of six [US Munitions Support Squadrons] bases) in expensive foreign security postings. Ongoing threats from terrorism further add to the risks against which these bases must guard themselves.

Because of these costs, the U.S. military has long questioned the usefulness of continuing to deploy U.S. tacnukes in Europe. Chalmers noted:

As early as the 1970s, there was a fierce internal Pentagon dispute as to whether the increased weight and complexity required to wire the USAF’s F-16s for the nuclear role, together with the training required to provide a useable capability, justified the costs in reduced conventional capability.

Those questions have not disappeared. As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.” The Task Force of course disagreed with this assessment, arguing that such an attitude ignores the political and psychological value that tacnukes possess as a concrete U.S. commitment to NATO security.

But are tacnukes really the best way to address squishy concerns like politics and psychology, particularly when the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal already provides a credible “over the horizon” deterrent? Not every problem needs to have a (redundant) military solution, after all, particularly when enormous budgetary pressures confront the U.S. military in the years ahead. If the Soviets probably aren’t coming through the Fulda Gap anytime soon, then maybe it’s time to do something totally unprecedented in U.S. defense planning—make a tough choice!—and reallocate resources toward the most serious and most likely threats confronting the United States in the 21st century.

Anyway, here are the key excerpts from the InsideDefense.com article…

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, B61, Air Force, tactical nuclear weapons, Extended Deterrence, F-35 (all tags)

Because this is Washington and it’s not what is said—it’s who says it—below are three statements from the last 24 hours worth bookmarking. Chilton, Schlesinger, and D’Agostino are not members of the Obama amen chorus, but in these comments, where they had the freedom and responsibility to speak their minds, they spoke forcefully about how New START, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Obama administration’s budget plans will protect and strengthen U.S. national security.

Let’s not forget these key validators’ comments as U.S. nuclear weapons policy moves to the political arena, where hacks and clowns will inevitably get everything wrong...

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Senate, New START, Posture Review (all tags)

Invitation: Nuclear Weapons Policy Conference Call for Youth/Student Leaders, 4/20/10

Are you a member of your school’s debate team that has focused on U.S. nuclear weapons policy this year? Or a member of a campus-based group working on peace and security issues? Or simply a young person concerned about the future and wanting to be more involved?

You are cordially invited to participate in a national conference call, The Next Generation Speaks – A Briefing and Discussion on Critical U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Initiatives, on Tuesday, April 20, 7- 8:15pm EDT.

To RSVP, please contact Sean Meyer at the Union of Concerned Scientists at smeyer@ucsusa.org or 617-301-8065. Please provide your full name, school and email address.

The purpose of the call is to engage and inform young people on a range of timely, critical nuclear weapons issues and related events, including the recently completed START nuclear reductions agreement with Russia, the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes will join the call to provide his perspective on the policy landscape for critical and current nuclear weapons issues. In addition, there will be brief presentations by other experts, including senior policy experts and national nuclear weapons advocacy organizers.

More details after the jump.

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nukes on a blog, New START, posture review (all tags)

This morning, while you were shaking off your NPR/regular Tuesday -induced Bud Light hangover, my analyst Kingston Reif was throwing down live on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal.

Watch the full video here.

Of course, he handles all the substantive stuff quite nicely. But you’ve got to check out the video at 19:35 when some dopey caller complains about how he says “nucular”. KReif’s response is class.

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, New START, Video (all tags)

Marc Ambinder rebuts the NPR objections expressed by Kyl and McCain.

PONI has a helpful compilation of NPR traffic.

Channeling William F. Buckley Jr., Peter Feaver writes of the NPR, “I don't see much evidence that this is the bold leap that wins plaudits in academic seminar rooms, activist think-tanks, and Norwegian parliaments.” Ha, faux-populism from conservative elites = funny.

Don’t forget, Russia’s gotta get the Prague Treaty through its own Duma. Why not gripe a bit about U.S. missile defenses and non-nuclear missiles to facilitate that process?

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review (all tags)

The Obama administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review (full PDF) strengthens U.S. nuclear deterrence and U.S. national security. The Review pledges that the United States will not use nuclear weapons to attack a non-nuclear state that adheres to its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, even if the state launches a chemical, biological, or cyber attack against the United States. This is a wise shift from the Bush administration’s policy of threatening nuclear retaliation in response to non-nuclear attacks.

An American president would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons, and kill tens of thousands of innocent civilians, in response to a non-nuclear attack against the United States because of the moral and political repercussions of such disproportionate retaliation. Issuing such unrealistic nuclear threats not only makes the president look like an empty suit, but also creates a commitment trap where the United States would feel pressure to launch nuclear weapons, regardless of the circumstances, in order to honor its doctrinal commitments and save face with its allies and adversaries.

Of course, an American president remains free to do whatever is necessary, including employing either nuclear or highly lethal conventional options, to protect the United States regardless of what was written in some obscure report. Because potential adversaries are deterred by the reality of this big stick, the United States doesn’t have to go around speaking loudly all the time about nuclear retaliation. Everybody gets the point: don’t mess with the United States or bad things will happen.

The primary nuclear threats facing the United States today are proliferation and nuclear terrorism. These threats cannot be overcome merely by maintaining a robust nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the overwhelmingly superior U.S. nuclear arsenal has not stopped North Korea and Iran from seeking nuclear weapons. That is why the new Nuclear Posture Review recommends a series of graded options, including new conventional military capabilities and tailored regional missile defenses, to deter proliferation and nuclear terrorism. By offering realistic responses, and not just massive nuclear retaliation, the new Posture Review reconfigures and enhances U.S. deterrence for the 21st century.

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, Iran Watch, North Korea, Missile Defense (all tags)

Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad.

In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.”

Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:

THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?

When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:

THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?

MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.

Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:

MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.

Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:

SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.

THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?

SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.

Well said, General.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Senate, Posture Review, Air Force (all tags)

Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.”

Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted.

Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support.

In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:

The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, CTBT, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Senate (all tags)