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Sanctions Deja Vu?
Tad Farrell | Aug 02, 2010 |Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on July 21 a series of measures to increase Washington’s ability to “prevent North Korea's proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions.” She added, “We will implement new country-specific sanctions aimed at North Korea's sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities.” Although the U.S is already committed to implementing exactly these sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, Ms. Clinton explained that they will now be more strictly imposed in response to steps North Korean entities have taken to adapt to the existing sanctions. In addition to bolstering current sanctions, Washington also looks set to freeze a number of bank accounts associated with suspect North Korean companies, although on limited scale. So, is this latest development merely a posturing, the seeds of a major change in North Korean behavior, or likely to start a second Korean war?
In answering this question it’s important to look first at the context in which the U.S announcement was made. March 26 saw the sinking of the Cheonan, on May 26 South Korea released its alleged evidence of North Korean culpability and ever since, U.S rhetoric has continued to condemn Pyongyang’s behavior while also warning of inevitable consequences. Unfortunately for Washington though, ‘consequences’ did not arise for North Korea when the Cheonan incident was finally raised at the United Nations Security Council in early July. While the UNSC statement condemned the sinking of the ROK navy corvette and expressed “deep concern” over South Korea’s investigative report, the carefully worded text excluded any actual reference to the DPRK. Consequently it came as no surprise that North Korea considered the UNSC statement a “diplomatic victory,” enabling it to elude any formal punishment at the Security Council. This was of course due to China’s reticence on the issue, which derives from the fact that Beijing was unwilling to call out its communist neighbor by name (just as the U.S is rarely willing to do so with Israel)....
Long-Term North Korea Strategy is Missing
Tad Farrell | Jul 15, 2010 |The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday. Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved.
Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States. Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame. Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats. He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”.....
All Talk?
Tad Farrell | Jun 08, 2010 |After South Korea released its international report on the sinking of the Cheonan detailing North Korean responsibility for the incident, tensions rose on the Korean peninsula to levels not seen in recent years. With South Korea promising a ‘stern response’ to the attack and North Korea promising retaliation that could include a ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, it looked like there was real potential for escalation. Now, nearly three weeks on, both South and North Korea appear to be u-turning on a number of the threats they issued. Which begs the question: were the threats just all talk, as we have seen in the past, or were tensions so high (as I explained here) that both sides deemed that they had no choice but to urgently take de-escalatory steps?
Reports initially suggested that South Korea would seek sanctions at the U.N Security Council as part of its promised ‘stern response’ to the sinking of the Cheonan. But Pyongyang threatened to respond to any action at the Security Council using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style.’ Nearly three weeks later, Seoul has finally referred the case to the Security Council and naturally, North Korea has responded again with strong rhetoric – even implying the possibility of more missile / nuclear tests. But instead of sanctions, South Korea now seems to be looking to send a ‘political, symbolic and moral message’ at the Security Council. North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric may have contributed to this change in approach, but it also seems that uncertainty over Russia and China’s position curtailed South Korea’s desire to try and get sanctions through the UN.
Dangerous Developments in the Koreas
Tad Farrell | May 26, 2010 |The international team investigating the sinking of the Cheonan released its report last week, alleging North Korean responsibility for the attack. With the outcome of the investigation widely accepted by the international community, condemnation of Pyongyang has been nearly universal. As I explained in last week’s analysis, both South Korea and its allies have few avenues to reprimand the DPRK. Nonetheless, talk of U.N sanctions and the resumption of South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign has infuriated Pyongyang, which has threatened to retaliate with ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style’. While this isn’t the first time North Korea has threatened to respond with war or even use nuclear weapons, its release in the context of the Cheonan incident must not be dismissed lightly – especially given signs that Kim Jong Il has instructed the DPRK military to get ready for combat.
Given the current uncertainties surrounding succession, Kim Jong-Il will not want to look weak to the DPRK military – the group holding the most significant power broker in North Korea. By not following through on at least some of the type of actions detailed in North Korea’s warnings, Kim could risk being seen as ineffectual – potentially causing problems for the planned succession to his son Kim Jong-Eun. Kim’s leadership over the coming days and weeks will thus be informed by this context. Similarly, Lee Myung Bak has stressed that South Korea ‘will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence’. He too will be under pressure to show strong leadership, especially in advance of the June 2, 2010 local elections in South Korea. In this context, it seems there are several potential flashpoints that could lead to escalation.
6 Party Talks and the sinking of The Cheonan
Tad Farrell | May 18, 2010 |Kim Jong Il’s declaration last week that he was willing to ‘provide favorable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks’ marked a positive change in tone from North Korea’s previous insistence on a peace treaty with the U.S. as a precondition to resuming negotiations. However, the pledge comes just six weeks after the deadly sinking of a South Korean navy vessel, the Cheonan - a catastrophe that Seoul appears set to formally accuse North Korea this week of.
While it’s unclear if the torpedo rumored to have sunk the Cheonan was actually launched by the order of Kim Jong Il, both the U.S and South Korea have made it clear that there will be no resumption of nuclear talks until the case is resolved. And until a response is decided upon and implemented, engagement of any sort will remain out of the question.
While North Korea denied attacking the Cheonan, sources within both the U.S and South Korean Governments have continued to insinuate that Pyongyang is to blame. Suggestions that a key KPA General was promoted at the time of the sinking, and that a rumor of responsibility has been ‘proudly’ circulating North Korea, further call into question Pyongyang’s assertion of innocence. Other indicators of North Korean culpability include the fact that the ship sunk so close to the disputed Northern Limit Line and the traces of the powerful explosive ‘RDX’ recently identified at the scene. Despite all this, there has still been no official confirmation of what seems to be crystal clear – a North Korean torpedo sunk the Cheonan…
Iran and North Korea - Growing Connections
Tad Farrell | May 07, 2010 |News has surfaced that Iran has invited Kim Jong-Il to Tehran in order to ‘to further economic ties’. The invitation comes amid a flurry of recent diplomatic contact between the two states. Two weeks ago, an Iranian delegation led by Vice-Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi met with Kim Yong Nam, de facto head of the North Korean state, to hold talks regarding ‘bilateral political, economic and cultural relations’ and ‘international and regional issues’. Last week Iran’s ‘Press TV’ subsequently reported that Kim Yong Nam will visit Iran this summer to launch a ‘scientific and cultural exchange program’ between the two countries.
Even if suggestions that Kim Jong-Il has an aversion to flight are true (thus rendering the idea of him visiting Tehran unfeasible), that the invitation was sent is in and of itself significant. Indeed, it marks the greatest diplomatic contact between the two countries since their recognition of one another diplomatically in 1979. Given their shared history of missile collaboration, however, these closer ties raise some disconcerting questions…







