AQ Khan

The Washington Post revealed yesterday accusations and alleged evidence of North Korean bribes for nuclear “know-how” in an article that if true, will prove extremely damning for Pyongyang, Islamabad, and Washington.  Any iota of faith left in North Korea’s desire to ever denuclearize would disappear among any of the remaining believers, for it would confirm that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium path to nuclear weapons simultaneous to the steps it was taking towards denuclearization in the late 1990s.  The reputation of Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat (also ex-U.S. Ambassador and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Commissioner) would be in tatters, raising serious questions in Washington about nuclear security in a country increasingly plagued by terrorism.

In essence, The Post’s story suggests that Abdul Qadeer Khan personally handed over North Korean money to a Pakistani general in 1998 in exchange for nuclear know-how.  To corroborate, Khan provided The Posts’ source (Simon Henderson) with a letter he allegedly received from North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary, Jon Bong-ho, which detailed payments of cash and jewelry intended for two Pakistani generals.  Henderson received the backstory and letter “in the years after  [Khan’s] 2004 arrest by Pakistani authorities”, deciding to pass them onto The Post in 2011 “because he lacked the resources to authenticate it himself”.  But despite The Posts best efforts, the articles author R. Jeffrey Smith admits he was unable to confirm the allegations, instead providing argument and counter-argument from U.S. and Pakistan officials respectively.  Given the serious allegations contained in the article and the potential ramifications if proved true, it is important to look closer at both source and evidence before making any hasty conclusions.

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north korea, dprk, kcna, pyongyang (all tags)

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 182 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation benefits of the CTBT, it should come as no surprise that state parties to the NPT reaffirmed the vital importance of the treaty’s entry into force at the recent May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. But after fourteen years, how much longer will the world have to wait?

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CTBT, Nukes on a Blog, UN, nuclear weapons testing (all tags)

A panel of experts on Monday discussed the utility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, in East Asia in the wake of a nuclear North Korea. The experts agreed that the U.S. policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has been effective symbolically.  

Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
-    to protect and reassure allies;
-    to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
-    to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;  
-    to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

Russia hopes to start the reactor in just days

Following news that Russia is to start powering up Iran’s Bushehr nuclear facility on August 21, John Bolton suggested that Israel subsequently has just days left to attack it.  This is because once Bushehr goes online, any attack would “almost certainly release radiation into the atmosphere,” implying that Israel will “most unlikely … act militarily after fuel rods are loaded.”   Both Bolton and the people at Heritage are worried that Russia’s assistance in bringing the plant online will “represent a major step forward for Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations”, giving the country a “second route to nuclear weapons.”

Bolton concedes that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains unlikely, but pointed out that if Israel was “going to do anything, they certainly wouldn't be talking about it” – just like before the bombing of Iraqi and Syrian reactors in 1981 and 2007 respectively.  However, given the resurgence in speculation on the probability of an Israeli attack, the hawkish nature of Netanyahu’s coalition government, and now even Saudi Arabian media outlets advocating military action, might there be a chance that officials in Jerusalem believe attacking Bushehr is essential?

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Iran Watch, iran nuclear, Bushehr, israel (all tags)

Will Pyongyang's famous propaganda ever become reality?

Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks.  On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.”  Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S.   Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.”   This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show "what a real war is like" if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.

The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise.  As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades.  I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan.  Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency allegedly reported Wednesday that Tehran has acquired “four S-300 surface-to-air missile systems”.  Iran apparently acquired two “S-300 from Belarus and two others from another unspecified source”, with Fars adding, "Iran possesses four S-300 PT missiles.”  The news comes following June reports that suggested the seemingly never-ending saga between Russia and Iran over the sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system had finally come to a close - as a result of a recent tightening of UN sanctions.

As explained before, if Iran really did acquire the much touted S-300 PMU-1, it would make an air attack of its controversial nuclear program a lot harder.  However, from looking at the Fars report in more detail and the context in which it was released, it seems that there are a number of issues which cast doubt on the credibility of the notion Iran has acquired a robust S-300 air defense system from Belarus.

In terms of the detail of the report, there is firstly no elaboration on what is meant with regards to the "four S-300 surface-to-air missile systems".  Indeed, does the wording refer to launchers or batteries?   One battery of S-300 PMU1’s, the system that Iran was trying to buy from Russia, consists of up to 12 semi-trailer erector-launchers (TEL) which mount four tubular missile container-launchers and a launcher complex of several other components, detailed photographically here.  Should this report merely infer that Iran has acquired four launchers, then there is little for any would-be aerial attacker to worry about.  Indeed, even with a launcher complex, four TELs would only ever be able to provide a highly limited air defense....

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Iran, S-300, missiles, Security Matters, Iran Watch (all tags)

It was reported at the end of last month that China successfully shot down one of its redundant satellites in January.    Allegedly, the firing took place at nearly the same time as a successful Chinese missile interception test conducted on January 11.   Given the reaction to its 2007 launch, some observers have suggested that the recent launch may have been ordered as a means for Beijing to vent displeasure over recent Taiwanese efforts to buy the Patriot missile defense system from the U.S.  However, others claim that the time needed to prepare for such a launch makes this notion unlikely.  Either way, the news is further evidence of continuing Chinese efforts to boost their space based military capabilities, and given the outcry following the last test, has probably not been met with cheers from countries possessing satellite capabilities.

In context of this news, Beijing’s official position on space might come as a surprise to some:

“The Chinese government has all along regarded the space industry as an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy, and upheld that the exploration and utilization of outer space should be for peaceful purposes and benefit the whole of mankind.”

China’s official position is probably guided by the concerns over the prospect of space based missile defense systems which might one day render its relatively few numbers of ICBMs useless.  However, just as in 2007, China risks losing legitimacy in this regard when it destroys its own satellites....

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China, satellite, Security Matters (all tags)

Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung - 1994

Last week the Council on Foreign Relations released a Task Force report suggesting that the current U.S policy of ‘strategic patience’ offers a ‘time time frame for achieving denuclearization…so vague that there is a significant risk that [it] will result in acquiescence to North   Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli.’ Echoing a frustration shared by many Korea watchers, the report describes the current administration’s efforts toward the objective of denuclearization in North Korea as ‘halfhearted’.  It warns that Washington must up its game and deal with the policy challenges presented by North Korea, ranked according to their fundamental importance: 1) preventing DPRK nuclear proliferation to others; 2) rolling back the nuclear program; and 3) integrating the isolated nation into the international community.

In order to deal with these issues the Task Force first identifies and reviews four policy options for the current administration: (1) explicitly recognizing and acquiescing to a nuclear North Korea; (2) containing and managing the problem; (3) attempting to roll back the program and; (4) pursuing regime change.  The report suggests that while the current policy of ‘strategic patience’ is most similar to option 2, it is now time to pursue this in combination with option 3, including ‘a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs’.

While many will welcome the timeliness of the report and its rightful critique of current policy, it is not clear how the proposed combination of policy options 2 and 3 can offer Washington any new leverage over Pyongyang…

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Nukes on a Blog, North Korea, Engagement, nuclear (all tags)

End of this badge manufacturers line?

As anticipated by many, it was reported this weekend that Russia has decided to cancel its controversial sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system to Iran.  According to Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov, the cancelation was a result of the restrictive measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1929 –though its not clear if the Resolution would actually prohibit the sale. The news marks the apparent end of a years long saga in which Russia ostensibly delayed delivery on a number of occasions due to ‘technical reasons’ – but perhaps more realistically as a result of pressure from Israel and the U.S.   As a result, this news represents an Israeli and U.S diplomatic success and illustrates a possibly increasing distance between the once close Iran and Russia…

The S-300 PMU-1 is one of the most advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the world, capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously up to 90 km away. Given the capabilities of the system, it was always easy to see why countries like Israel and the U.S were opposed to the sale.  Indeed, by installing S-300 missile batteries close to its nuclear facilities, Iran could have made it a lot harder for an enemy to successfully destroy its nuclear program from the air.  Naturally, this would not be in the interests of either Israel or the U.S in the event that they felt they had to use military force...

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Iran, S-300, Security Matters, Russia, sanctions, Iran Watch (all tags)

Trident D-5

During the recent UK election campaign Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg made his opposition to like-for-like Trident replacement plans clear, mainly on the basis of the high costs and record breaking budget deficit.   Forming a key element of the newly elected Coalition Government with Conservative David Cameron, Clegg is now in an excellent position to highlight other problems associated with Trident modernization plans before they are irreversibly acted on.

One problem not highlighted in the leadership campaign is the ‘dependence’ of the Trident system on the support of the US.   Indeed, having presented Trident modernization in the 2006 White Paper as meeting the requirement of a ‘UK nuclear force [that] remains fully operationally independent’, suggestions that it is anything short of this call into question the very rationale for renewing it on this basis.

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Nukes on a Blog, trident, submarines, modernization, d-5 (all tags)