While the results of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) have yet to be released, we can be sure that at least one decision has already been made: Full steam ahead on a major refurbishment study for the B61 gravity bomb.  

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s FY 2011 budget, released yesterday, includes $251.6 million for the B61 Phase 6.2/6.2A design definition and cost study, an increase of nearly $220 million over what Congress appropriated for FY 2010.  As I had suspected, last year’s request of $60 million and Congressional appropriation of $32.5 million for a non-nuclear refurbishment study turned out to be a mere placeholder that paved the way for a much larger request (and likely appropriation) for a full nuclear and non-nuclear study this year.  NNSA describes the purpose of the study as follows:

In FY 2011, funding supports a life extension study of the nuclear and non-nuclear components scope, including implementation of enhanced surety, extended service life and modification consolidation. This life extension study in coordination with the B61 Project Officers Group will publish a Phase 6.2A Report and Weapons Design and Cost Report. This report will document the conceptual designs, program costs and schedules associated with the nuclear and non-nuclear refurbishment scope, including development of concepts and costs to replace arming and fuzing components (e.g., neutron generator, power supplies, radars and programmer) to address near term end-of-life and sustainment concerns on the B61 bomb family. The study will evaluate options for improving safety and use control features and ensures compatibility and integration with modern aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Completion of the study will also provide options and a path forward to enable LANL and SNL participation in development of detailed designs to extend the life of the nuclear explosive package which may include an extension of the B61 nuclear primary’s life (reusing the existing B61 nuclear pit), potential implementation of multipoint safety, and reuse or remanufacture of the canned subassembly (CSA) and for a complete life extension of the B61 -3, -4, -7, and -10, if directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council.

A few things stand out here…

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Nukes on a Blog, B61, FY2011 Budget Request, tactical nuclear weapons (all tags)

Chalk up another Republican endorsement for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Last Friday former Utah Republican Senator Jake Garn called on the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty.  Said Garn:

Today, one of our greatest security interests is to discourage nuclear weapons testing by others. A global verifiable ban on testing would help block the ability of nuclear-armed countries, such as China, to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapon test explosions, could-be nuclear-armed nations — like Iran — would not be able to proof test the smaller, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs that could be used to arm ballistic missiles.

Evidence that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has some pretty sensible views on nuclear weapons continues to pour in.  Last week Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reaffirmed the DPJ's commitment to Japan's three nonnuclear principles.  Meanwhile, in an end of the year letter to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada stated that the Japanese diplomats who told the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that the TLAM-N is a key piece of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan might have gone a little overboard.  According to Okada:

Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, it was never the case that views were expressed as being those of our government concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, in some tentative way such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.

In a speech on European Security at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris Secretary of State Clinton reiterated the Obama administration's commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.  She also commented on the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.  On the Review Clinton noted: we are conducting a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to chart a new course that strengthens deterrence and reassurance for the United States and our allies while reducing the role and number of the nuclear weapons we have.  How exactly this tightrope will be walked will be revealed (as of now) on March 1.

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Nukes on a Blog, Table Scraps, tactical nuclear weapons, Japan, Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Posture Review (all tags)

In a recent op-ed attacking the New START negotiations, The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen argues, among other things, that the U.S. should not reduce its nuclear arsenal unless Russia agrees to reduce it’s enormous stockpile of nonstrategic (i.e. tactical) nuclear weapons.  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that Russia deploys approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, while another 3,300 are kept in reserve or are awaiting dismantlement. The U.S. deploys approximately 500 tactical nuclear weapons, 200 of which are believed to be deployed in Europe.

The emphasis Cohen puts on tactical weapons is unfounded for several reasons…

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, tactical nuclear weapons (all tags)

The Nuclear Posture Review seems to have been on the mind of more than one reporter over the holidays.  Both Bryan Bender over at the Boston Globe and Paul Richter at the LA Times penned very strong articles on some of the fault lines within the ongoing Review.  However, each article contains a mixup/error that requires a correction and some further explanation...

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Nukes on a Blog, Nuclear Posture Review, New START, tactical nuclear weapons (all tags)

Another day brings another baseless attack on President Obama’s important arms control agenda.  Today, the Heritage Foundation’s Peter Brookes argues in the New York Post that rushing to complete an agreement to replace START I, which is set to expire on December 5, makes no sense in light of Russia’s “record of non-compliance with existing arms-control agreements.”

Brookes’ cites four such instances of alleged non-compliance: 1) Russia’s failure to abide by its Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) commitments on tactical nuclear weapons; 2) Russia’s performance of low-yield nuclear tests; 3) Russia’s testing of a MIRV’ed configuration of the SS-27 in contravention of START I’s “new types” rule; and 4) Russia’s support for North Korea and Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  

I’ll address each of these allegations in the order they’re raised by Brookes.  

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Nukes on a Blog, tactical nuclear weapons (all tags)