My Blog Posts

• Conventional Wisdom
  08/14/2009 02:14:32 PM EST
  In the latest issue of International Security, defense analyst Bruce Sugden’s article, "Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles," weighs the pros and cons of deploying conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) in support of the Prompt Global Strike mission. Prompt Global Strike is an initiative that seeks to address rapidly emerging threats with non-nuclear means. Under both the ground- and sea-based iterations of the proposal, a conventional warhead would be mated to a long-range missile normally equipped with a nuclear payload. These conventionally-armed long-range missiles could then be used to engage time-sensitive targets globally, such as high-value terrorist encampments. CBMs based in the continental United States could strike an hour after the decision was made to launch, and would have a 15 minute advantage if forward-deployed on land or at sea. Sugden evaluates the merits of short term deployment of CBMs versus both unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and manned aircraft based on nine attributes. He concludes that CBMs are superior in the short term in terms of prompt response (speed), combat radius, accuracy, and throw weight. There are several limitations to deploying CBMs, however. The satellite technology used to identify targets is designed to monitor changes overtime, such as the movements of large military installations. The satellites are less useful for tracking small mobile targets like small groups of individuals. CBMs would also have to be paired with more persistent and multi-faceted surveillance such as localized human and aircraft reconnaissance. Thus, CBM prompt response and accuracy are contingent upon continued investment in, and reliance upon, multiple sources of quality ISR. Former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, along with STRATCOM chief Gen. Kevin Chilton, have advocated deploying CBMs. But opponents express legitimate reservations. There is a real danger of a nuclear state confusing a CBM with a nuclear-armed missile and quickly launching a retaliatory response in order to avoid losing their weapons in what they believe is an incoming counterforce strike (the “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem). Neither Russia nor China currently has the capability to distinguish between non-nuclear and nuclear missiles in the event of a fly-over, particularly in Russia’s case with its dilapidated radar infrastructure. Nevertheless, Sugden recommends continued R&D and near-term (by 2013) deployment of the Navy’s conventional Trident missile. For an comprehensive critique of Prompt Global Strike and the Conventional Trident Modernization program, see Steve Andreasen’s 2006 ACT article.
• Sandinista!
  08/04/2009 03:42:16 PM EST
  Recent rumors about Iran’s “close ties” with Latin America have caused Washington to shake in its alarmist boots. In January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of Iranian "subversive activity"  in the region. "The Iranians are building a huge embassy in Managua," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added in May. "And you can only imagine what that's for." To date, there is still no sign of the embassy in Nicaragua despite Clinton’s breathless warning. But additional warnings have come from elsewhere.
• Do the Right Thing
  07/28/2009 05:29:08 PM EST
  IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed the holes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and called for international regulation of the nuclear fuel cycle in his July 19 op-ed in the Guardian. The article is a much-needed comprehensive articulation of where the world is going wrong on non-proliferation. Sadly, ElBaradei’s complaints will probably fall on deaf ears. He says that the five nuclear weapons states undermine the NPT by not taking seriously their obligation to pursue disarmament. Other deficiencies in non-proliferation include lax export controls that don’t effectively safeguard against the shipment of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons, along with gross underfunding of the IAEA. The international community has been coasting and some states have only been doing the bare minimum to prevent proliferation of non-peaceful nuclear technology. Rogue states like North Korea and Iran create a new set of problems for the next IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. Amano takes office December 1, 2009 and will inherit the looming threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The jury is still out on whether enthusiasm for non-proliferation will be sufficient to fuel ElBaradei’s pet project: a global low enriched uranium bank. The bank is meant to replace domestic enrichment programs in non-nuclear weapon states in the long-term. The proposal is still a tough sell to developing nations who view such restrictive initiatives as impinging on their sovereign rights under the NPT. The world is at a critical impasse where nuclear proliferation is concerned, given the recent explosion of countries seeking nuclear power and domestic enrichment programs. Hopefully, renewed U.S.-Russian commitment to nuclear weapons reductions will spur the rest of the international community to take their non-proliferation responsibilities seriously.
• Throwing Caution to the Wind
  07/28/2009 05:24:13 PM EST
  The Naval War College Review just published an article that discusses the hypothetical conditions that might surround Japan’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option” is an interesting assessment of Japan’s potential path to weaponization. The authors consider rational and irrational reasoning that might take place within the Japanese government and in the public arena, reasoning which ultimately might culminate in some change to Japan’s long-standing “nuclear allergy.” They highlight the lapses in rational judgment that occur when national security and domestic political agendas intersect. They also emphasize regional instability and a wavering U.S. extended deterrent as key factors. In my humble opinion, the latter two arguments don’t hold up very well. Yoshihara and Holmes cite the relative decline of the U.S. Navy by more than half since the 1980s and Chinese naval modernization as nascent concerns that could spur the Japanese government to begin a nuclear weapons program. Though China has embarked on significant modernization, its logistical support for its fleet is still deficient, and certainly inferior to the United States. China faces shortcomings in the size and scope of its Navy and its institutional capacity for effective regulation. Even when operating remotely, and despite a reduction from 600 to 283 ships, the U.S. Navy is far superior to the Chinese Navy. Even excluding the threat of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, China has far too much to lose from launching an attack on Japan. Since the United States has shown no sign that its commitment to defend Japan has lessened, the underlying balance of power in East Asia remains intact despite Chinese military development. The authors also sail off course when they consider regional tensions that might be caused by the U.S. intention to engage in gradual, mutual nuclear weapons reductions. Here, they underestimate the value of a good old fashioned Disney villain. North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and historically erratic behavior have brought Russia, China, Japan, and the United States together under the banner of combating a common threat. None of these powers will sacrifice global stability and security on the altar of global zero. All of the security arguments outlined in the article are important factors to be aware of in terms of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan. We don’t want to hang one of our closest allies out to dry, and maintaining the credibility of our joint security pact is critical to our relationship. However, there is no political constituency in Japan with any meaningful public following that supports an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan. Nor is there any doubt in Japan about the relative strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis regional threats like North Korea. Japan is a leading voice in favor of nuclear nonproliferation and has come out in support of a START follow-on agreement and Global Zero campaign. Given these realities, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” looks to remain firmly entrenched for the foreseeable future.
• Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
  07/16/2009 01:29:07 PM EST
  Head over to the Center’s website to see the new factsheet Kingston and I co-authored on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The proposed FMCT is one of the many nonproliferation initiatives that languished during the Bush years. It was first discussed in the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the international control of atomic energy and the Baruch Plan. President Obama breathed new life into the idea in his Prague speech on April 5.   In short, the FMCT would ban the production of all fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons. It could also address existing stockpiles earmarked for blend-down or for use in nuclear powered subs. All five Nuclear Weapons States stopped production of weapons-grade fissile material by 1996, and all five support a verifiable FMCT.   Discussions on the FMCT are carried out through the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). The initiative has been stalled several times since the official resumption of talks in 1995. Israel has said that it opposes any FMCT that doesn’t address the Iranian nuclear threat. Pakistan opposes an FMCT without limits on stockpiles because it is concerned that India’s current stockpile is larger than its own. With so many seemingly immovable roadblocks, agreement on the FMCT is a ways off. But it has been a fixture in nonproliferation circles since the inception of nuclear weapons technology and efforts to bring it to fruition will continue, particularly now that Obama is in charge.