My Blog Posts

• Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #10
  12/08/2011 02:41:15 PM EST
  By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman
  (For more information on this feature, see here.)
  And this week’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include… Exploring the Maze: Counter-proliferation Intelligence
  Crawford, M., 2011. Exploring the Maze: Counter-proliferation Intelligence, Survival. 53:2, 2011, Spring 2011. pp.131-158.  

  “Since 9/11 there has been minimal political and public tolerance in the United States and some other Western countries for failures of pre-emptive intelligence affecting homeland security. This has created a strong political intelligence-community bias in favour of worst-case scenarios.”(p 138)

  Michael Crawford examines the problems that surround gathering intelligence for tracking foreign weapon of mass destruction programs.  A major difficulty stems from the wide range of backgrounds that are required to fully analyze WMD programs.  WMD programs are often times the most closely guarded of state secrets.  It becomes very difficult to for intelligence agencies to gain access to these programs.  Crawford highlights the role that the intelligence failures of the past such as the failure to prevent 9/11 have had on intelligence agencies.  As a result of these failures, many intelligence analysts have created a culture of immediately moving towards the worst case scenario estimates.  These scenarios, when coupled with WMD programs can often yield overhyped results.  Crawford concludes that intelligence agencies should learn from past successes and failures to improve the capability of developing proliferation intelligence.
• Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #8
  11/14/2011 03:10:39 PM EST
  Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #8 By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman (For more information on this feature, see here.) And this Monday’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include… Why Iran Didn't Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack
  Brown, G. D., Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack. Joint Forces Quarterly, October 2011, pp. 70-73.
  

  “Iran's "non-position" on the Stuxnet event has been frustrating to practitioners in the field of cyberspace operations. Finally, there was a well-documented, unambiguous cyber attack to dissect! And yet there was little official discussion of the issue because Iran passed up its opportunity to complain of an unjustified attack.”(p. 71)

  Colonel Gary Brown explores the reasons that Iran did not specifically admit that its centrifuges were destroyed by a cyber attack in the form of the Stuxnet virus.  Brown then explores how the refusal resulted in a missed opportunity to further define cyber warfare.  Brown deduces that Iran did not condemn the attack because of embarrassment.  That the computer virus was able to cause so much damage to their nuclear centrifuges was not something Iran wanted to become public.  Other reasons Brown thought might have caused Iran’s silence are: Desire by Iran to use cyber attacks itself, perception that such an announcement would not gain any sympathy from the international community, and inability to prove who the perpetrator was.  Brown finds that whatever the reason for Iran’s silence, that silence resulted in a valuable missed opportunity to define the parameters of cyber warfare.  
  
• Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #6
  11/01/2011 10:17:06 AM EST
  By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman
  
  (For more information on this feature, see here.)
  
  And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include… Revisiting Osirak
  Braut-Hegghammer, M., Revisiting Osirak: Preventative attacks and nuclear proliferation risks. International Security. 36:1, Summer 2011.  pp. 101-132.

  “I conclude that the attack had mixed effects, but that the most important consequence was a transformation and intensification of Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.” (p. 131)

  Braut-Hegghammer uses information gained since 2003 to re-examine the success of the Israeli air strike against the Osiriak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981.  He finds that the attack did force Iraq to be more secretive about its nuclear program, which slowed the pace of the program.  However before the attack Iraq was not organized in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and was not very dedicated in its pursuit.  After Osirak this changed, and Iraq became dedicated to acquiring nuclear weapons.  Braut-Hegghammer cautions that both those that argue that the Osirak attack was a success and those that insist it only made the situation worse are both missing some points.  He also finds that the Iraq situation was unique, and should not be used to predict the impact of a similar attack against another state’s nuclear program.  
  
• Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #3
  10/07/2011 03:36:05 PM EST
  By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman (For more information on this feature, see here.) And this Friday’s in the weeds theoretical/conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include… Sigal, L. V., 2011. Political Prospects for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia. Pacific Focus. XXXVI: 1, April 2011. pp22-36.

  “A Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) or a Japan–South Korea NWFZ could help entice the DPRK to carry out its commitment in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs”. (p.22).

  In this article, Leon Sigal, makes the argument that a Northeast Asian or a Japan-South Korea nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) would be beneficial for security in the region. In his opinion, there are two possible scenarios for the nuclear future of North Korea: containment or gradual rapprochement with its neighbours and the US. A regional NWFZ would be favourable could support either scenario. Political, economic and military containment is the strategy which the US and its allies have used against North Korea since the end of the Cold War. If this strategy, which has proven not to be very successful since North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, continues then a NWFZ between Japan and South Korea would strengthen containment. However, it could also lead the way to rapprochement since it would move in the direction of satisfying “Pyongyang’s longstanding demand for nuclear reassurances”. Sigal concludes that the NWFZ would be more viable if China and Russia join the pact, but that they probably will not do so without a commitment from the US. Although Sigal appears to doubt that this will happen soon, he believes that we are moving in the right direction and that beginning discussions between South Korea and Japan would be an advantageous starting point.
• Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don't have to, #2
  09/30/2011 03:07:19 PM EST
  By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman (For more information on this feature, see here.) And this Friday’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include… The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm.
  Harrington de Santana, A., 2011. The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm. Millennium Journal of International Studies. August 2011. pp.3-19.

  “Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that the practice of non-proliferation does not lead to disarmament. In fact, experience suggests just the opposite: the purpose of US non-proliferation policy is to obviate the need for the US to disarm itself.” (Harrington de Santana, 2011, p.5)

  In “The Strategy of Non-proliferation”, Anne Harrington de Santana, argues that the shift in US nuclear policy from extended deterrence to non-proliferation is not as large of a shift as has been suggested, and it will not lead to disarmament. She develops her argument by showing how the logic behind the two policies is the same “hard-headed, realist rationale”. A rationale which says that the US can no longer be safe using deterrence instead a policy of non-proliferation and a rhetoric of disarmament is being used. In Harrington de Santana’s opinion it does not matter whether the Obama Administration wants disarmament or not, “the current US nuclear policy will reduce the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the US”, however “it will not produce a world free of nuclear weapons”. For this to happen the relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament must evolve, and disarmament must become a practice in its own right.