My Blog Posts

• Iran Policy in the Aftermath of UN Sanctions
  06/24/2010 05:41:40 PM EST
  On Tuesday, Undersecretaries William Burns and Stuart Levey testified at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled “Iran Policy in the Aftermath of UN Sanctions.” The hearing focused on the recently passed Resolution 1929, which is intended to address “the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program” and “send an unambiguous signal to Iran that the international community holds it accountable for its actions.” Overall, Iran sanctions appear to be a nonpartisan issue, where both sides have taken on the view that the harsher the sanctions are, the better, given the nature and seriousness of the Iranian threat. Chairman Kerry opened the hearing by noting that “a nuclear armed Iran would pose an intolerable threat to our ally Israel, risk igniting an arms race in what is already the world’s most dangerous region, and undermine our global effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.” The two witnesses strongly supported the utility of the sanctions. However, while Burns asserted that they will leave Iran increasingly isolated, weak, and defenseless, he cautioned that “sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves. They are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still committed.”
  
• Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on New START
  06/18/2010 10:11:20 AM EST
  On June 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearing on the New START Treaty, with witnesses Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. They all testified in favor of ratification. As in earlier hearings on New START held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, criticism of the treaty focused primarily on the treaty’s provisions with regard to missile defense, verification, and nuclear weapons complex modernization. Ranking members Carl Levin and John McCain framed the debate for the hearing in their contradictory opening remarks: LEVIN: There have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply incorrect…This treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses. … MCCAIN: Secretary Gates, you have been quite clear, and I quote, "that the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. While such assurances are welcome, they don't change the fact that the treaty text, not just the preamble, but Article 5 of the treaty itself, includes a clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options.”
  
• Back to Back Hearings on New START
  06/16/2010 06:04:39 PM EST
  VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON On June 16, three high-ranking DoD officials – James N. Miller, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Commander, US Strategic Command, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency – testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START treaty.  The hearing marked the eighth hearing on the treaty. The witnesses’ introductory remarks were informative and reassuring from a military standpoint. Most notably, they took sufficient time to address Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty (which prohibits conversion of silos for ICBMs and for SLBMs for the placement of missile defense interceptors), testifying that it does not constitute a current or future limit on missile current U.S. missile defense plans. They specifically stated that the conversion of silos is an antiquated practice, costly and inefficient, and were it to be performed it would degrade U.S. national security, as it would require trading a Trident D5 SLBM for a single missile defense interceptor. Finally, General O’Reilly noted that New START is comparatively less constraining on missile defense than the original START I treaty. Citing the dueling unilateral statements issued by the U.S. and Russia on missile defense, Senator Risch (R-ID) challenged the witnesses as to whether the U.S. and Russia have deep differences on how to interpret the treaty when it comes to missile defense.  Gen. O’Reilly responded by noting that the treaty does not in any way limit current and planned U.S. missile defense activities and that he has briefed the Russians in detail about our plans.  Undersecretary Miller stated that while some on the Russian side would like to use the treaty ratification process to constrain U.S. missile defense programs, the two sides don’t have a different interpretation of the treaty text and the U.S. has made it absolutely clear that it will continue to expand and improve its existing missile defense programs.
  
• A Nuclear Myanmar? North Korea’s dangerous twin...
  06/10/2010 04:04:58 PM EST
  A report put out last week by former IAEA inspector Robert Kelly, on behalf of the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), claims that Burma is in the process of developing a nuclear weapons program. The evidence used to compile the report includes photographs and documents smuggled out by a renegade Burmese soldier, Sai Thein Win, Deputy Commander of a highly classified military factory that was the headquarters of the army's nuclear endeavors. Accusations of a nascent nuclear program in Burma are longstanding; however this new evidence exceeds previous unclear satellite images and uncertain reports, and should heighten concern about the program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has launched an investigation into the claims and may be in a position to confirm some of the information.   Without doubt, Burma is far from completing the project—and as an ostracized nation with a weak economy and few domestic resources, it will have trouble carrying through with it. However, the report claims the photos indicate a distinct interest in a nuclear weapons program—not a peaceful nuclear energy reactor. The evidence includes photos taken in critical facilities in Burma, including images of a vacuum glove box, used to produce uranium metal; technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which makes uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components; and detailed descriptions of tunnels used as command posts and storage areas for secret weapons and equipment.
  
• Futile Sanctions and Missed Opportunities
  06/08/2010 11:21:34 PM EST
  At an event held today at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Taking Tehran’s Temperature: One Year On,” some of the world’s top scholars on Iran, including Abbas Milani, Gary Sick, and Karim Sadjadpour, spoke about Iran’s domestic political situation and American policy towards the Islamic Republic. While Iran’s nuclear ambitions were not a focus of the panel, Professor Sick included substantive commentary on the recent round of UN sanctions. He stated clearly that sanctions do not work—noting most specifically that “when sanctions began, Iran had zero centrifuges. Today, after four UN Security Council sanctions resolutions, Iran has 9000 centrifuges.” He went on to explain that “Iran doesn’t like sanctions,” however if they are imposed, Iran will live with them; but, if they are threatened, Iran is likely to compromise in order to avoid them. This, he says, is what happened with the Brazil-Turkey deal. The West’s failure to take advantage of this opening was a “terrible decision,” missing the opportunity to use sanctions for what they do best—leverage. Missed opportunities (which he expands on in his blog), he says, are the most disappointing aspect of recent events. Professor Sick added that threatening smart sanctions- which target the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and not the citizens of Iran- could be effective. Details of the newest round of UN sanctions are included in the Annex of the most recent version of the resolution, which is expected to see a vote tomorrow.  The text of the Annex is, unfortunately, not available to the public, so we cannot yet conclude if these sanctions are “smart”, or will be as futile as those in the past.