“We’ve invested billions of dollars. We’ve proven this technology,” says Sessions, who represents the state where much of the GMD development work was conducted. “An extra site [on the East Coast] would clearly provide extra protection. And I think it would validate our investment. It’s such an unacceptable thing to have developed a system that will work and then not deploy it.”

Senator Jeff Session (R-AL), May 17, 2012.

And for a different view...

To date, GMD has demonstrated a limited capability against a simple threat.

Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, December 2011.

The current GMD system has serious shortcomings, and provides at best a limited, initial defense against a relatively primitive threat.

National Research Council Report "Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives", April 30, 2012.

Read more

Security Matters, missile defense, quote of the day (all tags)

The landmark civil nuclear agreement that the two countries signed in 2008 was supposed to lead to tens of billions of dollars in business for U.S. companies that build nuclear power plants. But it has not yielded anything except a disagreement over who would be liable in the event of a nuclear accident.

The nuclear deal was seen as the cornerstone of the broader strategic partnership between the two nations. Both countries are wary of China’s growing influence, have fallen victim to Islamist extremism emanating from Pakistan and share a commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan.

But at the same time, each pursues its own independent strategic agenda. India’s unwillingness to join international sanctions against Iran — which New Delhi sees as an important oil supplier — and its reluctance to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs — in Libya and Syria,?for example — are among the many wrinkles in the relationship.

India’s decision in January to buy 126 fighter jets from France’s Rafale for $11 billion instead of its American competitors was a major disappointment in Washington, though high hopes persist for business between the world’s largest weapons buyer and many of the world’s largest defense contractors, based in the United States.

Trade between the two countries is growing fast and reached $100 billion in 2011, but it is dwarfed by trade with China and remains a fraction of what most people see as its long-term potential. Indian concerns about U.S. agricultural policies that subsidize farmers and restrict imports are matched by American concerns about market access and jobs being outsourced to India.

Simon Denyer, "Promise of U.S.-India economic partnership remains unfulfilled", Washington Post, May 3, 2012.

Glad reporters are noticing - we've been banging this drum for a while!

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, U.S.-India deal, quote of the day (all tags)

SEN. LEVIN: And there have been suggestions by some in Congress that we should deploy a ground based interceptor or interceptors on the East Coast of the United States, to defend the homeland against a possible future long range Iranian missile threat. Now, you're the combatant commander who establishes the requirements for homeland missile defense capability. Is there a requirement for deploying an East Coast GBI site? And are you seeking to deploy such a site on the East Coast?

Army General Charles Jacoby Jr., (Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command): Chairman, today's threats do not require an East Coast missile field and we do not have plans to do so.

Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, March 13, 2012.

Recall that House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH)  included a requirement in his mark of the defense bill that the Missile Defense Agency develop a plan for the deployment of missile defense site on the East Coast of the United States to be operational not later than the end of 2015.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, missile defense, quote of the day (all tags)

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, General.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review called out for studying additional reductions in nuclear weapons. Do you think it is possible to further reduce our nuclear weapons beyond the New START levels?

GEN. KEHLER: Mr. Chairman, I think there are opportunities to reduce further, but I think that there are factors that bear on that ultimate outcome. And rather than get into those, which I don't think would be appropriate, I would just simply say I do think there are opportunities here, but recognizing that there are some factors that bear on this.

I would also mention it is never our view that we start with numbers. We start with an assessment of the situation we find ourselves in, the strategy, our objectives, et cetera, and ultimately then you get to numbers.

STRATCOM Commander Gen. Robert Kehler, March 27, 2012.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, quote of the day, nuclear guidance review (all tags)

The Defense Department must make "tough" cuts to major investments to accommodate the huge cost of replacing Ohio-class submarines that provide nuclear deterrence worldwide, according to Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale.

There are no easy solutions to the looming fiscal challenge presented by the Ohio-class replacement program, also known as SSBN(X), Hale told reporters Thursday at the Credit Suisse/McAleese defense program conference in Arlington, VA.

"I don't have any magic silver bullets," he said, noting the department will have to address the cost of the new multibillion-dollar nuclear ballistic missile subs in long-term budget discussions.

"We all know it's out there," Hale added. "It's really in the 2020s, but you know it will be within our five-year planning window within a couple of years, so we're going to have to start addressing it in the not-too-distant future."

The Pentagon's fiscal year 2013 budget request delays the first sub in the class from FY-19 to FY-21. Hale and Navy leaders have said the delay was mainly the result of affordability concerns but was also designed to let the program mature. Further delays are best avoided because they run the risk of driving up program costs, Hale said. But beyond controlling the program's schedule and cost, the department must come to terms with the impact it will have on other defense budget priorities.

"We're going to have to reprioritize to some extent," Hale said. "We need to hold down the cost of that. I hope that we don't need to slip the program any more than we already have. But we're going to have to make some tough priority judgments between it and other major investments." [emphasis mine]

Robert Hale, March 8, 2012 (h/t: Inside Defense).

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, SSBN(X), nuclear weapons budget, quote of the day (all tags)

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?

General KEHLER. China has a long-standing ‘‘No First Use’’ policy regarding nuclear weapons. China’s modernization of their nuclear forces is in line with this policy, with their nuclear arsenal designed to be a sufficient and effective deterrent to foreign use (specifically the U.S. and Russia) of nuclear weapons against China. At this time, China doesn’t appear to seek to expand their nuclear arsenal beyond what they perceive as a credible deterrent and is unlikely to attempt to match numbers of nuclear weapons or warheads with either the U.S. or Russia.

STRATCOM Commander Gen. Robert Kehler, response to a question for the record pursuant to a House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the Status of United States Strategic Forces, March 2, 2011.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, China, quote of the day (all tags)

Tauscher acknowledged there are people within the Russian government who will “never trust us” -- and still have concerns about “offense and defense.”

She also suggested vestiges of a Cold War-era mentality could be a contributing factor, and ran through a potential scenario: “I’m sitting, you know, in one of their Seven Sister buildings ... trying to figure out how to get my [Ministry of Defense] money, and I’ve been doing it the same old way for 25 years. Now all of a sudden somebody says, 'We're going to be friends with those people. You don’t have to worry about it,' ” Tauscher said. “[I’m] sitting there thinking, what does that mean? … I need an enemy … I have to have somebody that I’m going to say: ‘This is their most recent picture on their Internet, I need to now counter this.' Because that’s what I’ve done for 25 years."

"I understand this," Tauscher continued. "And every once in a while, you can imagine that these people kind of gin up their administration.”

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, speaking to reporters about the ongoing travails of NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation talks, January 12, 2011.

For  our take on the state of the missile defense impasse, see here.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, quote of the day, missile defense (all tags)

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn (aka the Four Horseman), January 4, 2007.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, quote of the day (all tags)

The hypothetical program reductions cited by Secretary Panetta in his November 14 warning would hit nuclear forces harder than any other part of the U.S. defense posture. That's a worrisome prospect given the fact that those forces were already programmed to decline as the U.S. complies with arms-control treaties, and nobody really knows what the future requirements of effective deterrence will be. Having taught and written about this subject for decades, though, I can say one thing with absolute certainty: if the Pentagon phases out land-based ICBMs, cuts the size of the sea-based deterrent, and delays buying a new bomber, nuclear war will become more likely. The one thing that keeps us secure in the nuclear age is the expectation potential adversaries have of suffering devastating retaliation for nuclear aggression. If they can construct a plausible theory of how to disarm America in a surprise attack, then they have powerful incentives to do so. [emphasis mine.]

Lexington Institute CEO Dr. Loren B. Thompson, December 13, 2011.

My quick (because I don't have the energy for a longer and more humorous) observation: If Dr. Thompson admits that "nobody really knows what the future requirements of effective deterrence will be," how can he be absolutely certain that reductions in U.S. delivery systems will make nuclear war more likely?

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Quote of the Day (all tags)

Let's turn to "New Start" and global zero. Without regard to China's modernizing strategic arsenal, Obama signed an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675.

American Enterprise Institute Resident Fellow Daniel Blumenthal, November 29, 2011.  Back on planet Earth, the New START agreement in reality limits the U.S. and Russia to no more than 1,550 deployed (New START accountable) warheads.  The 1,500 to 1,675 warhead range referred to by Blumenthal reflected the status of the New START negotiations as of the Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty.  When was that Joint Understanding released, you ask?  Try July 6, 2009.

It's also noteworthy that in a piece designed to convince his readers that the New START treaty is tempting China to expand its nuclear arsenal, Blumenthal can't actually bring himself to state how many nuclear weapons China actually has.  This is understandable, since the best estimates suggest that China possesses approximately 250 nuclear warheads.  Instead Blumenthal links to a story highlighting the research conducted by Georgetown Professor Phil Karber and his students suggesting that China has thousands of nuclear weapons.  What Blumenthal again fails to mention is that Karber's estimate is highly suspect - at best.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, quote of the day, New START (all tags)