My Blog Posts

• Sanctions Deja Vu?
  08/02/2010 09:43:13 AM EST
  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on July 21 a series of measures to increase Washington’s ability to “prevent North Korea's proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions.”  She added, “We will implement new country-specific sanctions aimed at North Korea's sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities.”  Although the U.S is already committed to implementing exactly these sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, Ms. Clinton explained that they will now be more strictly imposed in response to steps North Korean entities have taken to adapt to the existing sanctions.   In addition to bolstering current sanctions, Washington also looks set to freeze a number of bank accounts associated with suspect North Korean companies, although on limited scale. So, is this latest development merely a posturing, the seeds of a major change in North Korean behavior, or likely to start a second Korean war? In answering this question it’s important to look first at the context in which the U.S announcement was made.  March 26 saw the sinking of the Cheonan, on May 26  South Korea released its alleged evidence of North Korean culpability and ever since, U.S rhetoric has continued to condemn Pyongyang’s behavior while also warning of inevitable consequences.  Unfortunately for Washington though, ‘consequences’ did not arise for North   Korea when the Cheonan incident was finally raised at the United Nations Security Council in early July.  While the UNSC statement condemned the sinking of the ROK navy corvette and expressed “deep concern” over South Korea’s investigative report, the carefully worded text excluded any actual reference to the DPRK.  Consequently it came as no surprise that North Korea considered the UNSC statement a “diplomatic victory,” enabling it to elude any formal punishment at the Security Council.  This was of course due to China’s reticence on the issue, which derives from the fact that Beijing was unwilling to call out its communist neighbor by name (just as the U.S is rarely willing to do so with Israel)....
• Long-Term North Korea Strategy is Missing
  07/15/2010 11:36:39 AM EST
  The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday.  Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved. Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States.  Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame.  Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats.   He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”.....
• All Talk?
  06/08/2010 01:38:03 PM EST
  After South   Korea released its international report on the sinking of the Cheonan detailing North Korean responsibility for the incident, tensions rose on the Korean peninsula to levels not seen in recent years.  With South Korea promising a ‘stern response’ to the attack and North   Korea promising retaliation that could include a ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, it looked like there was real potential for escalation.  Now, nearly three weeks on, both South and North Korea appear to be u-turning on a number of the threats they issued. Which begs the question: were the threats just all talk, as we have seen in the past, or were tensions so high (as I explained here) that both sides deemed that they had no choice but to urgently take de-escalatory steps? Reports initially suggested that South Korea would seek sanctions at the U.N Security Council as part of its promised ‘stern response’ to the sinking of the Cheonan. But Pyongyang threatened to respond to any action at the Security Council using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style.’  Nearly three weeks later, Seoul has finally referred the case to the Security Council and naturally, North Korea has responded again with strong rhetoric – even implying the possibility of more missile / nuclear tests.  But instead of sanctions, South Korea now seems to be looking to send a ‘political, symbolic and moral message’ at the Security Council.  North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric may have contributed to this change in approach, but it also seems that uncertainty over Russia and China’s position curtailed South Korea’s desire to try and get sanctions through the UN.
• response
  05/27/2010 01:46:47 PM EST
  attached to Dangerous Developments in the Koreas
• Dangerous Developments in the Koreas
  05/26/2010 04:57:59 PM EST
  The international team investigating the sinking of the Cheonan released its report last week, alleging North Korean responsibility for the attack.  With the outcome of the investigation widely accepted by the international community, condemnation of Pyongyang has been nearly universal.  As I explained in last week’s analysis, both South Korea and its allies have few avenues to reprimand the DPRK.  Nonetheless, talk of U.N sanctions and the resumption of South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign has infuriated Pyongyang, which has  threatened to retaliate with ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style’.  While this isn’t the first time North Korea has threatened to respond with war or even use nuclear weapons, its release in the context of the Cheonan incident must not be dismissed lightly – especially given signs that Kim Jong Il has instructed the DPRK military to get ready for combat. Given the current uncertainties surrounding succession, Kim Jong-Il will not want to look weak to the DPRK military – the group holding the most significant power broker in North Korea.  By not following through on at least some of the type of actions detailed in North Korea’s warnings, Kim could risk being seen as ineffectual – potentially causing problems for the planned succession to his son Kim Jong-Eun.  Kim’s leadership over the coming days and weeks will thus be informed by this context.  Similarly, Lee Myung Bak has stressed that South Korea ‘will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence’.  He too will be under pressure to show strong leadership, especially in advance of the June 2, 2010 local elections in South Korea.  In this context, it seems there are several potential flashpoints that could lead to escalation.