Chad
Chad O'Carroll
Chad O'Carroll is a spring intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where tracks nuclear non-proliferation and international security issues, attends policy meetings and Congressional hearings, briefs members of staff, and assists with the Center's research on various national security issues.
Chad last year studied an MA in 'Non-Proliferation & International Security' at Kings College London where he specialized in the case studies of North Korea and Iran.
He previously interned at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in New York City.
My Blog Posts
See All: Comments | Blog Posts Showing 5 of 6- Norm Dicks, the next likely Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
03/10/2010 10:26:11 AM EST
Norman Dicks (D-WA) has spent his entire career on Capitol Hill, having started out as a Senate staffer for Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, and since 1977, serving as a congressmen on the House Appropriations Committee. In March 2010, he was named the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, replacing the late Rep. John Murtha (D-PA)....
- Trident Uncertainties
03/08/2010 03:23:00 PM EST
A 2006 MOD White Paper said that the UK’s current fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines would have to be retired in the early 2020s, estimating that it would take around 17 years to design, manufacture, and commission the replacement boomers. After a controversial vote in the House of Commons in 2007, it looked certain that the UK would replace its Vanguard class submarines as a key part of an extension plan to its at-sea ‘Trident’ nuclear deterrent. Having devoted £7.7 billion in October 2007 for research and design in the initial ‘Concept Phase’ of the replacement program, the UK Government was scheduled to make ‘Initial Gate’ decisions as early as September 2009. These decisions would have kicked off a series of technical assessments and design work, committing Prime Minister Gordon Brown to pay out some 15% of the estimated £15-20 billion procurement costs for the new submarine. In July 2009, the Government decided to delay the design contract until 2010. In January 2010, it was reported that the Government had postponed making its ‘Initial Gate’ decisions indefinitely, allegedly due to difficulties in agreeing on the type of nuclear reactors needed to power the future submarines. However, the timing of the announcement casts doubt on the claim that the delay is purely technical in nature. And as the Vanguard retirement clock continues to tick, suggestions of ‘indefinite’ delays call into question the Government’s commitment to the ‘urgent’ nature of the replacement program, as depicted in the White Paper timetable… - Lips and Teeth
03/04/2010 02:05:32 PM EST
It was reported last week that China is looking into allegations that it may have been involved in aiding a North Korean arms shipment bound for the Republic of Congo. The shipment, which contained North Korean parts for Congo’s fleet of vintage T-54/T-55 tanks, was intercepted by South Africa in November 2009 and reported to the U.N Security Council this week. South Africa was authorized to inspect and seize the cargo, first discovered by the French vessel owners who were shipping it, under the auspices of U.N Security Council Resolution 1874, which prohibits the DPRK from importing and exporting all military hardware, including parts. The fact that the cargo was loaded onto the French ship at the port city of Dalian in China is notable. Indeed, it seems that the North Korean cargo was brought into Dalian right under the nose of Chinese customs officials, who one might assume to be more vigilant of exports from the DPRK. It turns out that assumption is not entirely accurate…
- Stuck in the middle
02/26/2010 12:30:35 PM EST
Despite signing a contract with Iran for five batteries of the S-300PMU1 missile defense system back in December 2005, Russia continues to put off delivery of the system to Tehran. The latest news from Moscow alleges that the current delay is due to ‘technical’ problems – a rather bizarre excuse given that the S-300 has been functioning quite well since 1979. Perhaps this is why Almaz-Antey (the company that builds the S-300) told Interfax news that “there are no technical problems with the S-300 systems. This is a political issue.” With Russia contractually obligated to deliver the system (it already received payment from Tehran), it’s interesting to speculate about the reasons for the delay… - The cost of nuclear security - Conan O’Brien?!
02/25/2010 10:30:41 AM EST
With President Ahmadinijad last week boasting of the production of Iran's first batch of highly enriched uranium and its "capability to enrich at over 20 percent and at over 80 percent," the need to accurately account for and safeguard Iran’s nuclear material is of ever-pressing importance. Most observers agree that any weapons program in Iran is more likely to follow a clandestine path, since Tehran is unlikely to risk diverting materials from IAEA monitored facilities. Yet just how satisfied can we be that Iran can’t actually misuse the stocks of uranium currently safeguarded by the IAEA? Given the scope of the IAEA's worldwide responsibilities, it must rely on remote nuclear monitoring equipment to ensure that the nuclear fuel under its watch is not diverted for military use. Many people fail to realize that this system is not fool proof. However, the steps required to fill in these gaps and strengthen the IAEA require additional resources that the international community has to date been unwilling to provide…
