My Blog Posts

• USAF Chief: New START Won’t Require Cuts to Bomber Fleet
  03/08/2010 05:29:31 PM EST
  Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad. In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.” Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:

  THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?

  When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:

  THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?

  MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.

  Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:

  MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.

  Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:

  SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.

  THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?

  SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.

  Well said, General.
• Inhofe Issues Two Ratification Threats in 250 Words
  03/08/2010 01:51:28 PM EST
  Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.” Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted. Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support. In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:

  The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.

• I think so
  03/05/2010 06:58:20 PM EST
  attached to Can DOD Measure the Resource Allocation for its Strategic Missions?
• Can DOD Measure the Resource Allocation for its Strategic Missions?
  03/05/2010 04:25:22 PM EST
  You may recall the policy debate over Afghanistan from last year:

  Analyst 1: [Counterterrorism] is better. I go on first and clean the [foreign nation].
  Analyst 2: [Counterinsurgency] is better. I leave the [foreign nation] silky and smooth.
  Analyst 1: Oh, really, fool?
  Analyst 2: Really.
  [Fracas ensues…]

  People feel strongly about other policy debates, too. For instance, some people feel that the United States is focusing too much on counterinsurgency. Others feel that nuclear terrorism has been overhyped. Feelings are nice things. I enjoy feelings. But what do we spend?
• Conventional Weakness Propels North Korean Nuke Ambitions
  03/05/2010 11:33:10 AM EST
  It doesn’t take much prodding for me to post Team America or topless fishing pics. As fun as that is, foreign leaders’ quirks are not the reason states seek nuclear weapons. For example, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair shed some light on North Korea’s nuclear motivations during his annual threat assessment testimony last month:

  The [Korea People’s Army] capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

  Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

  I was told by a friend with a background in Asia intelligence that this language about DPRK conventional capabilities was more detailed than what has typically been revealed in open source forums. If that is true, maybe a small U.S. policy shift is on display in this switching DPRK from an axis of evil designee (i.e. Bush) to more of a legitimate security seeker? After all, the United States ought to deal differently with a North Korea possessing justifiable security concerns versus a North Korea that is irreconcilably provocative and dangerous, right? This is pure uninformed speculation on my part, so DPRKers should feel free to chin check me.