My Blog Posts

• Can a “Region by Region” Approach Effectively Prevent the Spread of Sensitive Nuclear Technology?
  08/17/2010 10:56:43 AM EST
  Following an August 3 report in the Wall Street Journal, the arms control blogosphere has been buzzing about a nearly finalized nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Vietnam. According to the Journal, and now other outlets including The Guardian and Global Security Newswire , the U.S.-Vietnam deal has considerably weaker proliferation controls than the Obama administration has demanded in the past – specifically, the agreement would allow Vietnam to retain the right to enrich uranium. The Risks and Benefits of Enrichment Uranium enrichment technology has both civil and military applications: it can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Any country that possesses enrichment facilities would be able to use this technology to jumpstart a weapons program. But any country without enrichment facilities is unable to independently produce nuclear fuel for its reactors and thus required to import fuel for its nuclear energy program.
• Rumblings of Change in Japanese Nuclear Policy
  08/10/2010 03:41:05 PM EST
  An advisory panel to Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan is poised to recommend that Japan reevaluate its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, report the Asahi Shimbun, Global Security Newswire, and Bloomberg. The three principles, which comprise some of the most stringent anti-nuclear legislation in the world, have guided Japanese nuclear policy since the 1960s. The principles forbid the possession and production of nuclear weapons by Japan as well as the introduction of foreign nuclear arms into Japanese territory.   Arguing that “it may not necessarily be wise to have as a principle anything that unilaterally limits what the United States can do,” the panel’s report calls for a review of the third principle’s ban on introducing American arms into Japan. This recommendation comes on the heels of government admissions that the third principle had been violated secretly throughout the Cold War. Even given recent revelations about Cold War secret agreements, however, official governmental approval for the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan would carry significant domestic and international political repercussions.
  
• National Labs: New START Will Not Reduce Ability to Maintain Safe, Secure, and Reliable Stockpile
  07/16/2010 05:26:57 PM EST
  The directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories appeared yesterday in front of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, testifying that the New START Treaty would not prevent the labs from ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The directors head the three labs that carry out the NNSA’s (National Nuclear Security Administration) stockpile stewardship program. The three directors were joined by Dr. Roy Schwitters, the Chairman of the JASON Defense Advisory Group, at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.