If you read one thing on New START and verification in the coming weeks and months...
Kingston | Feb 23, 2010 |
2 ...read Arms Control Association Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann's most recent threat assessment brief. It's a comprehensive and outstanding take on the purpose of verification and how to think about it in the context of the (hopefully) soon to be signed New START agreement, especially the hand wringing over Votkinsk and telemetry. I've been trying to make many of the same points here at NoH, but Greg seamlessly ties it all together in less than 8 pages.
The bottom line, as Greg notes, is that while New START will draw upon much of what was in START I, the new treaty will contain new rules and limits. New rules and limits in turn require verification provisions that are actually pegged to those new rules and limits, not rules and limits from a treaty that was negotiated during the 1980s and early 1990s...
“It’s the Telemetry, Stupid”
Kingston | Jan 14, 2010 | 0 The Cable’s Josh Rogin and Global Security Newswire’s Elaine Grossman confirm what we’ve known for some time: verification, specifically telemetry, is delaying completion of the New START agreement.
START I defined “telemetric information” as “information that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery.” It required both parties “to make on-board technical measurements during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; to broadcast this information using unencrypted telemetry, with limited exceptions; and to exchange copies of telemetry tapes acceleration profiles, and interpretive data from all flight-tests.”
The Russians are arguing that they should no longer be required to share (and broadcast unencrypted?) telemetric information because they are building new missiles while we are not. The Obama administration is under pressure to retain START I’s provisions on telemetry in part because, as Travis notes, "certain [mostly Republican] senators will go nuts without access to the data."
I think there are a couple of things to keep in mind as we think about this issue – and verification more broadly…
Nukes on a Blog, New START, telemetry, verification (all tags)
More "New START" Balderdash, Courtesy of the Wall Street Journal
Kingston | Dec 11, 2009 | 0 Via Max Bergmann over at the The Wonk Room, today's Wall Street Journal editorial on Obama's Nobel Prize acceptance speech predictably includes far more misinformation than truth about the "New START" negotiations...
Rummy on Russia's Nuclear Forces and Verification: Who Cares!
Kingston | Dec 02, 2009 | 0 
All I need to verify Russian nuke deployments are these special glasses
Via Heather Hulburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network, comes still more evidence that despite what Jon Kyl would have you believe, there was a time not so long ago when some Republicans deemed it ok not to freak out about the configuration of Russia's nuclear forces or the absence of provisions to verify the size and location of those forces.
Jon Kyl vs. Jon Kyl on New START
Kingston | Nov 24, 2009 | 0 
I (now) love verification!
A few weeks ago I noted that it was ironic that Senator Jon Kyl has been accusing the Obama administration of being weak on verification in its pursuit of a New START agreement considering his past lackadaisical approach to this topic. Apparently the Senator's inconsistency knows no bounds.
Nukes on a Blog, Jon Kyl, New Start, verification (all tags)
Kyl: "The Russians are Cheaters"
Kingston | Nov 06, 2009 | 0 
Cheater!
Behold the latest anti-“New START” talking point: the Russians are cheaters! So alleged NoH BFF Sen. Jon Kyl in an October 19 speech on the Senate floor:
Finally, I will refer again to the issue of Russia's multiple-warhead RS-24. In this case, it appears the Russians have cheated--if not in the letter of the START agreement, at least in its spirit--by converting one of their existing missiles, the TOPOL-M, to this new multiple-warhead variant.
However, if you look at the 2005 Section 403 Report, which is also known as the Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report, prepared by the State Department's VCI Bureau, there are a litany of other outstanding issues regarding Russia's failure to comply with START.Let’s start with the RS-24.
