There’s been talk for a while about North Korea requesting a bilateral meeting with the U.S. It’s now official the two sides will sit down next week in Beijing. State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters today (February 13, 2012) that U.S. envoy on North Korea Glyn Davies and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan will meet in Beijing on February 23rd.

It would be the third bilateral meeting of its kind since last summer with the objective on how to resume the stalled, six-party nuclear talks. Prior to Kim Jong-il’s death, the two sides had agreed in October 2011 that Pyongyang would suspend its uranium enrichment in return for food assistance ahead of the six-party talks, and hold follow-up talks on December 22, 2011. However, details including timing and logistics of the exchange apparently were not agreed upon last year, and the sudden death of Kim Jong-il (December 17) canceled the third round of talks.

Washington and Seoul have been demanding Pyongyang take sincere steps toward denuclearization before the resumption of six-party talks. Washington’s other precondition is progress in inter-Korean relations, which are currently anything but smooth.

The timing of the Beijing meeting is noteworthy as it comes just days before a series of annual, U.S.-South Korea joint military drills begin, starting with the Key Resolve exercise on February 27th, and lasting until April. Pyongyang has been highly sensitive to and denounced such drills as pretexts for an attack against the regime.

Preparations are also in full swing for the North Korean founder Kim Il-sung’s centennial in April and the opening its doors to becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.”

Perhaps the biggest question at this point is whether Pyongyang will return to two-way talks and implement the late Kim Jong-il’s instructions, or use it to help solidify the new Kim Jong-un regime, or both.

Five years ago today (February 13, 2007), the six parties agreed on initial actions they would take to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement, including shutting down the plutonium-producing Yongbyon facility in return for heavy fuel oil to meet the North’s energy needs. The six-party talks broke down in December 2008 over ways to verify Pyongyang's nuclear inventory it submitted under a six-party agreement.

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Nukes on a Blog, U.S., North Korea, bilateral talks, Glyn Davies, Kim Kye-gwan, six-party talks (all tags)

(full texts)

2010.12.6 TRILATERAL STATEMENT ROK, U.S., JAPAN: WASHINGTON, DC

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Seiji Maehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea Kim Sung-hwan, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America Hillary Rodham Clinton, met in Washington, D.C., on December 6, 2010 for a ministerial trilateral. This meeting builds on longstanding efforts to intensify policy coordination and strategic dialogue among the three countries and reflects the need for greater trilateral cooperation in addressing enduring and emerging challenges. The Ministers noted that as three of the world’s major economies with shared values, the three nations have a common cause and responsibilities to maintain stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. (Click "read more")

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South Korea, U.S., Japan, Joint Statement, Yeonpyeong, North Korea, Six-Party Talks (all tags)

We’ve seen this play before:

Act I Scene I: North Korea works on nuclear development.
Act I Scene II: The U.S. says “Woah~” Responds with engagement and/or sanctions. Signs of some “progress” become noticeable, but then, another impasse.
Act II: The U.S. gets distracted elsewhere, ignores North Korea for a few months, maybe years, slapping more sanctions every time Pyongyang engages in provocations.
Act III: North Korea tests a nuclear device and blasts missiles.
Act IV: The U.S. (and international community) resumes engagement, offers goodies for nuclear dismantlement, positive signs appear, but dialogue breaks down again.
Act V Scene I: A new U.S. administration comes in, and attempts to do something different: Ignore North Korea and blame Pyongyang for another impasse.
Act V Scene II: North Korean provocation (missiles, nuclear tests, nuclear facility tinkering, etc).
Act V Scene III: U.S. reaction: condemns, knocks on North Korea’s door, contains the situation, and then ignores some more until the next provocation.
Act VI: Repeat Acts I~V.

This is more or less how the North Korean nuclear saga has played out. For twenty years.

The Obama administration came into office saying it will “not buy the same horse twice” vowing to do things differently from his predecessor. But it doesn’t take long to recall that the Bush 43 administration took a similar path: It began with engagement in the Six-Party Talks, then turned hard-lined, and then softened its stance toward the end of its second term when it hit roadblocks in the Middle East.

The Obama administration may have begun with the extended hand, but quickly reverted to Act V: Ignore North Korea, and only react to North Korean provocations. Of course because of Pyongyang’s 2009 missile and nuclear tests.

Pyongyang is expected to test a third nuclear device. Now we’re also hearing about a light-water reactor to produce plutonium and a pilot uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges -- the tools for bomb-making. It’s a matter of time until we hear another kaboom in North Korea and witness a boost in U.S. frequent flyer miles to contain the problem once again.

Perhaps some in this town are waiting, maybe even hoping, for another nuclear test. That way, Pyongyang can deplete its plutonium stockpiles and be further isolated and squeezed, which currently seems to be a bipartisan hope. After all, there are more urgent headaches overseas: Afghanistan.

But that doesn’t solve the problem, nor does it prevent the North’s nuclear pursuits as we’re witnessing now. More nuclear testing means it’s trying to miniaturize to tip a missile. And the latest construction work at Yongbyon indicates it wants to refill its plutonium stock.

North Korea is centered on juche (self-reliance), and Hecker’s latest report shows Pyongyang turning inward once again.

We must remember that North Korean behavior is not exclusively geared toward the U.S. It’s also preparing for a leadership succession, and has a fast-approaching deadline to become a “mighty and prosperous nation by 2012.” Kim’s minions are probably working around the clock to make sure their Dear Leader is not embarrassed with empty promises in the face of his domestic (and even international) audience, and that Great Leader Kim Il-sung is revered with the utmost respect during his 100th birthday celebration.

The Obama administration has not been entirely wrong to pursue its current “strategic patience” policy -- it tried sometime different, and it may have been serving its purpose. But we’re now seeing that this policy may actually be adding to the vicious cycle.

The only way this administration can truly set itself apart from previous administrations is to proactively try to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Yes, North Korea probably won’t surrender its nuclear ambitions under the current Kim Jong-il regime. But chances are his son Kim Jong-un won’t either.

Cracking the problem begins with persistent engagement. Talking to adversaries is usually viewed as a reward. But in North Korea’s case, we may have now witnessed that not talking is the ultimate reward – it's granted time for nuclear development and more provocations. History has shown that when North Korea is engaged in dialogue, it refrains from provocative actions. Inaction could result in the U.S. resigning itself to accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. And more nuclear actors could emerge following the “Pyongyang model.”

Sure, it’s increasingly difficult to engage in backdoor diplomatic dialogue without it being leaked to the press, which would then lead to heightened expectations for a breakthrough, and then lead to sheer disappointment and criticism if that one baby step didn’t produce substantive results. If a series of talks don’t lead to progress, then the blow is even greater.

But the nuclear game will only become more difficult to beat if Washington stands idly by without directly gauging its playmate’s position. Not talking only increases the intractability of problems, and keeps the stage curtain up forever.

World history has shown that the seemingly impossible has been made possible because of aggressive and ambitious -- sometimes at first idealistic -- initiatives. Foreign policy should always be crafted from a realistic and pragmatic foundation. But sometimes, a sprinkle of ambition and creativity can make history.

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North Korea, nuclear, diplomacy, Six-Party Talks, nuclear policy (all tags)

Chinese envoy Wu Dawei met with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul on August 26th to discuss the resumption of the six-party nuclear talks on North Korea's nuclear disarmament.  But the meeting merely reaffirmed that the gap in their perception is still wide among the parties.

Wu reportedly proposed resuming nuclear negotiations in three phases, according to South Korean media:

1. Hold U.S.-North Korea direct talks

2.Hold unofficial, preliminary six-party talks privately behind closed doors

3. Hold official six-party talks

Wu reportedly said Beijing and Pyongyang have agreed on this method, and China is now trying to convince Seoul and later Tokyo, Washington and Russia to accept the plan.  The Chinese envoy’s trip coincided with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s North Korea visit and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s China tour.

Reaction to the Proposal?

Seoul and Washington have maintained that Pyongyang must take responsibility over sinking the Cheonan before resuming six-way negotiations.  Many observers believe that Pyongyang is trying to avoid responsibility with China’s help by dangling the possibility of resuming nuclear talks.

Beijing’s handling of the Cheonan incident has upset the other members of the six-party talks (minus Russia). So it may not be easy for China, the chair of the six-party talks, to coax Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. It remains to be seen what card Beijing plays to win the others over.

IF Pyongyang does have the will to denuclearize and proves this with concrete actions, then it will be difficult for Seoul and Washington to endlessly demand an apology before resuming the six-party talks.

The Gap: Still Wide

The problem, which has been so since the first nuclear crisis, is the wide gap in perception between the two sides. On one side, Pyongyang continues to deny its involvement in Cheonan, insist on the lifting of sanctions and insist on signing a peace treaty before denuclearization. On the other side, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo demand denuclearization steps first.

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan are unified in their policy and approach toward North Korea, which has been a rare phenomenon in the past. On the other side is China and North Korea. It is unclear what hidden cards will be played to break the current impasse.

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China, Wu Da-wei, South Korea, North Korea, Kim Jong-il, Cheonan, six-party talks, peace treaty (all tags)