On Tuesday, Undersecretaries William Burns and Stuart Levey testified at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled “Iran Policy in the Aftermath of UN Sanctions.” The hearing focused on the recently passed Resolution 1929, which is intended to address “the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program” and “send an unambiguous signal to Iran that the international community holds it accountable for its actions.”

Overall, Iran sanctions appear to be a nonpartisan issue, where both sides have taken on the view that the harsher the sanctions are, the better, given the nature and seriousness of the Iranian threat.

Chairman Kerry opened the hearing by noting that “a nuclear armed Iran would pose an intolerable threat to our ally Israel, risk igniting an arms race in what is already the world’s most dangerous region, and undermine our global effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.”

The two witnesses strongly supported the utility of the sanctions. However, while Burns asserted that they will leave Iran increasingly isolated, weak, and defenseless, he cautioned that “sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves. They are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still committed.”

Read more

Iran Watch, Congress, sanctions (all tags)

On June 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearing on the New START Treaty, with witnesses Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. They all testified in favor of ratification. As in earlier hearings on New START held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, criticism of the treaty focused primarily on the treaty’s provisions with regard to missile defense, verification, and nuclear weapons complex modernization. Ranking members Carl Levin and John McCain framed the debate for the hearing in their contradictory opening remarks:

LEVIN: There have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply incorrect…This treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses.

…

MCCAIN: Secretary Gates, you have been quite clear, and I quote, "that the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. While such assurances are welcome, they don't change the fact that the treaty text, not just the preamble, but Article 5 of the treaty itself, includes a clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options.”

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Missile Defense (all tags)

VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON

On June 16, three high-ranking DoD officials – James N. Miller, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Commander, US Strategic Command, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency – testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START treaty.  The hearing marked the eighth hearing on the treaty.

The witnesses’ introductory remarks were informative and reassuring from a military standpoint. Most notably, they took sufficient time to address Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty (which prohibits conversion of silos for ICBMs and for SLBMs for the placement of missile defense interceptors), testifying that it does not constitute a current or future limit on missile current U.S. missile defense plans. They specifically stated that the conversion of silos is an antiquated practice, costly and inefficient, and were it to be performed it would degrade U.S. national security, as it would require trading a Trident D5 SLBM for a single missile defense interceptor. Finally, General O’Reilly noted that New START is comparatively less constraining on missile defense than the original START I treaty.

Citing the dueling unilateral statements issued by the U.S. and Russia on missile defense, Senator Risch (R-ID) challenged the witnesses as to whether the U.S. and Russia have deep differences on how to interpret the treaty when it comes to missile defense.  Gen. O’Reilly responded by noting that the treaty does not in any way limit current and planned U.S. missile defense activities and that he has briefed the Russians in detail about our plans.  Undersecretary Miller stated that while some on the Russian side would like to use the treaty ratification process to constrain U.S. missile defense programs, the two sides don’t have a different interpretation of the treaty text and the U.S. has made it absolutely clear that it will continue to expand and improve its existing missile defense programs.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Security Matters, New START, Missile Defense, Congress (all tags)

A report put out last week by former IAEA inspector Robert Kelly, on behalf of the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), claims that Burma is in the process of developing a nuclear weapons program. The evidence used to compile the report includes photographs and documents smuggled out by a renegade Burmese soldier, Sai Thein Win, Deputy Commander of a highly classified military factory that was the headquarters of the army's nuclear endeavors. Accusations of a nascent nuclear program in Burma are longstanding; however this new evidence exceeds previous unclear satellite images and uncertain reports, and should heighten concern about the program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has launched an investigation into the claims and may be in a position to confirm some of the information.  

Without doubt, Burma is far from completing the project—and as an ostracized nation with a weak economy and few domestic resources, it will have trouble carrying through with it. However, the report claims the photos indicate a distinct interest in a nuclear weapons program—not a peaceful nuclear energy reactor. The evidence includes photos taken in critical facilities in Burma, including images of a vacuum glove box, used to produce uranium metal; technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which makes uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components; and detailed descriptions of tunnels used as command posts and storage areas for secret weapons and equipment.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog; Security Matters; North Korea; Myanmar (all tags)

At an event held today at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Taking Tehran’s Temperature: One Year On,” some of the world’s top scholars on Iran, including Abbas Milani, Gary Sick, and Karim Sadjadpour, spoke about Iran’s domestic political situation and American policy towards the Islamic Republic.

While Iran’s nuclear ambitions were not a focus of the panel, Professor Sick included substantive commentary on the recent round of UN sanctions. He stated clearly that sanctions do not work—noting most specifically that “when sanctions began, Iran had zero centrifuges. Today, after four UN Security Council sanctions resolutions, Iran has 9000 centrifuges.” He went on to explain that “Iran doesn’t like sanctions,” however if they are imposed, Iran will live with them; but, if they are threatened, Iran is likely to compromise in order to avoid them. This, he says, is what happened with the Brazil-Turkey deal. The West’s failure to take advantage of this opening was a “terrible decision,” missing the opportunity to use sanctions for what they do best—leverage. Missed opportunities (which he expands on in his blog), he says, are the most disappointing aspect of recent events.

Professor Sick added that threatening smart sanctions- which target the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and not the citizens of Iran- could be effective. Details of the newest round of UN sanctions are included in the Annex of the most recent version of the resolution, which is expected to see a vote tomorrow.  The text of the Annex is, unfortunately, not available to the public, so we cannot yet conclude if these sanctions are “smart”, or will be as futile as those in the past.

Read more

Iran Watch, Sanctions (all tags)

Predicting when Iran will get the bomb has been a popular activity for politicians, strategists, analysts, and the public for some time now.  Unfortunately, these predictions are frequently politicized and exploited to justify increased investments in long-range missile defenses, unilateral sanctions, and even military strikes.

Last month, a report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities concluded that a deployable Iranian ICBM is more than a decade away. The study, authored by former UN weapons inspector Mike Elleman, states that “Iran is not likely to field a liquid-fueled missile capable of targeting Western Europe before 2014 or 2015… Iran is many years away from developing a ‘second-generation’ 4,000-5,000 km intermediate-range solid-propellant missile, if it should decide to do so.” It goes on to say that “many years” has historically been around ten, and thus concludes that since Iran would develop and field an intermediate range missile before developing an ICBM, “a notional Iranian ICBM, based on No-Dong and Scud technologies, is more than a decade away from development.”  The report also separates the development of ballistic missile technologies from the development of nuclear capabilities, saying it can only “appear” that these two programs are linked, but that this cannot be confirmed by the IAEA, and is in fact denied by Iran.

This analysis helps to clarify statements put forward by public officials, which are often stripped of crucial context and twisted by the media in an effort to make an Iranian nuclear weapon seem right around the corner.

Read more

Iran Watch, Sanctions, IAEA, NPT, Missile Defense (all tags)

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 - to be attended by all Middle Eastern states - which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”

Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty "ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”

Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Israel, Iran, Nuclear Weapons, NPT (all tags)

As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones.  A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.

Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too.  The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole.  While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.

The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.

Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons.  First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.  Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.

Read more

Middle East, NPT, Iran, Israel, RevCon (all tags)

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing: The Role of Strategic Arms Control in a Post-Cold War World (The New START Treaty)
May 25, 2010

On Tuesday May 25, Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START Treaty, unequivocally recommending the treaty’s ratification.

Secretary Kissinger is experienced in the field of arms control and nuclear security—he is author of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, he negotiated the first agreement to limit U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons through the SALT I accord, and in 2007 he became one of the most well known figures to endorse the goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons...

Read more

Nuclear weapons, START, Senate, Missile Defense (all tags)

Center Chairman General Gard has written an op-ed on the support of military leadership for the President’s nuclear weapons agenda published today by the McClatchy-Tribune news service. The article, GOP critics vs. the Pentagon, appeared in Lexington, Kentucky in the Lexington Herald-Leader

Read more

New START, Nuclear weapons, Obama Administration, Senate, Conservative High Jinks (all tags)