With the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces set to mark up the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on April 26, to be followed on May 9 by the full House Armed Services Committee, stay tuned to this space for a preview of what to expect on nuclear weapons and missile defense policy as well as analysis of the bill as it moves it's way through the House.

For a reminder of what transpired on these issues last year, see our summary of the FY 2012 NDAA here.

As was the case last year, Strategic Force Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) plans to use the defense bill to attempt to severely constrain the President and the Pentagon's ability to implement the New START treaty and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Rep. Turner and his allies are likely to draw amendments to offer to the NDAA during the full Committee markup from two sources: H.R. 4178, also known as the "Maintaining the President's Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security Act of 2012," and H.R. 4125, titled "Protecting U.S. Missile Defense Information Act of 2012."

We'll have more to say about these bills and their specific provisions in the coming days - in fact we've already had a say on some of the content of H.R. 4178. Our colleagues over at the Arms Control Association also provided a nice rejoinder.

For a taste of just how mystifying Rep. Turner's program is, it's difficult to do better than H.R. 4178's provision titled "Nuclear Warheads on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles of the United States."

The provision includes a Sense of Congress stating "that reducing the number of nuclear warheads contained on each intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States does not promote strategic stability if at the same time other nuclear weapons states, including the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, are rapidly increasing the warhead-loading of their land-based missile forces." It also includes a limitation mandating that the number of nuclear warheads on ICBMs can't be reduced to a single warhead "unless the President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both also carrying out a similar reduction."

You'll recall that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review declared that "The United States will “deMIRV” all deployed ICBMs, so that each Minuteman III ICBM has only one nuclear warhead....This step will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first."

This decision has been applauded by just about everyone, except it seems, the Republicans on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.  For example, the bipartisan Senate ICBM caucus, which can't exactly be accused of being soft on this issue, noted in a recent letter the move a single warhead force is a "stabilizing trend".  And at an April 17 House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, STRATCOM Gen. Robert Kehler proclaimed:

And so the idea is to bring them down to one reentry vehicle per ICBM to essentially reduce their strategic value. That's the pathway that we've been on for quite some time. I support that. I think that that is the right way to go forward for both of those reasons. I also believe that maintaining the ability to go back to a MIRV in the future as a hedge is also the right thing to do.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, nuclear guidance review (all tags)

"Over the life of the New START treaty (10 years), our best estimate of the total estimated cost for DOD activities associated with implementation of the New START treaty would be between $880.5 million and $1,169 million. This estimate is tentative and does not include potential offsetting cost savings such as reducing operations and maintenance costs of eliminated forces. However, until final decisions are made on U.S. Air Force strategic delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for ICBM silos and conversion methods for the B–52 and SLBM launchers, it is not feasible to provide an accurate total cost estimate."

Then-Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller in response to questions for the record after a May 4th hearing of the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 4, 2011 (Hat Tip: the Federation of American Scientists Secrecy News blog). To my knowledge this is the first public record of a cost-estimate to implement the treaty. An interesting question is whether it would be more expensive or cheaper if the Pentagon achieved the reductions required by the treaty prior to the 2018 implementation deadline. At this point the Pentagon has no plans to implement the treaty early.

DoD's responses to other questions for the record contain some additional interesting nuggets.  Here's Gen. Robert Kehler, Commander of STRATCOM, responding to Sen. Jeff Sessions about the prudence of considering further reductions below New START levels:

General KEHLER: It is prudent to consider any actions that have the potential to improve the security of the United States and its allies by enhancing deterrence and maintaining strategic stability. I will always evaluate any such actions carefully and provide my best military judgment accordingly. In the meantime, STRATCOM is fully engaged in implementing the New START treaty.

And here are Dr. Miller and Gen. Kehler responding to a question from Sen. Sessions about nuclear policy and targeting guidance:

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is wrong with the current guidance?

Dr. MILLER. Current guidance is not ‘‘wrong.’’ Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting strategy have continually evolved with the global strategic environment. The United States would be remiss if we did not reexamine our nuclear strategy in today’s dynamic security environment. Revisions to current guidance may be required to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured for the real threats of today and tomorrow. Updating guidance to support deterrence is a key responsibility of any administration and both previous NPRs preceded pres- idential updates in nuclear guidance.

General KEHLER. Reviewing nuclear employment guidance following a NPR is a logical follow-on step, given past precedent and today’s dynamic security environment.

Remember that existing nuclear doctrine and targeting principles are based on guidance from the George W. Bush administration, which was developed approximately a decade ago. As Kehler and Miller note, the ongoing Obama administration review of this outdated guidance is something that every administration does. It's smart national security due diligence.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, nuclear weapons budget, nuclear guidance review (all tags)

By now most readers have undoubtedly read Robert Burns' Associated Press story that as part of the Obama administration's ongoing review of deterrence requirements, the Pentagon has prepared options for future nuclear force levels that could eventually lead to steep reductions below the New START level of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Burns alleges that one of the options under consideration calls for a reduction to 300 deployed warheads. Predictably, the usual Republican suspects freaked out, because that's what they do when anyone suggests altering the unsustainable nuclear status quo.  

Others have noted that the timing of this leak is suggestive, given that it came days before scheduled speeches by Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  

Our Dear Leader has already weighed in on this issue. You can read his article entitled "The Dawn of Nuclear Sanity" here.  For other contributions from friends of NoH, see here, here, here, here, and here. Below are a few of my observations...

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, nuclear guidance review, nuclear weapons budget (all tags)

Today marks the 1st anniversary of the entry into force of the New START treaty.  I used my February Bulletin column to muse on the treaty's implementation to date as well as future prospects for further nuclear arms reductions.

Here's an excerpt:

The Obama administration has stated that it seeks additional verifiable reductions with Russia not only in deployed strategic forces, but also in non-deployed strategic warheads and nonstrategic (i.e., tactical) nuclear weapons, which aren't currently limited by any treaty. This would greatly benefit US security.

For example, a new treaty limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads would reduce the number of Russian nuclear weapons pointed at the United States and likely dissuade Moscow from moving forward with destabilizing nuclear modernization programs -- such as the development of a new heavy ICBM. Verifiable limits on non-deployed warheads and nonstrategic weapons could enhance stability by addressing Russia's large stockpile of nonstrategic weapons, ensuring that nuclear warheads are actually eliminated as opposed to merely placed in storage, and providing greater transparency on all types of nuclear warheads instead of only deployed warheads.

Plus, additional reductions would save money -- not a minor calculation in this budget climate. As it stands, the Pentagon and Energy Department are planning to spend hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade and beyond to build new nuclear delivery systems and warhead-production facilities. But reductions would stem the need for many of these planned replacement systems.

You can read the whole thing here. The State Department also released a helpful update on the treaty's implementation that you can view here.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, nuclear guidance review, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column (all tags)

On December 12 the Senate and House Armed Services Committees filed the Conference report on the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.  Congress is expected to send the measure to the President's desk before the end of the year.  

We’ll have a more comprehensive summary out soon, but our early verdict on the bill’s nuclear weapons policy and missile defense provisions is that Senate and House conferees deserve credit for responsibly bridging the differences between the two versions of the bill.

The original House version of the defense bill (H.R. 1540) included many objectionable limitations on nuclear and missile defense policy matters that would 1) constrain the Pentagon’s ability to implement the New START treaty and 2) undercut the Constitutional authority of the President and senior military leaders to determine U.S. nuclear force structure and engage in discussions with the Russians on missile defense cooperation. The White House threatened to veto the final bill if it included such constraints. You can read our full analysis of the House version of the bill here.

In contrast the Senate bill (S. 1253) contained a number of reporting requirements on nuclear policy issues, but it does not impose policy or funding limitations. You can read our full analysis of the Senate versions of the bill here and here.

The Conference Committee report largely follows in the footsteps of the Senate bill.  It requires a number of reports and includes several Sense of Congress provisions, but it eliminates or significantly scales back the objectionable House provisions without compromising Congress’ important oversight responsibilities over U.S. nuclear policy.  

You can read the longer analysis here.

Read more

Nukes on a blog, Congress, New START (all tags)

Let's turn to "New Start" and global zero. Without regard to China's modernizing strategic arsenal, Obama signed an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675.

American Enterprise Institute Resident Fellow Daniel Blumenthal, November 29, 2011.  Back on planet Earth, the New START agreement in reality limits the U.S. and Russia to no more than 1,550 deployed (New START accountable) warheads.  The 1,500 to 1,675 warhead range referred to by Blumenthal reflected the status of the New START negotiations as of the Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty.  When was that Joint Understanding released, you ask?  Try July 6, 2009.

It's also noteworthy that in a piece designed to convince his readers that the New START treaty is tempting China to expand its nuclear arsenal, Blumenthal can't actually bring himself to state how many nuclear weapons China actually has.  This is understandable, since the best estimates suggest that China possesses approximately 250 nuclear warheads.  Instead Blumenthal links to a story highlighting the research conducted by Georgetown Professor Phil Karber and his students suggesting that China has thousands of nuclear weapons.  What Blumenthal again fails to mention is that Karber's estimate is highly suspect - at best.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, quote of the day, New START (all tags)

Note: For our analysis of the first New START data exchange, see here.

Category of Data       

Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers       
822 United States of America
516 Russian Federation

Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers   
1,790 United States of America
1,566 Russian Federation

Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers       
1,043 United States of America
  871 Russian Federation
______________

(As of September 1, 2011, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties. Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of September 1, 2011. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.)

Fact Sheet
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
October 25, 2011

Read more

New START, nuclear weapons (all tags)

But Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) still mark an extraordinary moment in history, the point at which it might be said that the US truly won the Cold War. For decades, the superpowers had been piling warhead upon warhead. As historian Raymond L. Garthoff has noted, Bush’s September speech and Gorbachev’s response were a time when the arms race ran in reverse—downhill. Furthermore, the PNIs showed that ponderous negotiations aiming at a treaty were not the only way to cut nuclear arsenals. Unilateral arms control turned out not to be an oxymoron. And it was perhaps a good example of the deftness with which Bush handled the US response to the USSR’s collapse and Russia’s rebirth as a separate state.

Peter Grier, "When the Nuke Plan Changed".  Air Force Magazine, September 2011.  Read the whole thing; it's really an excellent piece on the origins of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the 1991 reductions in U.S tactical nuclear weapons order by President George H.W. Bush, which led the Soviet Union to take similar steps, dramatically increasing U.S. security.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, tactical nuclear weapons, New START (all tags)

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller spoke to the U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium on August 4, and her comments regarding progress on the New START treaty were encouraging.

Gottemoeller stated that the Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, has been “very successful,” and she likened its implementation to a “fast moving train.”

To date more then 1,000 notifications have been passed between Washington and Moscow, tracking movements and changes in the status of each country’s strategic offensive arms and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller noted that U.S officials and their Russian counterparts have been “constantly in communication,” strengthening mutual understanding and confidence.

Read more

New START, Goettemoeller, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

By Kingston Reif and Trish Morris

Last summer, Mitt Romney unintentionally proved in a Washington Post Op-Ed attacking the New START treaty that his national security GPS is less effective than a broken compass.

His argument was promptly devastated by critics wielding facts.  

Slate’s Fred Kaplan noted that he had “never seen anything quite as shabby, misleading and—let's not mince words—thoroughly ignorant.”  Senator John Kerry (D-MA) used words like “uninformed” and “baloney” to describe Romney’s attack on the treaty.  Most devastatingly for Romney, fellow Republican Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) publically excoriated the former Massachusetts Governor for defying the advice of U.S. military leaders and raising “discredited objections.”

Despite these stinging rebukes, Romney held firm in his opposition to New START, which was approved by the U.S. Senate on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26.  

With the race for the 2012 Republican nomination for President now in full swing, Romney is revisiting his opposition to the treaty in an attempt to score political points.

In a June 15 post on his blog titled “The Price of Inexperience,” Romney stated that because Russia is already below New START’s limits on deployed warheads and delivery vehicles, “we’re the ones who now have to give, while Russia gets.”  Both Keith Payne and Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) have made the same argument.

Like Payne and Kyl, what Romney fails to recognize is that without the treaty there would be no verifiable limits on the size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  Whether some Russian reductions might have happened with or without the treaty is beside the point, as former STRATCOM Commander Gen. Kevin Chilton argued last April:

One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because as you look to the future though Russia may be close to or slightly below them already, when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty...

Read more

Mitt Romney, New START (all tags)